Value and Justification: The Foundations of Liberal TheoryCambridge University Press, 1990年7月27日 - 540 頁 This important new book takes as its points of departure two questions: What is the nature of valuing? and What morality can be justified in a society that deeply disagrees on what is truly valuable? In Part One, the author develops a theory of value that attempts to reconcile reason with passions. Part Two explores how this theory of value grounds our commitment to moral action. The author argues that rational moral action can neither be seen as a way of simply maximising one's own values, nor derived from reason independent of one's values. Rather, our commitment to the moral point of view is presupposed by our value systems. The book concludes with a defense of liberal political morality. |
內容
THE NATURE OF THE THEORIES | 1 |
12 Theories of concepts | 4 |
13 Grounds for accepting the theory | 10 |
Moral justification | 13 |
22 Public justification | 15 |
23 Contractualism | 18 |
24 Remarks on the task of moral theory | 19 |
A THEORY OF VALUE | 23 |
VALUE AND MORAL REASONS | 253 |
162 Simple Rationalism | 261 |
Valuegrounded rationalism i | 269 |
172 Solipsism and egocentristn | 275 |
173 Minimal objectivity | 278 |
174 Psychopathy | 292 |
175 Moral personality habit and reason | 300 |
Valuegrounded rationalism ii | 306 |
EMOTION | 25 |
Two theories of emotion | 26 |
32 The CognitiveArousal Theory | 33 |
33 Three versions of CAT | 34 |
Affects | 41 |
42 Some objections and additional evidence | 45 |
Affects and objects | 49 |
52 The content of emotional states | 51 |
53 Items in the world | 56 |
54 Grounding beliefs | 57 |
Appropriateness conditions | 64 |
62 Emotions and evaluations | 69 |
63 Stronger appropriateness conditions | 74 |
VALUING | 80 |
What valuing presupposes | 81 |
72 Desire presuppositions | 84 |
73 Needs presuppositions | 101 |
Intrinsic valuing | 105 |
82 Affects and attitudes | 112 |
83 Beliefs about goodness | 118 |
84 Unworthy emotions and their objects | 124 |
Extrinsic valuing and rational action | 126 |
92 Purely derivative valuings | 130 |
93 Foundational valuings | 140 |
VALUE JUDGMENTS | 145 |
Simple value judgments | 146 |
102 Externalism and internalism in value theory | 153 |
103 Impersonal value judgments and action | 161 |
104 How value judgments can be criticized | 165 |
105 Extrinsic value judgments | 172 |
Comparative value judgments | 173 |
111 Comparative valuings | 175 |
112 Are there impersonal comparative value judgments? | 185 |
Reasons and objectivity | 190 |
122 Objectivity as decentering | 198 |
VALUES AND VALUE SYSTEMS | 204 |
131 Abstract valuings | 205 |
132 Valuational criteria | 207 |
133 Value orientations | 217 |
Value systems | 219 |
142 The coherence of value systems | 223 |
143 Values goods and plans | 235 |
Conclusion to part I | 241 |
152 The openquestion argument | 244 |
153 Anthropocentrism and the environment | 247 |
A THEORY OF MORAL JUSTIFICATION | 251 |
consistency as a value | 313 |
the gap between belief and action | 315 |
the instrumental interpretation | 316 |
TELEOLOGICAL AND DEONTOLOGICAL JUSTIFICATION | 319 |
192 Public morality and justification | 322 |
193 Contractualism | 328 |
Constrained teleology | 329 |
202 The common good | 334 |
Common good arguments | 336 |
211 Community of valuing | 337 |
212 Harmony | 339 |
213 Compromise | 343 |
214 Proceduralism | 351 |
215 Neutrality and common good arguments | 356 |
Value and deontology | 359 |
222 Deontofagical public justification | 362 |
223 The rational commitment to both forms of justification | 365 |
Two remaining issues | 367 |
232 Moral value | 376 |
THE STATE OF NATURE | 379 |
242 The justification of natural liberty | 381 |
243 Two objections | 386 |
244 On interpreting liberty | 390 |
Paternalism | 396 |
252 Is paternalism always justified? | 399 |
On further describing the state of nature | 404 |
262 Property | 407 |
263 Exchange | 416 |
264 Harm | 420 |
265 Needs | 423 |
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT | 429 |
272 Immoral proposals | 431 |
273 The state of nature as a baseline | 437 |
Ideology and compromise | 439 |
282 The contractual argument in onedimensional political space | 443 |
283 The Ndimensional contractual argument | 457 |
284 Equal liberty and antiliberal ideologies | 466 |
285 Distributive justice | 470 |
Concluding remarks | 476 |
292 The limits of justification | 478 |
293 Morality and value in a liberal society | 480 |
IZARDS DES CATEGORIES AND SOME RELIABILITY STATISTICS | 484 |
DESERT AND VALUE | 485 |
BIBLIOGRAPHY | 490 |
| 517 | |
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