knowledge, and that it contains a priori the condition on which we know anything by experience. A criticism of reason naturally led to a criticism of the conclusions of reason, or rather it included them. Prominent among these were the proofs of the Being of God, in the Cartesian and Leibnitzian philosophies, the 'ontological,' the 'cosmological,' and peculiarly in the original philosophy of Locke, the physico-theological.' The two first, Kant showed to be only subjectively valid, we having no means of applying to them the test of experience necessary to give validity to the mental ideas. The last he showed to be imperfect, as from design we cannot argue the existence of any being greater than a designer. The argument proves a world maker, but not a Creator; a framer, but not a maker of matter.

The idea of God, which Des Cartes recognized as in-born in the human mind had been elaborated by a process of dialectics into a demonstration of the existence of God. Kant objected to the conclusion, and yet admitted the fact of the existence of the idea, and while admitting it, endeavoured to determine how far, and in what manner, our reasonings concerning it are justified. In objecting to the idealistic arguments as theoretical demonstrations, he opposed the idealists. In again establishing their practical validity he opposed the sceptics. His guide, however, was not eclecticism, but criticism. His object was not idealistic, nor realistic, but to find exactly what was true in Idealism and in Realism.

The idea of God is in the mind, but His existence is not verified by experience, for it transcends experience. So on the other hand, the idea of the external world is derived through the senses. We have experience, or empirical knowledge of its existence; practically it exists, but as we have no cognition of anything external, by, and in itself, without the mind accompanying the cognition, so in pure reason its exist ence cannot be demonstrated. In the external world we have phenomena. Beyond this, we can demonstrate nothing. True to his principle of a critical investigator Kant wished to stop here, as having reached the furthest boundary of the possibility of human knowledge. Further than this, he was not an idealist, and only thus far is he the founder of Transcendentalism. In the first edition of his Critique of the pure Reason,' he threw out a conjecture that perhaps the reality of phenomena was only the I that contemplates it; that the thinking mind and the thing thought are perhaps one and the same substance. On this conjecture Fichte started the doctrine of the I-hood,

Kant protested that Fichte's doctrine was not his, and to strengthen the protest that he was not responsible for the development of his ardent disciple, he omitted this passage in all subsequent editions of his 'Critique.'

The primitive duality then, of subject and object, was left untouched by Kant. The one he maintained to be the complement of the other, and both were reckoned necessary to make knowledge possible-subject as the form or the principle of our representations, and object as the principle of the matter of these representations. The one being thus necessary to the other, it could not be proved that either of them was a real being. Something real in their internal nature there must be, but what this substratum of phenomena is, what this being is which unites subject and object was not only left by Kant undefined, but even declared to be beyond our knowledge.

FICHTE. It might have been supposed that the critical philosophy of Kant was omnipotent to check all further speculation concerning the nature of that which Is. Had he not fixed the limits of the human mind, and shown the impossibility of any science of the absolutely unconditioned? Had he not shown that it was impossible to demonstrate the truth, either of idealism or materialism; that, in the one case, we had no means of verifying by experience the ideas in the mind, and, in the other, no means of knowing the existence of objects independent of the mind always present in the cognition of them. Philosophy seemed to have spoken its last word. Materialism and idealism had been fairly weighed, and the truth in each impartially acknowledged. But,' said Fichte on the side of idealism,' is not our knowledge of the subject greatly more than that of the object, and moreover, prior to it? We know that we have an internal world, and only through the medium of it do we know that there is an external world. The existence of my 1, my consciousness, is a primary fact. The existence of anything external is only seen in the mirror of this I. Its existence therefore, is dependent, and may be only apparent. The subject is the manifest reality; the primitive ground of knowledge; the true foundation of philosophy.

On this consciousness Fichte based his philosophy, and from the given existence of the I it received its first form. We think, is our most certain knowledge. What it is which thinks need not concern us. Of its essence we know as little as we do of the substance of the world. Indeed we may not be justified in concluding that such an essence exists. We need not suppose its

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existence, it is enough to take by itself the simple fact of consciousness. This is only cognised by us as an activity. It is the act of forming and. representing internal images. We must, however, distinguish between the act and the image-the one is the acting process, the other the process by which it acts. In this way the I creates itself. By thus acting it becomes actually what it is potentially. It renders itself self-conscious. And in this act of the I we have a duality, itself and the object it evokes. The I, in positing its own existence, posits also that of the nonI. These two principles stand in the consciousness opposed to each other-the one limiting and determining the other, for what the I is, the non-I is not, and what the non-I is, the I is not. But the I in determining itself to a representation does so with the consciousness that the representation is only a modification of itself; so that the I and the non-I are again united in one and the same consciousness. The formula is Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis.

Jacobi called this philosophy an inverted Spinozism. In place of the absolute substance Fichte substituted the 1. He thought by this to avoid Spinoza's theology, but the endeavour was vain. He had ultimately to go beyond the 1, for in no other way could he reach the Infinite. The finite consciousness disappeared in the infinite consciousness. The I found nothing but its own reflex. It sought a God, but it only found itself—the I answering to the 1. Freed from the limits which it produces for itself, our I is the Infinite I of the universe; that in which all finite I's lose their existence, and in which are embraced as its representation all the varied phenomena of the external world. There is originally and essentially but one consciousness, that of the absolutely Infinite I. Every effort to represent this I as conceivable by the human intellect was rejected by Fichte as anthropomorphism. The supposition of a personal God was a mere transference of human limits and imperfections to the Divine Being; and when we ascribe to Him such attributes as consciousness, or extra-mundane existence, we only make Him finite, for these qualities necessarily include the idea of substance extended in time and space.

God is not substance. The attributes ascribed to Him by Spinoza are liable to the same objections as were made to the common anthropomorphism. If they do not make God man, they yet limit Him. They make Him corporeal, and substitute a substratum of the universe for the Divine Activity. Nor do we escape this result by calling God a Spirit. What is spirit?

S

A mere negation of body, a term which as a positive definition of God, is wholly useless unless by a deception of the mind we ascribe to spirit some of the qualities which constitute a body. For the same reason that we deny to God consciousness, personality, and substantiality, we also deny Him reality; all reality being to us only finite. God cannot be adequately conceived, defined, or represented; for conceptions, definitions, and representations are only applicable to things limited and determined. 'If,' says Fichte we call God a consciousness, it follows that we apply to Him the limits of the human consciousness, if we get rid of this limit of thought, then there remains to us a knowledge which is quite incomprehensible, and this might well be ascribed to God, who, so to speak, is in this sense pure consciousness, intelligence, spiritual life, and activity, save only that we could form no notion of such attributes, and on that account would rather abstain from the approximate definition, and that, too, out of strict regard to philosophical accuracy, for every conception of the Deity would be an idol.'

We

God is the infinite I, clearly incomprehensible. The finite I is known only as an activity, and so likewise only as an Activity do we know God. We are constituted in a moral order. As finite I's we have duties and destinies. By fulfilling these we realize our place in the moral order of the universe. And this order is the highest idea of God to which we can attain. need no other God, we can comprehend no other. Only by this Moral Order living and working in us do we perceive anything divine. God is not a being or an existence, but a pure Activity -the life and soul of a transcendent world order, just as every personal I or finite intelligence is no being, but a pure activity in conformity with duty, as a member of that transcendent world order.

This form the form of morality-is the second phase of the development of Fichte's philosophy. It incurred, as we might have expected, the charge of Atheism. Jacobi said it was the 'worship of mere universality, and even Schelling said that it swallowed up all religion.' Fichte defended himself, and in his later works so explained his meaning as to leave no doubt of his firm faith in God. Jäsche says 'The idealist's religious faith in a moral order of the world is now raised to a higher standpoint; to the realistic religious faith in a living and independent intelligent principle of the world order; and for the proud selffeeling of absolute freedom, we now have humility and submission to an Absolute Will.' These later writings were

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addressed to popular audiences. A mystical faith had taken the place of metaphysical reasonings. Man reaches the knowledge of God in pure thought, which is the eye of the soul. By this he perceives God, for what is pure thought but the Divine Existence? Of the mode of God's being we know nothing, nor do we need to know. 'We cannot pierce the inaccessible light in which He dwells, but through the shadows which veil His presence there flows an endless stream of life, and love, and beauty. He is the Fountain of our life, the Home of our spirits, the One Being, the I am, for whom reason has no idea, and language has no name.' In conscious union with the Infinite, addressing Him as a 'Sublime and Living Will,' Fichte exclaims 'I may well raise my soul to Thee, for Thou and I are not divided. Thy voice sounds within me, mine sounds in Thee, and all my thoughts, if they are but good and true, are in Thee also. In Thee the incomprehensible, I myself and the world in which I live, become comprehensible to me. All the secrets of my existence are laid open, and perfect harmony arises in my soul. I hide my face before Thee, and lay my hand upon my mouth. How thou art and seemest to Thine own Being I can never know, any more than I can assume Thy nature. After thousands upon thousands of spirit lives I shall comprehend Thee as little as I now do in this house of clay. Thou knowest, and willest, and workest, omnipresent to finite reason, but as I now, and always must conceive of being, Thou art not.'

God knows, wills, and works, He is something more than a principle, just as He is something more than a person. Yet our highest conception of Him is as a principle, as the world order; and our most convincing proof of His existence is in the realization of our place in this order. Then we become conscious of our oneness with Him. We cannot become God, but when we annihilate ourselves to the very root, God alone remains, and is all in all. We speak of our existence as something distinct from God's, but ours is only the negation of existence. Apart from the Being of God our being is a mere semblance, which has assumed the form and appearance of being. That, alone, is reality, which is good and true. Our highest conception of being is identical with our highest conception of good-a principle of right. What then is blessedness, but to seek this true life? The eternal is in us and around us on every side. Would we realize this presence; would we feel that this eternal Being is our being, then must we forsake the transitory and apparent, and cling with an unfailing love to the unchangeably true, and