Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential Democraciesn Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential Democracies political scientist Mark P. Jones addresses the conditions necessary for the survival of democratic presidential systems, arguing that the electoral laws employed by such systems are intricately linked to the longevity of democracy. Throughout the book Jones's focus is on the most realistic and feasible mechanism for facilitating the proper functioning and survival of democratic presidential systems: electoral law reform. In order to demonstrate the importance of a strong presidential legislative contingent for the successful functioning of democratic presidential government, Jones structures his argument into two parts. He first employs a review of the relevant literature plus a multitiered set of empirical analyses of Latin American presidential systems. Maintaining that certain electoral laws are more compatible with the successful functioning of democratic presidential systems than others, Jones then offers an examination of electoral data and examples from two separate populations: 16 Latin American presidential democracies and 23 Argentine provincial (gubernatorial) systems. Jones uses these data as evidence to support his argument that presidential systems that consistently fail to provide their president with adequate legislative support are inherently unstable and ineffective. |
讀者評論 - 撰寫評論
我們找不到任何評論。
內容
Presidential Legislative Support | 34 |
The Latin American and Argentine | 64 |
Legislative Multipartism and Presidential | 75 |
版權所有 | |
15 個其他區段未顯示
常見字詞
allocate analysis arrangement average bicameral Bolivia Brazil candidate Chamber Chapter Chile Colombia concurrent constitutional contest democracy democratic discussed districts divided government Ecuador effective magnitude electoral formula electoral laws electoral systems employed examined executive executive's exist factors four functioning governor held impact important included influence lack Latin American lead legislative contingent legislative elections legislative majority legislative multipartism legislature less level of legislative level of multipartism lower/single house majority or near-majority majority runoff formula mandate measure method midterm national systems nonconcurrent occurred parliamentary partial particularly Partido percentage period Peru plurality plurality formula political parties popular population present president presidential and legislative presidential election presidential legislative presidential systems principal received relationship representation represents round rules seats Senate Shugart significant similar strong Table tend term tion United utilize variable Venezuela vote