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accounted for before we go farther. An element of an idea, an idea or a series of ideas may occupy consciousness to the exclusion of others. If the second starting-point were not given, the associations would undoubtedly follow the given one. Inhibition must then be one form of "obstructed association," the inhibiting ideas being present to the exclusion of the inhibited. But are we thus forced to say inhibition is the "negative side of the association process," claiming that all ideas not in consciousness are inhibited, and thus being forced to conclude the conscious idea is inhibiting an unconscious idea, which cannot exist (by the very definition and presuppositions of psychology) until it is an object of consciousness. This would mean that content of consciousness and inhibition are identical. On the other hand, the notes and exemplifying facts of the tables show Dr. Breese's fallacious position when he concludes that "because, obeying the laws of association, the train of ideas takes one direction rather than another can hardly be considered sufficient ground to hold that the other possible train of ideas is inhibited." He has overlooked the possibility of two or more trains of associations having been started and the associations of one starting-point are excluded from entering the focus of consciousness by the direction of the given series. Inhibition would then be the negative side of fusion. The explanation must, as has already been demonstrated, be psycho-physical in character. If these impulses to action have actually been observed by the subjects we are justified in concluding that just as in physiological inhibition one action excludes another, so the correlative tendencies to movement of one idea exclude others.

1

By. observed that the image of the starting-point lingered and inhibited subsequent ideas. The implication here, from our previous reasoning, would be that not the ideational images, as such, but the physiological motor concomitants, persisted and excluded others, and this is why disparate terms give a "shock to the nervous system" (A.),

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require different lines of expression" (A.); and "one has more momentum," as so many report. This would explain why the associations of a new starting-point inhibit the associations of a former one; for as the motor nervous impulses tend to work themselves out into action, the reaction of the previous impulse will be suppressed by those of a new impulse which enters, by the conditions of these experiments, an attentive consciousness. Thus the prepotent impulses to action are the conditioning factors in mental inhibition.

All this indicates that the basis of habit which has been the universal principle of explanation of associations is inadequate. As

1 Breese, B. B.: On Inhibition, Psy. Rev. Monograph, vol. 3, p. 15.

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e we go farther. An element of an idea, an y occupy consciousness to the exclusion g-point were not given, the associations w given one. Inhibition must then be one fr ion," the inhibiting ideas being present the ed. But are we thus forced to say inhibition association process," claiming that all ideas: nhibited, and thus being forced to conche ibiting an unconscious idea, which cannot and presuppositions of psychology) un ess. This would mean that content of cons identical. On the other hand, the not e tables show Dr. Breese's fallacious posi "because, obeying the laws of association direction rather than another can hardly und to hold that the other possible tr has overlooked the possibility of two or ing been started and the associations of ed from entering the focus of conscious en series. Inhibition would then be the planation must, as has already been demo 1 in character. If these impulses to ac 1 by the subjects we are justified in condir! ical inhibition one action excludes ante s to movement of one idea exclude others ge of the starting-point lingered and i The implication here, from our previo t the ideational images, as such, but the ants, persisted and excluded others and ve a "shock to the nervous system" ession" (A.); and "one has more mo his would explain why the associations it the associations of a former one, fr es tend to work themselves out into evious impulse will be suppressed by enters, by the conditions of these er usness. Thus the prepotent impuls actors in mental inhibition. Dasis of habit which has been the n of associations is inadequate. As

Psy. Rev. Monograph, vol. 3, P. 15.

Münsterberg has pointed out, contrary to wha either idea may bring to consciousness the other, i ent of the order of the original presentation. thesis to include the formation of associations be that in order for two ideas to become asso together in consciousness, each as parts of a total attitude; the motor reactions of the idea more comprehensive reaction which includes correlated motor impulses: when, in future time one are reëxperienced, there is a sequence of i complex impulses to movement, and any ter reaction tends to reproduce the whole of which reaction is more or less bound up in the integri tral nervous system.

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THE purpose of this investigation, of which the following gives a preliminary report, was to compare the tendency to associate by contiguity, with the tendency to associate by similarity.

In every series of stimuli to which one gives attention there is tendency to association by contiguity. But some similarity among certain elements of the series may produce a dissociation of the given elements into two series with some bond of similarity in each. This is a matter of common experience, as when as when you find you can read your newspaper and listen to your neighbors' conversation at the same time, understanding both, although the actual order in which the several words are perceived would form a meaningless mixture.

We may say dissociation is always accomplished by a tendency to association by similarity overcoming the constant tendency to association by contiguity. Study of the relative efficacy of the two may therefore be called a study of dissociation. The tendency to associate by contiguity might be measured in two ways.

First, when one attempts to learn a series in exactly the given order, the number of errors in the series as recollected may be taken as an inverse indication of the strength of association by contiguity. The three kinds of error possible in nearly all of the experiments were Omissions, Displacements, and Imperfections. All of these three have been tabulated. But the number of elements omitted seems considerably the most reliable as an indication of the degree of inadequacy of the associative tendency. The cases of displaced or imperfect elements are comparatively few: moreover, Displacements and Imperfections are not mutually exclusive categories. A single element may be both imperfectly recollected and wrongly placed in the recollected series. On the whole, it seems that the number of given elements which were omitted in the recalled series is the most positive and reliable of the errors. Our conclusions are based on the Omis

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Tendency to association by similarity can evidently be measured in the same two ways, by counting errors when one purposes to learn the series as two groups of similar elements, and by counting sequences of similar elements when one avoids any effort to learn the series and recollection is spontaneous.

In the first seven experiments we used the first method. The errors made when the purpose is to associate by contiguity can then be compared with the errors made when the purpose is to associate by similarity, an equal number of series, given under the same conditions, and of identical character, being given in each case.

In the last four experiments we have used the second method. The number of sequences of elements given contiguously can then be compared with the number of sequences of similar elements.

Five subjects have coöperated in this, but the experiments were strictly individual, one observer being alone in the room with the experimenter. Each test lasted about an hour. As a matter of course, the results have been calculated for each of the five subjects and their agreements and disagreements have been carefully considered. But as this first report is to indicate merely the general tendency, we give here at first only the average of the five persons.

The experiments have varied as to the kind of elements used, the manner of presentation, the time allowed, and the manner of recording the recollected series. But throughout each experiment the series were of one identical type, while the individual elements were altered in each series.

In the experiments where the series were to be learned, some in the given order, some dissociated by similarity, it was found rather confusing to turn from one method to the other; so several consecutive series were learned by one method, and then several by the other, four alternations being made each hour to neutralize any effect of practice or of fatigue.

The series were of course different in kind in the several experiments, but were usually of eight or of ten elements. Half of this number had some distinct characteristic in common, the other half some other characteristic. In some experiments these elements were alternated, in some arranged irregularly.

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