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SENATE.]

Bank of the United States.

[Feb. 2, 1831.

phia. Foreigners become the landlords of free born Americans; and the young and flourishing towns of the United States are verging to the fate of the family boroughs which belong to the great aristocracy of England. Let no one say the bank will not avail itself of its capacity to amass real estate. The fact is, it has already done so. . I know towns, yea, cities, and could name them, if it might not seem invidious from this elevated theatre to make a public reference to their misfortunes, in which this bank already appears as a dominant and engrossing proprietor. ... I have been in places where the answers to inquiries for the owners of the most valuable tenements, would remind you of the answers given by the Egyptians to similar questions from the French officers, on their march to Cairo. You recollect, no doubt, sir, the dialogue to which I allude: “Who owns that palace?” “The Mameluke;” “Who this country house?” “The Mameluke ;" “These gardens?” “The Mameluke;” “That field covered with rice?” “The Mameluke.”—And thus have I been answered, in the towns and cities referred to, with the single exception of the name of the Bank of the United States substituted for that of the military scourge of Egypt. If this is done under the first charter, what may not be expected under the second? If this is done while the bank is on its best behavior, what may she not do when freed from all restraint and delivered up to the boundless cupidity and remorseles exactions of a moneyed corporation? 6. To deal in pawns, merchandise, and bills of exchange.—I hope the Senate will not require me to read dry passages from the charter to prove what I say. I know I speak a thing nearly incredible when I allege that this bank, in addition to all its other attributes, is an incorporated company of pawnbrokers! The allegation staggers belief, but a reference to the charter will dispel incredulity. The charter, in the first part, forbids a traffic in merchandise; in the after part, permits it. For truly this instrument seems to have been framed upon the principles of contraries; one principle making limitations, and the other following after with provisoes to undo them. Thus is it with lands, as I have just shown; thus is it with merchandise, as I now show. The bank is forbiden to deal in merchandise—proviso, unless in the case of goods pledgcd for money lent, and not redeemed to the day; and, proviso, again, unless for goods which shall be the proceeds of its lands. With the help of these two provisoes, it is clear that the limitation is undone; it is clear that the bank is at liberty to act the pawnbroker and merchant, to any extent that it pleases. It may say to all the merchants who want loans, Pledge your stores, gentlemen! They must do it, or do worse; and, if any accident prevents redemption on the day, the pawn is forfeited, and the bank takes possession. On the other hand, it may lay out its rents for goods; it may sell its real estate, now worth three millions of dollars, for goods. Thus the bank is an incorporated company of pawnbrokers and merchants, as well as an incorporation of landlords and land-speculators; and this derogatory privilege, like the others, is copied from the old Bank of England charter of 1694. Bills of exchange are also subjected to the traffic of this bank. It is a traffic unconnected with the trade of banking, dangerous for a great bank to hold, and now operating most injuriously in the South and West. It is the process which drains these quarters of the Union of their gold and silver, and stifles the growth of a fair commerce in the products of the country. The merchants, to make remittances, buy bills of exchange from the branch banks, instead of buying produce from the farmers. The bills are paid for in gold and silver; and, eventually, the gold and silver are sent to the mother bank, or to the branches in the Eastern cities, either to meet these bills, or to replenish their coffers, and to furnish vast loans to favorite States or individuals. The bills sell cheap, say a fraction of one per cent.; they are, therefore, a good remittance to the merchant. To the

bank the operation is doubly good; for even the half of one per cent. on bills of exchange is a great profit to the institution which monopolizes that business, while the collection and delivery to the branches of all the hard money in the country is a still more corsiderable advantage. Under this system, the best of the Western banks—I do not speak of those which had no foundations, and sunk under the weight of neighborhood opinion—but those which deserved favor and confidence, sunk ten years ago. Under this system, the entire West is now undergoing a silent, general, and invisible drain of its hard money; and, if not quickly arrested, these States will soon be, so far as the precious metals are concerned, no more than the empty skin of an immolated victim. 7. To establish branches in the different States without their consent, and in defiance of their resistance.—No one can deny the degrading and injurious tendency of this privilege. It derogates from the sovereignty of a State; tramples upon her laws; injures her revenue and commerce; lays open her Government to the attacks of centralism; impairs the property of her citizens; and fastens a vampire on her bosom to suck out her gold and silver. 1. It derogates from her sovereignty, because the central institution may impose its intrusive branches upon the State without her consent, and in defiance of her resistance. This has already been done. The State of Alabama, but four years ago, by a resolve of her Legislature, remonstrated against the intrusion of a branch upon her. She protested against the favor. Was the will of the State respected? On the contrary, was not a branch instantaneously forced upon her, as if, by the suddenness of the action, to make a striking and conspicuous display of the omnipotence of the bank, and the nullity of the State? 2. It tramples upon her laws; because, according to the decision of the Supreme Court, the bank and all its branches are wholly independent of State legislation; and it tramples on them again, because it authorizes foreigners to hold lands and tenements in every State, contrary to the laws of many of them; and because it admits of the mortmain tenure, which is condemned by all the republican States in the Union. 3. It injures her revenue, because the bank stock, under the decision of the Supreme Court, is not liable to taxation. And thus, foreigners, and nonresident Americans, who monopolize the money of the State, who hold its best lands and town lots, who meddle in its elections, and suck out its gold and silver, and perform no military duty, are exempted from paying taxes, in proportion to their wealth, for the support of the State whose laws they trample upon, and whose benefits they usurp. 4. It subjects the State to the dangerous manoeuvres and intrigues of centralism, by means of the tenants, debtors, bank officers, and bank money, which the central directory retain in the State, and may embody and direct against it in its elections, and in its legislative and judicial proceedings. 5. It tends to impair the property of the citizens, and, in some instances, that of the States, by destroying the State banks in which they have invested their money. 6. It is injurious to the commerce of the States, (I speak of the Western States,) by substituting a trade in bills of exchange, for a trade in the products of the country. 7. It fastens a vampire on the bosom of the State, to suck away its gold and silver, and to co-operate with the course of trade, of federal legisla

tion, and of exchange, in draining the South and West of

all their hard money. The Southern States, with their thirty millions of annual exports in cotton, rice, and tobacco, and the Western States, with their twelve millions of provisions and tobacco exported from New Orleans, and five millions consumed in the South, and on the lower Mississippi, -that is to say, with three-fifths of the marketable productions of the Union, are not able to sustain thirty specie paying banks; while the minority of the States north of the Potomac, without any of the great

Feb. 2, 1831.]

Bank of the United States.

[SENATE.

staples for export, have above four hundred of such banks. These States, without rice, without cotton, without tobacco, without sugar, and with less flour and provisions, to export, are saturated with gold and silver, while the Southern and Western States, with all the real sources of wealth, are in a state of the utmost destitution. For this calamitous reversal of the natural order of things, the Bank of the United States stands forth pre-eminently culpable. Yes, it is pre-eminently o and a statement in the National Intelligencer of this morning, (a paper which would overstate no fact to the prejudice of the bank,) cites and proclaims the fact which proves this culpability. It dwells, and exults, on the quantity of gold and silver in the vaults of the United States’ Bank. It declares that institution to be “overburdened” with gold and silver; and well may it be so overburthened, since it has lifted the load entirely from the South and West. It calls these metals “a drug” in the hands of the bank; that is to say, an article for which no purchaser can be found. Let this “drug,” like the treasures of the dethroned Dey of Algiers, be released from the dominion of its keeper; let a part go back to the South and West, and the bank will no longer complain of repletion, nor they of depletion. 8. Exemption of the stockholders from individual liability on the failure of the bank. This privilege derogates from the common law, is contrary to the principle of partnerships, and injurious to the rights of the community. It is a peculiar privilege granted by law to these corporators, and exempting them from liability, except in their corporate capacity, and to the amount of the assets of the corporation. Unhappily, these assets are never assez, that is to say, enough, when occasion comes for recurring to them. When a bank sails, its assets are always less than its debits; so that responsibility fails the instant that liability accrues. Let no one say that the Bank of the United States is too great to fail. One greater than it, and its prototype, has failed, and that in our own day, and for twenty years at a time: the Bank of England failed in 1797, and the Bank of the United States was on the point of failing in 1819. The same cause, namely, stockjobbing and overtrading, carried both to the brink of destruction; the same means saved both, namely, the name, the credit, and the helping hand of the Governments which protected them. Yes, the Bank of the United States may fail; and its stockholders live in splendor upon the princely estates acquired with its notes, while the industrious classes, who hold these notes, will be unable to receive a shilling for then. This is unjust. It is a vice in the charter. The true principle in banking requires each stockholder to be liable to the amount of his shares; and subjects him to the summary action of every holder on the failure of the institution, till he has paid up the amount of his subscription: . This is the true principle. It has prevailed in Scotland for the last century, and no such thing as a broken bank has been known there in all that time. 9. To have the United States for a partner. Sir, there is one consequence, one result of all partnerships between a Government and individuals, which should of itself, and in a mere mercantile point of view, condemn this association on the part of the Federal Government. It is the principle which puts the strong partner forward to bear the burthen whenever the concern is in danger. The weaker members flock to the strong partner at the approach of the storm, and the necessity of venturing more to save what he has already staked, leaves him no alternative. He becomes the Atlas of the firm, and bears all upon his own shoulders. This is the principle: what is the fact? Why, that the United States has already been compelled to sustain the federal bank; to prop it with her revenues and its credit in the trials and crisis of its early administration. I pass over other instances of the damage suffered by the United States on account of this

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partnership; the immense standing deposites for which we receive no compensation; the loan of five millions of our own money, for which we have paid a million and a half in interest; the five per cent...stock note, on which we have paid our partners four million seven hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars in interest; the loss of ten millions on the three per cent. stock, and the ridiculous catastrophe of the miserable bonus, which has been paid to us with a fraction of our own money: I pass over all this, and come to the point of a direct loss, as a partner, in the dividends upon the stock itself. Upon this naked point of profit and loss, to be decided by a rule in arithmetic, we have sustained a direct and heavy loss. The stock held by the United States, as every body knows, was subscribed, not paid. It was a stock note, deposited for seven millions of dollars, bearing an interest of five per cent. The inducement to this subscription was the seductive conception that, by paying five per cent. on its note, the United States would clear four or five per cent. in getting a dividend of eight or ten. . This was the inducement; now for the realization of this fine conception. Let us see it. Here it is: an official return from the Register of the Treasury of interest paid, and of dividends received. The account stands thus:

Interest paid by the United States, $4,725,000
Dividends received by the United States, 4,629,426
Loss to the United States, 95,574

* Disadvantageous as this partnership must be to the United States in a moneyed point of view, there is a far more grave and serious aspect under which to view it. It is the political aspect, resulting from the union between the bank and the Government. This union has been tried in England, and has been found there to be just as disastrous a conjunction as the union of church and State. It is the conjunction of the lender and the borrower, and holy writ has told us which of these categories will be master of the other. But suppose they agree to drop rivalry, and unite their resources. Suppose they combine, and make a push for political power: how great is the mischief which they may not accomplish! But, on this head, I wish to use the language of one of the brightest patriots of Great Britain; one who has shown himself, in these modern days, to be the worthy successor of those old iron barons whose patriotism commanded the unpurchaseable eulogium of the elder Pitt. I speak of Sir William Pulteney, and his speech against the Bank of England, in 1797.

The speech—Ertract.—“I have said enough to show that Government has been rendered dependent on the bank, and more particularly so in the time of war; and though the bank has not yet fallen into the hands of ambitious men, yet it is evident that it might, in such hands, assume a power sufficient to control and overawe, not only the ministers, but king, lords, and commons. * * * * As the bank has thus become dangerous to Government, it might, on the other hand, by uniting with an ambitious minister, become the means of establishing a fourth estate, sufficient to involve this nation in irretrievable slavery, and ought, therefore, to be dreaded as much as a certain East India bill was justly dreaded, at a period not very remote. I will not say that the present minister, (the younger Pitt,) by endeavoring, at this crisis, to take the Bank of England under his protection, can have any view to make use, hereafter, of that engine to perpetuate his own power, and to enable him to domineer over our constitution: if that could be supposed, it would only show that men can entertain a very different train of ideas, when endeavoring to overset a rival, from what occurs to them when intending to support and fix themselves. My object is to secure the country against all risk either from the bank as opposed to Government, or as the engine of ambitious men.”

SENATE.]

And this is my object also. I wish to secure the Union from all chance of harm from this bank. I wish to provide against its friendship, as well as its enmity—against all danger from its hug, as well as from its blow. I wish to provide against all risk, and every hazard; for, if this risk and hazard were too great to be encountered by King, Lords, and Commons, in Great Britain, they must certainly be too great to be encountered by the people of the United States, who are but commons alone. 10. To have foreigners for partners.--This, Mr. President, will be a strange story to be told in the West. The downright and upright people of that unsophisticated region believe that words mean what they signify, and that “the Bank of the United States” is the Bank of the United States. How great then must be their astonishment to learn that this belief is a false conception, and that this bank (its whole name to the contrary notwithstanding,) is just as much the bank of foreigners as it is of the Federal Government. Here I would like to have the proof–a list of the names and nations, to establish this almost incredible fact. But I have no access except to public documents, and from one of these I learn as much as will answer the present pinch. It is the report of the Committee of Ways and Means, in the House of Representatives, for the last session of Congress. That report admits that foreigners own seven millions of the stock of this bank; and every body knows that the Federal Government owns seven millions also. Thus it is proved that foreigners are as deeply interested in this bank as the United States itself. In the event of a renewal of the charter they will be much more deeply interested than at present; for a prospect of a rise in the stock to two hundred and fifty, and the unsettled state of things in Europe, will induce them to make great investments. It is to no purpose to say that the foreign stockholders cannot be voters or directors. The answer to that suggestion is this: the foreigners have the money; they pay down the cash, and want no accommodations; they are lenders, not borrowers; and in a great moneyed institution such stockholders must have the greatest influence. The name of this bank is a deception upon the public. It is not the bank of the Federal Government, as its name would import, nor of the States which compose this Union; but chiefly of private individuals, foreigners as well as natives, denizens, and naturalized subjects. They own twenty-eight millions of the stock, the Federal Government but seven millions, and these seven are precisely balanced by the stock of the aliens. The Federal Government and the aliens are equal, owning one-fifth each; and there would be as much truth in calling it the English Bank as the Bank of the United States. Now mark a few of the privileges which this charter gives to these foreigners. To be landholders, in defiance of the State laws, which forbid aliens to hold land; to be landlords by incorporation, and to hold American citizens for tenants; to hold lands in mortmain; to be pawnbrokers and merchants by incorporation; to pay the revenue of the United States, in their own notes; in short, to do every thing which I have endeavored to point out in the long and hideous list of exclusive privileges 'anted to this bank. If I have shown it to be dangerous or the United States to be in partnership with its own citizens, how much stronger is not the argument against a partnership with foreigners? What a prospect for loans when at war with a foreign Power, and the subjects of that Power large owners of the bank here, from which alone, or from banks liable to be destroyed by it, we can obtain money to carry on the war! What a state of things, if, in the division of political parties, one of these parties and the foreigners, coalescing, should have the exclusive control of all the money in the Union, and, in addition to the money, should have bodies of debtors, tenants, and bank officers stationed in all the States, with a supreme and irre

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sponsible system of centralism to direct the whole!, Dan-
gers from such contingencies are too great and obvious to
be insisted upon. They strike the common sense of all
mankind, and were powerful considerations for the old
whig republicans for the non-renewal of the charter of
1791. Mr. Jefferson and the whig republicans staked
their political existence on the non-renewal of that charter.
They succeeded; and, by succeeding, prevented the coun-
try from being laid at the mercy of British and ultra-fede-
ralists for funds to carry on the last war. It is said the
United States lost forty millions by using depreciated cur-
rency during the last war. That, probably, is a mistake
of one-half. But be it so! For what are forty millions
compared to the loss of the war itself—compared to the
ruin and infamy of having the Government arrested for
want of money-stopped and paralyzed by the reception
of such a note as the younger Pitt received from the Bank
of England in 1795?
11. Exemption from due course of law for violations of
its charter.—This is a privilege which affects the adminis-
tration of justice, and stands without example in the annals
of republican legislation. In the case of all other delin-
quents, whether persons or corporations, the laws take
their course against those who offend them. It is the
right of every citizen to set the laws in motion against every
offender; and it is the constitution of the law, when set in
motion, to work through, like a machine, regardless of
powers and principalities, and cutting down the guilty
which may stand in its way. Not so in the case of this
bank. In its behalf, there are barriers erected between
the citizen and his oppressor, between the wrong and the
remedy, between the law and the offender. Instead of a
right to sue out a scire facias or a quo warranto, the injured
citizen, with an humble petition in his hand, must repair
to the President of the United States, or to Congress, and
crave their leave to do so. If leave is denied, (and denied
it will be whenever the bank has a peculiar friend in the
President, or a majority of such friends in Congress, the
convenient pretext being always at hand that the general
welfare requires the bank to be sustained,) he can proceed
no further. The machinery of the law cannot be set in
motion, and the great offender laughs from behind his bar-
rier at the impotent resentment of its helpless victim.
Thus the bank, for the plainest violations of its charter,
and the greatest oppressions of the citizen, may escape the
pursuit of justice. Thus the administration of justice is
subject to be strangled in its birth for the shelter and pro-
tection of this bank. But this is not ali. Another and
most alarming mischief results from the same extraordinary
privilege. It gives the bank a direct interest in the Pre-
sidential and Congressional elections: it gives it need for
friends in Congress and in the Presidential chair. Its fate,
its very existence, may often depend upon the friendship
of the President and Čongress; and, in such cases, it is not
in human nature to avoid using the immense means in the
hands of the bank to influence the elections of these offi-
cers. Take the existing fact—the case to which I alluded
at the commencement of this speech. There is a case
made out, ripe with judicial evidence, and big with the fate
of the bank. It is a case of usury at the rate of forty-six
per cent., in violation of the charter, which only admits an
interest of six. The facts were admitted, in the court be-
low, by the bank’s demurret; the law was decided, in the
court above, by the supreme judges. The admission con-
cludes the facts; the decision concludes the law. The for-
feiture of the charter is established; the forfeiture is in-
curred; the application of the forfeiture alone is wanting
to put an end to the institution. An impartial President
or Congress might let the laws take their course; those of
a different temper might interpose their veto. What a
crisis for the bank! It beholds the sword of I)amocles
suspended over its head! What an interest in keeping

those away who might suffer the hair to be cut!

Feb. 2, 1831.]

Bank of the United States.

[SENATE.

12. To have all these unjust privileges secured to the corporators as a monopoly, by a pledge of the public faith to charter no other bank.--This is the most hideous feature in the whole mass of deformity. If these banks are beneficial institutions, why not several? one, at least, and *ach independent of the other, to each great section of the Union? If malignant, why create one? The restriction constitutes the monopoly, and renders more invidious what was sufficiently hateful in itself. It is, indeed, a double monopoly, legislative as well as banking; for the Congress of 1816 monopolized the power to grant these monopolies. It has tied up the hands of its successors; and if this can be done on one subject, and for twenty years, why not upon all subjects, and for all time? Here is the form of words which operate this double engrossment of our rights: ... No other bank shall be established by any future law of Congress during the continuance of the corporation hereby coasted, for which the faith of congress is hereby pledg- cli” with a proviso for the District of Columbia. And that no incident might be wanting to complete the title of this charter, to the utter reprobation of whig republicans, this compound monopoly, and the very form of words in which it is conceived, is copied from the charter of the Bank of England!—not the charter of william and Mary, as granted in 1694, (for the Bill of Rights was then fresh in the memories of Englishmen,) but the charter as amond. *', and that for money, in the memorable reign of Queen Anne, when a tory Queen, a tory Ministry, and a tory Parliament, and the apostle of toryism, in the person of Dr. Sacheverell, with his sermons of divine right, passive obedience, and non-resistance, were riding and ruling over the prostrate liberties of England! This is the precious Period, and these the noble authors, from which the idea was borrowed, and the very form of words copied, which now figure in the charter of the Bank of the United States, **tituting that double monopoly, which restricts at oncé th.Powers of Congress and the rights of the citizens. These, Mr. President, are the chief of the exclusive Privileges, which constitute the monopoly of the Bank of the United States. I have spoken of them, not as they deserved, but as my abilities have permitted. I have shown you that they are not only evil in themselves, but copied from an evil example. I now wish to show you that the Government from which we have made this copy has condemned the original; and, after showing this fact, I think I shall be able to appeal, with sensible effect, to all liberal minds, to follow the enlightened example of Great Britain in getting rid of a dangerous and invidious institution, after having followed her pernicious example in assuming it. For this purpose, I will have recourse to proof, and will read from British state papers of 1826. I will read extracts from the correspondence between Earl Liverpool, first Lord of the Treasury, and Mr. Robinson, chancellor of the Exchequer, on one side, and the Governor and Deputy. Governor of the Bank of England on the other; the subject being the renewal, or rather non-renewal, of the charter of the Bank of England.

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“The failures which have occurred in England, unaccompanied as they have been by the same occurrences in Scotland, tend to prove that there must have been an unsolid and delusive system of banking in one part of Great Britain, and a solid and substantial one in the other. * * * * In Scotland, there are not more than thirty banks, (three chartered,) and these banks have stood firm amidst all the convulsions in the money market in England, and amidst all the distresses to which the manufacturing and agricultural interests in Scotland, as well as in England, have occasionally becn subject. Banks of this description must ne

cessarily be conducted upon the generally understood and

approved principles of baking. * * * * The Bank of England may, perhaps, propose, as they did upon a former occasion, the extension of the term of their exclusive privilege, as to the metropolis and its neighborhood, beyond the year 1833, as the price of this concession, [immediate surrender of exclusive privileges.] It would be very much to be regretted that they should require any such condition. * * * * It is obvious, from what passed before, that Parliament will never agree to it. * * * * Such privileges are out of fashion; and what expectation can the bank, under present circumstances, entertain that theirs will be renewed?”—Jan. 13. Answer of the Court of Directors.-Extract. “Under the uncertainty in which the Court of Directors find themselves with respect to the death of the bank, and the effect which they may have on the interests of the bank, this court cannot feel themselves justified in recommending to the proprietors to give up the privilege which they now enjoy, sanctioned and confirmed as it is by the solemn acts of the Legislature.”—Jan. 20.

Second communication from the Ministers.--Extract.

“The First Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Fxchequer have considered the answer of the bank of the 20th instant. They cannot but regret that the Court of Directors should have declined to recommend to the Court of Proprietors the consideration of the paper delivered by the First Lord of the Treasury and the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the Governor and Deputy Governor on the 13th instant. The statement contained in that paper appears to the First Lord of the Treasury and the Chancellor of the Exchequer so full and explicit on all the points to which it related, that they have nothing further to add, although they would have been, and still are, ready to answer, as far as possible, any specific questions which might be put, for the purpose of removing the uncertainty in which the Court of Directors state themselves to be with respect to the details of the plan suggested in that paper.” —Jam. 23.

Second answer of the Bank.--Extract.

“The Committee of Treasury [bank] having taken into consideration the paper received from the First Lord of the Treasury and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, dated January 23d, and finding that His Majesty’s ministers persevere in their desire to propose to restrict immediately the exclusive privilege of the bank, as to the number of partners engaged in banking to a certain distance from the metropolis, and also continue to be of opinion that Parliament would not consent to renew the privilege at the expiration of the period of their present charter; finding, also, that the proposal by the bank of establishing branch banks is deemed by His Majesty’s ministers inadequate to the wants of the country, are of opinion that it would be desirable for this corporation to propose, as a basis, the act of 6th of George the Fourth, which states the conditions on which the Bank of Ireland relinquished its exclusive privileges; this corporation waiving the question of a prolongation of time, although the committee [of the bank] cannot agree in the opinion of the First Lord of the Treasury and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that they are not making a considerable sacrifice, adverting especially to the Bank of Ireland remaining in possession of o privilege five years longer than the Bank of England.” —-Jan. 25.

Here, Mr. President, is the end of all the exclusive privileges and odious monopoly of the Bank of England. That ancient and powerful institution, so long the haughty tyrant of the moneyed world—so long the subsidizer of Kings and ministers—so long the fruitful mother of national debt and useless wars—so long the prolific manufactory of nabobs and paupers—so long the dread dictator of its own terms to Parliament—now droops the conquered wing, lowers its proud crest, and quails under the blows

SENATE.]

of its late despised assailants. It first puts on a courageous air, and takes a stand upon privileges sanctioned by time, and confirmed by solemn acts. Seeing that the ministers could have no more to say to men who would talk of privileges in the nineteenth century, and being reminded that Parliament was inexorable, the bully

suddenly degenerates into the craven, and, from showing

fight, calls for quarter. The directors condescend to beg for the smallest remnant of their former power, for five years only; for the city of London even; and offer to send branches into all quarters. Denied at every point, the subdued tyrant acquiesces in his fate, announces his submission to the spirit and intelligence of the age; and quiet. ly sinks down into the humble, but safe and useful, condition of a Scottish provincial bank. And here it is profitable to pause; to look back, and see by what means this ancient and powerful institution——this Babylon of the banking world—was so suddenly and so totally prostrated. Who did it? And with what weapons? Sir, it was done by that power which is now regulating the affairs of the civilized world. It was done by the power of public opinion, invoked by the working members of the British Parliament. It was done by Sir Henry Parnell, who led the attack upon the Wellington ministry on the night of the 15th of November; by Sir William Pulteney, Mr. Grenfell, Mr. Hume, Mr. Edward Ellice, and others, the working members of the House of Commons, such as had, a few years before, overthrown the gigantic oppressions of the salt tax. These are the men who have overthrown the Bank of England. They began the attack in 1824, under the discouraging cry of too soon, too soon—for the charter had then nine years to run! and ended with showing that they had began just soon enough. They began with the ministers in their front, on the side of the bank, and ended with having them on their own side, and making them co-operators in the attack, and the instruments and inflicters of the fatal and final blow. But let us do justice to these ministers. Though wrong in the beginning, they were right in the end; though monarchists, they behaved like republicans. They were not Polignacs. They yielded to the intelligence of the age; they yielded to the spirit which proscribes monopolies and privileges, and in their correspondence with the bank directors, spoke truth and reason, and asserted liberal principles, with a point and power which quickly put an end to dangerous and obsolete pretensions. They told the bank the mortifying truths, that its system was unsolid and de

lusive-–that its privileges and monopoly were out of

fashion—that they could not be prolonged for five years even--nor suffered to exist in London alone; and, what was still more cutting, that the banks of Scotland, which had no monopoly, no privilege, no connexion with the Government, which paid interest on deposites, and whose stockholders were responsible to the amount of their shares—were the solid and substantial banks, which alone the public interest could hereafter recognise. They did their business, when they undertook it, like true men; and, in the single phrase, out of fashion, achieved the most powerful combination of solid argument, and contemptuous scarcasm, that ever was compressed into two words. It is a phrase of electrical power over the senses and passions. It throws back the mind to the reigns of the Tudors and Stuarts—the termagant Elizabeth and the pedagogue James—and rouses within us all the shame and rage we have been accustomed to feel at the view of the scandalous sales of privileges and monopolies which were the disgrace and oppression of these wretched times. fashion! Yes; even in England, the land of their early birth, and late protection. And shall they remain in fashion here? Shall republicanism continue to wear, in America, the antique costume which the doughty champions of antiquated fashion have been compelled to doff in £ngland? shall English lords and ladies continue to find,

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in the Bank of the United States, the unjust and odious privileges which they can no longer find in the Bank of England? Shall the copy survive here after the original has been destroyed there? Shall the young whelp triumph in America, after the old lion has becom throttled and strangled in England? No! never! The thing is impossible! The Bank of the United States dies, as the Bank of England dies, in all its odious points, upon the limitation of its charter; and the only circumstance of regret is, that the generous deliverance is to take effect two years earlier in the British monarchy than in the American republic. One word, Mr. President, upon an incidental topic. It is shown that the stock of the Bank of the United States has fallen five per cent. in consequence of the cpinions disclosed in the President’s messages; and, thereupon, a complaint is preferred against the President for depreciating the property of innocent and unoffending people. I made a remark upon this complaint in the beginning of my speech, and now have a word more to bestow upon it. I wish to contrast this conduct of the American stockholders with that of the Bank of England stockholders, in a similar, and to them, much more disastrous, case. The Bank of England stockholders also, have had a decline in the price of stock; not of five dollars, but of thirty-five pounds, in the share. Bank of England stock, in consequence of Earl Liverpool's communication, and of the debates in Parliament, has fallen from 238 to 203; equal to a loss of $165 in every share. This is something more than $5. Yet I have never heard that Earl Liverpool, or any member of Parliament, has been called to account for producing this depreciation. It would seem that the liberty of speech, and the rights of discussion, in Great Britain, extended to the affairs of the Bank of England; and that ministers and legislators were safe in handling it like any other subject. Fourthly. i object, Mr. President, to the renewal of the bank charter, because this bank is an institution too costly and expensive for the American people to keep up. Let no one cavil at this head of objection, under the belief that the Bank of the United States supports itself, like the hibernal boar, by sucking its own paws; or that it derives its revenues, as a spider spins its web, from the recesses of its own abdomen. Such a belief would be essentially erroneous, and highly unbecoming the intelligence of the nineteenth century. The fact is, that the bank lives upon the people! that all its expenses are made out of the people; all its profits derived from, and all its losses re-imbursed by, them. This is the naked truth; by consequence every shilling held, or issued, by the bank, over and above the capital stock, is a tax upon the people; and, as such, I shall look into the amount of the levy, and prove it to be too great for the people to bear any longer. In the first place, we have the direct expenses of the bank, the actual cost of its annual administration. These expenses are returned at $372,000 for the year 1830; and, assuming that sum for an average, the total cost of the administration for twenty years will be about seven and a half millions of dollars. The enormity of this sum must strike every mind; but, to judge it accurately, let us compare it to the expenses of some known establishment. Let us take the civil list of the Federal Government in the first term of President Washington’s administration. . Resorting to this standard, I find the expenditure of this branch of the Government to be: for 1792, $381,000; for '93, $338,000; for '94, $441,000; for '95, $361,000; presenting an annnal average of $385,000; which is but a trifle over the bank expenditure for 1830. Now, what were the heads of expenditure included in the civil list at the peri; od referred too. They were the salaries of the President and Vice President; the salaries of all the Secretaries, their clerks and messengers, and the purchase of the paraphernalia of all their offices; compensation to both Houses of Congress, and the discharge of every attendant expense; salaries to

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