nounced. What it is not possible to believe is that they would have riveted this manner of voting into the Constitution had they had the least idea of the hideous injustice that would be involved when some states would out-people others by up to 20 to 1. . . . and still have to be counted on an even-Steven basis! It would be interesting to learn how defenders of this state of affairs would go about justifying it in the light of the new doctrine of 1 man 1 vote.

The dubious performance of the House in 1824, the even sorrier situation in 1876 when another Democrat, Tilden, was counted out by the action of the House and the Congress as a whole, the uneasy awareness that such events can recur at any time in future elections, have resulted in the widespread public convictions that "something is wrong" and that "something ought to be done". The dismay and apprehension with which the television audience looked on as a constitutional crisis seemed all but certain in 1968 have increased the uneasiness and heightened the demand for a change. Yet, despite some hundred separate attempts, nothing has been done to change the system, there seems to be a prevading sense of helplessness before the difficulties of the problem, and the same old system remains, like the Old Man of the Sea, grimly riding on the American back.

Yet there is little reason for this sense of frustration. The trouble in the past has usually been caused by the persistent itch of would-be system changers to abolish or tinker with the electoral college. It is true that, since the last election, the public opinion polls have shown some increase in voter inclination to favor a change in the electoral college system, but this is NOT going to open the door to a constitutional amendment in that direction. The rights and interests of the smaller states are too deeply involved in the maintenance of the status quo to permit such an amendment. It must be remembered that it only takes a NO vote in 13 of the state legislatures to defeat any such attempt, and there is no reason to doubt that these NO votes will be forthcoming.

A second and very formidable obstacle in the way of change has been the persistent failure or refusal to recognize two cardinal principles vital to the procedure of such a colossal undertaking as a modern election to the office of President of the United States. These two principles are, or ought to be: (1) each such election should in itself be clear-cut, definite and final, the winner to be determined or determinable SOLELY by a complete and accurate count of the ballots actually on hand at the closing of the polls on election day. And (2) the second principle stems logically from the first. It is that partisanship, while necessary and proper for the presentation of the issues, should utterly cease to play a part in the determination of the outcome, at the very moment when the final ballots are cast. For it is at that very moment that only one question may properly be asked. That question should always be, "Whom have the people elected?", and no longer the question, "Whom will the House of Representatives decide to wiggle into the job?"

Manifestly the House of Representatives in its election-deciding role could never, by any stretch of the imagination, live up to the requirements advanced above. The House, despite its admitted overall virtues, is by nature and necessity a partisan body; and as long as it retains the power of final decision of unresolved elections, there is the certainty of partisanship entering into their deliberations and their determination of the result. At the very best, referral of an election to the House is an automatic debasement of the whole electoral process; for the moment it occurs, the whole vast electoral undertaking is relegated to LESS THAN A MERE PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY. It is less than a preferential primary because, in such a primary, there is some obligation to give effect to the ballots, whereas in the House procedure, by law, there is not. There is no obligation on the part of the House to award an election to the plurality winner, but by law the House may award the presidency to the second or even the third candidate of the people's or the electoral college's choice. It will surprise vast numbers of people to learn that in the last election, had a deadlock occurred, the House need not have chosen either Vice-President Humphrey or Richard Nixon but could have awarded the presidency to Mr. Wallace and this would have been entirely legal according to the existing system. It may be that if the present system persists, some future House will give the presidency to the man most clearly entitled to it. The grim fact is that it never has in the past and there is no assurance that it ever will.

It follows from the above that the House of Representatives is not a proper instrumentality to take over when the presence of third party votes in the

electoral college makes a clear-cut majority impossible to attain. Unlike the electoral college which has stood the test of time, the House in this respec most certainly has not. The House should be relieved completely from thi function, and such action is, therefore, Point Two of this Plan. Moreover, if thir party strength in the recent election is any augury for the future, this should be done with the shortest practical delay.

What are the practical chances for success of this California Plan? The would seem to be excellent. The plan would run little or no risk of opposition coming from the electoral college quarter. Point One of the Plan would seen to assure this. . . . “HANDS OFF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE, leave it jus as it has always been". As for the other traditional source of objections, the popular vote people. . . and there are many millions of them... are no likely to clamor too long or too loudly against one of the few substantial con cessions accorded them in the history of the United States. Thus, there is likely to be far less opposition than is usual in the case of projects of this kind. Thes factors plus the timeliness of the project and the predictable preference of the voters for clear-cut, decisive elections, would seem to warrant a healthy optimism about the final result.

In summary the California Plan would

Render elections clear-cut and always decisive.

Eliminate permanently all danger of constitutional crises arising fron close elections, regardless of the number of candidates involved.

Remove the possibility of post-balloting manipulation and render elections more responsive to the popular will.

Conserve in traditional balance the interests of the separate (particularly the smaller) states and the interests of the people of the United States as a whole.

By reason of these advantages, stand an excellent chance of being carried into effect, through the normal practical processes of non-partisar co-operation.

Let us stop worrying about presidential elections and DO something about them. Let's support this California Plan to give Americans the kind of elections that Americans want.

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION REFORM, BY GEORGE H. ŠKAU, CHAIRMAN, DepartmeNT OF HISTORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE, MARIST COLLEGE

On Tuesday, November 5, 1968, millions of Americans discussed and feared the possibility of a constitutional crisis. Television commentators explained the in tricacies of the presidential electoral system telling how it is possible for a presi dential candidate to receive a larger number of popular votes than his opponent: and still not be elected President of the United States.

The presidential electoral system (as defined in Article II, Section 1) was established over one hundred and eighty years ago. It provided for the selections of electors, equal to the number of senators and representatives, in a method pre scribed by state legislatures. This system assumed that the electors would be mer of discernment who would use independent judgment in casting their votes.

Although men of the stature of James Madison, Gouverneur Morris and James Wilson were favorably disposed toward direct election of the President, their was a minority view at the Constitutional Convention. The democratic principle of universal suffrage was not yet a reality in eighteenth century America. Many of the states in 1787 had property qualifications for voting as well as religiou qualifications for office-holding. During the early presidential elections, in majority of the states the presidential electors were selected directly by the state legislatures, without consulting the electorate. Over the years the role of the electors has changed. Political parties, which delegates to the Constitutiona Convention did not anticipate, made the electors a registering board under "winner take all" system. The growth of political parties and democratic prin ciples has given rise to the "faithless elector" concept.

In the early decades of the nineteenth century states did away with property qualifications for voting. Universal white manhood suffrage became a reality Later in the nineteenth century the negro was enfranchised as a result of the Fifteenth Amendment, and by 1920 women received the right to vote by the passing of the Nineteenth Amendment. Universal suffrage had become part of the American political process. The movement toward greater participatory democracy was also enhanced by the passing of the Seventeenth Amendment in

1913 which provided for the direct election of senators; previously they had been elected by the state legislatures. The concept of equal representation has been recently underscored by the courts in the "one man one vote" decisions.

In short, this historical progression of democratic reforms mandates a change in a system which permits the man who receives the largest number of popular votes for the presidency not being elected President. The present system allowed this undemocratic result to occur on three occasions-1824, 1876, and 1888.

The only system that insures that the will of the people will prevail is the direct election system. While the proportional and district systems may provide for a more equitable distribution of the electoral votes they do not get to the root of the problem. They do not prevent a man who receives less popular votes than his opponent from becoming President of the United States. The election of 1960 highlights this situation since both under the proportional and the district systems Richard Nixon would have received more electoral votes than John Kennedy who led in the popular votes.

While many governmental leaders are basically in favor of the principle of the direct election of the President by the people, some hesitate to fully endorse it because they feel it is not implementable within the near future. The arguments of federalism, the two party system and the anticipated lack of support in small and southern states are well taken. However, those political realists who call for practicality and piecemeal adjustments may very well be fainthearted defeatists who have given way to expediency. Indeed, the polls seem to indicate that about eighty percent of the American people want the undemocratic, uncertain, unfair and antiquated electoral system abolished.

The issue must be kept before the American people through the press and congressional hearings like this. The academic community, through public forums, has to inform and educate the electorate on the necessity for direct popular election of the President. Leadership, communication and education are the requisites to bring this reform to fruition.

It is abundantly clear that a government which rests on the democratic principle of the consent of the governed must insure that the man who receives the most popular votes for President must become President of the United States. In order to facilitate this vital reform I endorse and recommend the passage of the American Bar Association's proposal of January 1967 and hope that this proposal which is in accordance with democratic principles will result in the Twenty-Sixth Amendment.

A CASE FOR THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE, BY DAVID N. THOMAS, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, OGLETHORPE COLLEGE, ATLANTA

I

Without the electoral college, the United States at this moment could be in the midst of a serious constitutional crisis. The popular vote, upon which the outcome of the recent presidential election would have hinged, was extremely close. In at least one state there was a delay in the reporting of huge blocs of popular ballots. In a system of direct popular elections, these blocs of votes might have been of crucial importance. In such an event, charges and countercharges would surely erupt. A partisan atmosphere would spread and other disputes over tabulation become inevitable. Delays in the counting of absentee ballots lead to a heightening of tension. To the shock and surprise of electoral reformers, the simple arrangement for a direct popular election of the President results in a web of complexities. In the end a proud country finds itself on the edge of helplessness. This potential nightmare was averted in November 1968 by the operation of the American system of political succession which, while not perfect, has worked reasonably well for 180 years. In spite of that record, however, the electoral college, a key feature of the American electoral system, is once again under attack.

Criticism of the electoral college engendered by the recent candidacy of George Wallace stems from a problem as old as government: the maintenance of an effective system of political succession. Scholars cite this problem of political succession as one of the historic causes for the downfall of empires and nations alike. However successful a political system in maintaining control, administering government and fostering economic development, there can never be any assurance of continuity without a reliable means of transferring power.

Moreover, the transfer of control from one leader, or administration, to a suecessor must be orderly, non-violent and based on consent. Without a political mechanism capable of assuring such stability, no society is ever safe from the dangers of disintegration.

II

For nearly two hundred years American political leaders have wrestled with the problem of succession of national executive leadership. When the first United States government was established during the American Revolution there was no problem. Fearful of excessive concentration of power, the patriots of the Second Continental Congress refused to provide for an executive department. The Articles of Confederation set up the simplest national government imaginable, a unicameral legislature with virtually no powers to govern the young republic. There was no executive to be replaced, thus no danger arising from the problem of succession.

The first several years of American independence were similar to the experiences of young nations emerging from colonialism today. Threatened from within and without, the new American Republic faced almost daily the dangers of internal chaos and territorial fragmentation. Observers predicted an early end to the republican experiment. "The mutual antipathies and clashing interests of the Americans," said the Englishman, Josiah Tucker, “indicate that they will have no centre of union and no common interest. They can never be united into one compact empire under any species of government whatever."

After several fruitless attempts to amend the Articles of Confederation, a movement led by such men as James Madison and Alexander Hamilton resulted in the Constitutional Convention of 1787. Twelve states chose sixty-five delegates to attend that famed assembly in Philadelphia which commenced deliberations in the late spring of the year. Between May 25 and September 17 fifty-five of the delegates arrived. Of those who attended only thirty-nine men were present at the end to sign what Gladstone called "the most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of man."

The most creative achievement of the American Constitutional Convention was the establishment of an executive department for which there was no real precedent in the annals of republican government. The absence of executive leadership had been one of the most glaring weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation. The apparent drift of events toward domestic chaos illustrated by a recent rebellion in Massachusetts and the recurrent ravages of the frontier pointed to the urgent need for a national leader with strong powers. At the same time the Founding Fathers, remembering their unhappy relations with colonial governors, were determined to safeguard the nation against tyranny. Finally, the delegates wanted a system of political succession which would assure easy transition from one chief executive to another. They were familiar enough with history to know that if they failed to achieve a workable method of presidential elections, little else would matter. Thus from the beginning until almost the very end of the summer of 1787, the founders of this nation struggled with the problems of establishing a national system of presidential politics that would provide clear-cut decisions and effective leadership based on popular consent. Every conceivable aspect of this enormously complicated problem was considered. Scarcely a single proposal made by contemporary critics of the Electoral College failed to receive thorough investigation. The success of the electoral system which they created has become one of the marvels of Western Civilization. Those who call that system outmoded are in error.

The real genius of the American electoral system was not limited to the work of 1787. More important was the building of a firm foundation on which a superstructure could be erected over the succeeding half century. In the end this system consisted of the Electoral College, the two-party system, and the national nominating convention. Uniquely American and unbelievably effective, this system is to United States politics what mass production is to American economics.

III

An account of the adoption of the Electoral College will be helpful in understanding the historic problem of achieving and maintaining an effective system of political succession. The first suggestion for an executive office was made early in the convention's proceedings by Edmund Randolph of Virginia. Under his plan the executive would be chosen by the national legislature. Randolph also wanted a plural executive in order to avoid concentration of power in one

man. Beginning with this proposal, vaguely resembling parliamentary government, the Convention began its long debate on the executive department.

The first issue in that debate concerned whether the executive office should consist of one or more persons. Randolph feared that a one-man presidency would resemble monarchy. A plural executive, on the other hand, would assure national harmony by having all sections of the country represented. For that idea there was no support, and on the motion of South Carolina's Charles Pinckney, the Convention voted that whatever else might be decided about the American presidency, it would consist of a single person. The remainder of Randolph's proposals for the presidency, however, were tentatively adopted after only a few days of consideration.

The strongest opposition to the Randolph plan came from delegates critical of presidential selection by the national legislature. James Wilson and Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania maintained that under that system of election the executive would be dependent on the legislature. From their arguments emerged the doctrine of separation of powers strongly urged by Madison. If legislative, judicial and executive powers are to be separately exercised, Madison said, they should also be independently exercised. To assure strict separation of these powers, Wilson, Morris, and Madison supported direct election of the President by popular vote.

Arguments for separation of powers were not at first persuasive. For over two months the Convention seemed committed to the Randolph plan for legislative selection of the President. Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts and George Mason of Virginia vigorously opposed direct popular elections. Having recently witnessed the uprising of farmers in his home state, Gerry feared a simple reliance on the people for choosing the Chief Executive. The people, he said, were too uninformed and were "liable to deceptions." Mason, the noted champion of state rights, suggested that popular elections were like a blind man selecting colors. Moreover, the Virginian argued, "The extent of the country renders it impossible that the people can have the requisite capacity to judge the respective pretentions of the candidates."

Supporters of separation of powers continued their attack on congressional selection of the President. The issue of eligibility for a second term provided them an opportunity to show the weaknesses of legislative domination of the executive office. Under the Randolph plan, Congress was to select the President for seven years without eligibility for a second term. Morris argued that without a chance for executive service beyond a first term, the legislature would “aggrandize and perpetuate themselves." Wilson agreed that, with congressional selection, the executive ought to be eligible for a second term. During debate on the question of eligibility, Wilson revealed that among all the delegates there was a growing sentiment for presidential elections "mediately or immediately by the people."

A second issue opened the way for more criticism of legislative election of the American President. On August 24, less than a month before adjournment, the question arose as to whether Congress, in selecting the President, would vote together as one body. Here the delegates encountered another controversy between large and small states, a rock on which the Constitutional Convention had nearly shipwrecked on several occasions. Large states demanded the joint ballot in order to reap the benefits of proportional representation in the House of Representatives. Separate balloting by each house, on the other hand, would enhance the small states' role in presidential selection.

In the renewed outbreak between large and small states, opponents of congressional selection of the executive once again pointed to the undesirability of that system of election. Long after the convention seemed settled on that mode of presidential elections, Morris launched another slashing attack on executive dependence on the legislature. “Cabal and corruption," he said, “are attached to that mode of election." The debate over joint balloting was a crucial turning point in the Convention's consideration of presidential elections. In the ensuing deadlock, the convention turned the entire issue of how to choose a President over to a special committee of eleven, one member from each state. The membership was chosen by ballot.

At least five members of that committee were outspoken opponents of congressional selection of the President. Two members, Morris and Madison, were strong supporters of presidential elections by direct vote of the people. Morris later reported that in the committee "many were anxious even for an immediate choice of the people." A substantial change seems to have occurred in the con