much originality of genius. "Religion in Common Life" is a good, plain, practical discourse, possessing nothing original in design or execution, but pervaded by much sound sense, and written throughout with a homely eloquence. Occasionally we have touches of his peculiar power of happy illustration from the objects or incidents of ordinary life, and the strength and reality with which some shadowy idea is brought before us, enables us to trace the lines of the master's pencil; still we have great doubts whether the hearers of Mr Caird on this occasion, would not have been disposed to dispute his identity in print, and whether the impression produced upon his royal hearers was not fully as much owing to the charms of his manner and well modulated voice, as to any inherent excellence in the composition itself. But we feel it would be ungracious under the circumstances to say any thing farther; and would, in conclusion, only express the wish-a wish in which we are sure many join-that as we have not the happiness of residing in the parish of Errol, Mr Caird will at no distant date, furnish us with some more authentic record of his eloquence than the Penny Pulpit. IS IT PEACE? PEACE is now the question. This now engrosses attention as much as ever the War did. No one can pretend to say which scale will preponderate, for never since the commencement of the contest, has the question of Peace or War been so nicely balanced. In the article for January, we showed that the terms proposed by the Allies were most moderate; and that the Czar had a fine opportunity-an opportunity not likely to occur again, of bringing this war to a speedy conclusion by the unreserved acceptance of these terms. At the same time, the sum of the probabilities then seemed to be as we expressed it :— "On a review of the various grounds, pro and con, we feel disposed to think that Russia will not accede to these terms. But may she not accept them as she did the four points, and agree to meet to deliberate on their interpretation? We should not be surprised if this proposition were made. If Russia will not do more, but agrees to do this, Austria will second her, and endeavour to prevail on the Western Powers to accede to it. She will thus wriggle out of her engagement to assume a menacing attitude, if the conference should end in smoke. What course will the Allies take in this case? We can hardly suppose that they will be again cajoled into any conferences. Let the terms proposed be drawn up, and their interpretation agreed on before Russia receives them. And let these be simply accepted or rejected." The con This is not far from a description of our present position. cluding paragraph is the view which the "Times" took of the matter about ten days ago, that the terms should have been presented in a form requiring a simple acceptance or rejection. At the present moment, we are in the greatest uncertainty, as to what has been accepted; and everything is left to speculation. The least observation must convince any one how entirely the question has been made the subject of speculation and conjecture. The whole has been a series of castle-building and Is it Peace? stock-jobbing. Most difficult is it to extract even anything like proba- war. At the outset, we again repeat that the terms proposed by the Allies are most moderate; and the acceptance of them in their integrity by the Czar, would involve no degradation on his part. Further, if peace is not concluded, with Russia alone will be the responsibility of continuing the The Allies can submit to no diminution of these terms, seeing that they are the lowest, compatible with the attainment of the object of the war. The Czar also, if he weighs the matter, must see that he will never have a better opportunity; and if he rejects them, he distinctly declares that he does not give up his aggressive policy. And this is the real question with which we have to deal-the concession by Russia of her aggressive policy. We propose to consider if Russia is sincere or insincere in the nominal acceptance of the terms of peace. Before, however, discussing these two points of view, the so termed pure and simple acceptance of these propositions by Russia, and the mode of its being brought about demand attention. The Czar at first rejected the terms; and within a few hours after accepts them. We are led to inquire what could have produced so sudden a change, but to this no explicit answer has yet been given. Some influence must have effected this result, but whether it was the influence of circumstances which induced the Czar to take this course, or whether some external pressure was applied, canIt may be that the Czar thought to trifle not be distinctly ascertained. with the Allies, and first declined the terms, and then accepted them when he found the Allies firm, and the day fixed for the final answer approaching. Or perhaps M. Seebach, his father's friend, and now the reputed interpreter of the sentiments of Louis Napoleon, was the cause have of the alteration. Or again, as it is positively asserted, an additional pressure and firmer attitude on the part of Austria and Prussia may accomplished this sudden change. All of these are weighty reasons. The first is not improbable, and seems the simplest mode of accounting for it. The second implies the separate action of the Emperor of the French, so as to make it doubtful. The third, if the true cause, throws suspicion on the past acceptance and the future negotiations. There has been throughout the contest so much appearance of understanding between Russia, Austria, and Prussia, as to give good cause for suspicion, and to demand great caution on the part of the Western Powers. Russia has also asserted that she has yielded to the solicitations of the Powers, evi. All these causes, and many others more imdently meaning these two. portant, and chiefly that which the Czar affects to repudiate-the interests of Russia-have tended to this result. Now that we have an acceptance, what is accepted? The propositions of the Allies pure T and simple, is the reply. If this be the case, Peace follows at once. Not quite so fast. Russia accepts these terms as the basis of negotiations. But there is still a cloud over the acceptance. It is noteworthy that Russia accepts the Austrian proposals; but the Western Powers had another article to which it does not appear that Austria assented. This additional article is not named in Russia's acceptance. It would have been of advantage if this article, or special conditions, had been distinctly proposed to Russia with the others. Before entering into negotiations, these special conditions should be at once submitted for Russia's acceptance, or should be withdrawn. We have now arrived at that stage when we can consider the sincerity or the insincerity of this movement. We are willing, in all charity, to assume the sincerity of the Czar; though presumption is in favor of his insincerity. Upon what grounds is his insincerity to be presumed? The ever active and insidious character of Russian diplomacy, backed by the no less artful policy of the Court of Vienna, would be sufficient. But we are not confined to suspicions founded on general character. A particular instance is conveniently presented to us in the very recent conference of Vienna, where insincerity was manifest, as existing ab initio. The mode in which the present acceptance has been arranged, and the ulterior conduct of Russia, are not calculated to increase confidence in her honesty of purpose. There is sufficient to make the Western Powers cautious lest they be betrayed into any course of proceedings which may serve to weaken not only their preparations, but their efforts and their alliances. The remotest prospect of peace, and especially negotiations with this object, must exert a baneful influence on all the preparations and operations of war. The insincerity of Russia cannot injure her, but rather enables her to gain an advantage over the Allies. With Russia insincere, the consequences to the Western Powers are disastrous in negotiations. The diplomatic skill of our adversaries will be used for the worst purposes of sowing dissension among us, and weakening our alliances. But worst of all, the insincerity of Russia cannot be known, seeing that every endeavour will be made to throw round her conduct the appearance of sincerity. But again, suppose Russia is really sincere in her desire for peace, in what better position are we? That the Czar and his people are desirous of peace we verily believe; but then, are they sincerely willing to conclude a peace which will satisfy the object of the war? This we very much doubt. All the powers are equally anxious for a return to peace, but the terms are not agreed on. Russia accepts the terms, and agrees to meet to negotiate. We have already had a specimen of what this means, and what is the result. It is quite natural that each should try to make the best bargain in an arrangement. Any one who has had experience of negotiations, must be aware how often attempts at agree ment, entered into with the utmost sincerity and desire of arrangement on both sides, have completely failed. In this matter there can be no doubt that if Russia accepts unreservedly all the conditions proposed by the Allies, there will be peace. It seems almost certain that this ambi tious power will not do so. And if we are right here, there is many circumstances on both sides which make it most improbable that this happy result will be the issue. Russia may have acted with perfect sincerity in the acceptance of the propositions, in the hope that she might be able to come to terms with the Allies. But everything is against the supposition that she will as yet concede all that is there demanded. If the Czar speaks truth in saying that he has yielded to the solicitations of the Powers, and not because the interests of Russia demand a conclusion of the war, the hopes of peace are very small. But again, if the Czar feels, though he has denied it, that the interests of his country do require peace, there may be considerable hope; and if further, he gives the whole matter due consideration, he must see that the welfare of his empire calls for a cessation of the warfare. In this case, he may feel compelled to accept the best terms which he can obtain. Wise, indeed, will he be, if he is so moved; but it is only in this last view that our hopes of peace are sanguine. How with regard to the Allies? Prussia is out of the field. Austria will not hesitate to make peace on any terms. Turkey will be guided by the others. The Western Powers are ready to lay down their arms if the present terms are accepted in their integrity. How will they act in a question of lower terms? Britain will not be disposed to accept less. It is said that France's ruler has not been altogether uninfluential in bringing about the present position of affairs; if so, he may be inclined to listen to a somewhat modified arrangement. Russia will not then fail to discern her advantage; and to foment any differences which may arise between the two Western Powers. Should it unfortunately be the case that Russia will not concede the terms in their integrity, but proposes a modification acceptable to Austria and to France, but not agreeable to Great Britain, it will require more firmness in our government than they get credit for to resist. If Napoleon is firm, then we can scarcely hold out; though we have great confidence that if our rulers resolve to abide by the conditions of peace offered to Russia, the Emperor of the French will yield, as we think he is bound to do. The one power has always the advantage over several in negotiations. It is the occurrence of some slight differences such as we have indicated, which we dread. There may be perfect cordiality now as to the terms, but the very admission of negotiations opens the way to alterations in the progress. It will, therefore require more than ordinary care to avoid any misunderstanding. Finally, Russia will lose no opportunity of gaining by diplomacy what she has lost or has been unable to obtain in war, Austria-and to us this is a subject of deep regret, and one which we have always dreaded,-Aus-tria will be the only gainer, though she has not spent a shilling nor a drop of blood in the contest. Let the several questions be at once brought to an issue, and let the Allies act cordially together in a determination to obtain the terms demanded. Nothing less will be satisfactory. If Russia yield, a great victory has been gained, and peace is likely to be enduring. If Russia does not submit, the prospects of the Allies are most encouraging, and we need not despair of soon gaining by force of arms, still better conditions than those which we shall not have succeeded in obtaining by diplomacy. LITERARY NOTICES. The Abomination of Desolation come, or Revelation Revealed. London: A BETTER title would be "The Abomination of Desolation, or Revelation Ravelled;" for such ravelment is here made of Scripture, that, were it not for the appearance of perfect sincerity in the author, we should have thought he had purposely set himself to reduce it to confusion. Here is some of the "Desolation" which he produces: The "Root of Jesse" (Isa. xi. 10) is the holy sepulchre; and the "ensign of the Root of Jesse (ibid.) is the Holy places protection question;" (pp. 8, 76). "Messiah the Prince" (Dan. ix. 25,) was the governor of Jerusalem to whom (he says) Adrian, A.D. 130, gave a commandment to rebuild the city: but "Messiah" in the next verse was Belisarius, A.D. 564, who, however, was .not 66 cut off," but died a natural death (pp. 24, 26). The "Shepherd" and "Fellow" of "the Lord of Hosts" (Zech. xiii. 7,) is the Pope, (p. 18).. "Then shall the lambs feed after their manner," (innocently one would think) means "Then shall the Roman Catholics be immersed in their own devices," p. 10. The "two witnesses" (Rev. xi.) are "natural and revealed light," and were slain last year at Vienna; "the two witnesses were there figuratively killed, and dismissed spiritually to heaven by the virtual breaking up of the conference on the 21st of April," (p. 78.) In regard to the words (Mat. xxiv. 15,) "When ye shall see the abomination of desolation, spoken of by Daniel the prophet, stand in the holy place;" he supposes the word "stand" to be the second person plural of the imperative mood, "stand ye;" for he paraphrases "stand in the holy place," "show yourselves to be true Christians in the East," p. 34. He seems to be utterly ignorant of Greek (which makes his alleged Cambridge M.A.-ship seem rather strange) but still his eye might have shown him, had he looked at the original that oras is used here as well as in Mark xiii. where the word being translated "standing" he understands it better, p. 37. Another ravelment is as to what he understands by the "abomination of desolation," and as to its being now" come." He repeatedly (pp. 23, 29) says that the "desolation" spoken of by Daniel is "the Moslem power in the East," and how that can be "come" now more than formerly it is difficult to conceive. Does he understand the "abomination" of desolation as something opposed to the desolation itself, and as meaning the abominating or abhorring of the desolation? (Every one knows that it is a Hebraism for the "desolating abomination.") Or does he mean that his book is actually as well as nominally the "abomination?” : All the extraordinary interpretations of Scripture, which we have mentioned, he takes for granted. The only one for which he gives any reason is his interpretation of "the Root of Jesse," viz., in a note to p. 8, thus:"It is scarcely needful to observe that Christ is from the Root of Jesse, Mat. i. 6, and that therefore the standard or ensign of the root of Jesse being set up, as a signal for the gathering of the nations, is the Christian protection question in the East." We don't feel the argument very conclusive. There are, of course, two ways by which it might be shown that the abomination of desolation, or anything else which the prophets foretel, is now come. 1. By showing that the present time is described by its characters as the time in question. 2. By showing that the prophetical numbers fix the present time. Either of these would be sufficient, if not contradicted by the other. |