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second would occur independently of the first out of the same conditions as give rise to the first, it is bound to occur in any case, secondarily to the first. For the first involves inactivity, and nothing is so detrimental to machinery, animate or inanimate, as disuse. A vicious circle thus arises between the two factors; the engine more and more losing its mechanical efficiency, and developing less and less power.

The anxiety-neurosis and the compulsion or obsessional neurosis are usually considered to be symptomatic of neurasthenia. It is true they are often associated, but that is simply because they are all effects of "degeneracy." They are obviously not symptoms of neurasthenia, as I have defined it. I might say, they are symptoms of "neurasthenia,” only when the term is used in a portmanteau sense, as equivalent to "degeneracy."

The anxiety-neurosis is part of the price paid for reflective self-consciousness. Men look before and after and pine for what is not; we all hope and fear; the anxious-neurotic simply hopes and fears too much, more than the average. He is emotionally hyper-aesthetic, like the hysteric, but in the world of four dimensions.

III.

Obsessions cannot be dismissed so easily. Let me remind the reader first that "mental" normality consists in appropriateness of reaction, organic and voluntary, to all the various circumstances of life as they arise. "Action tends to be repeated in similar circumstances" is the sanction of our organic and voluntary reactions when we meet a lion at large. If then similar reactions, more or less modified, arise in certain individuals when they meet a cat, it is no great matter for surprise. The circumstances are fairly similar. The case is exactly analogous to that of personal idiosyncrasy; it is a psychological idiosyncrasy, a "local" hysteria.

On the other hand, this is not the only possible aetiology of a catphobia. For just as we exhibit acquired as well as instinctive idiosyncrasies, so may we exhibit acquired as well as instinctive psychological idiosyncrasies. Many phobias have actually been traced to events experienced by the individual and "forgotten." The organism, as physiological, "remembers" better than the organism, as psychological, the individual "self."

This dissociation of the two "organisms," or tendencies, the physiological and the psychological, is well illustrated by cases of the shell-shock type. The physiological organism keeps on reacting in the appropriate

manner to the circumstances of the original shock long after the circumstances have ceased. The reactions have become habitual. The "memory" of the original shock, on the other hand, has been lost, and this seems to be a condition of the continuance of the physiological reactions, for if, by psycho-analysis, suggestion or other means, the memory is revived, the patient recovers, more or less, from his physiological bad habit. This is not surprising, being analogous to what occurs normally. We cannot control our organic (emotional) tendencies, but normally we are aware of their occasion, and when the unviable occasioning conditions cease (when the viva is over), we gradually subside, return to our normal viable equilibrium. The shell-shocked man, being unaware of the occasion of his physiological reactions, does not subside in this natural way; but let his memory of the shock be revived, and it is as natural for him to subside as it is for us when we wake out of a terrible nightmare. The loss of "memory" in these cases seems to be a primary condition of the symptoms; I should not care to be dogmatic as to the conditions of the loss of memory. In cases of concussion they may be physiological; it seems beyond doubt that in some cases they are psychological ("repression").

Other obsessions arise out of the relation of the individual to his ideal world, i.e. the world of his ideas-another part of the price of reflective self-consciousness.

This brings us to the phenomenon of repression. I would here emphasize the fact that in my account of this indubitable phenomenon, for the discovery of which, or for emphasizing which, the world is indebted to Freud, I shall rely on laws which I had formulated from the observation of the lower functions and forms of life, long before I came to apply them to the higher, namely, to the human intellectual activities. I mention this because it would undoubtedly seem far-fetched, as an ad hoc explanation of the facts.

Repression, then, consists in the operation of my Second Law of Life in the field of the imagination, where it has no business to operate. No ideas ought to be unviable. Where we have repression we have an individual not at unity with himself.

The Second Law ("Unviable activity tends not to be repeated") modifies the operation of the First, in those organisms which have. developed general instincts, who try all things, many of them, naturally, unviable. It is the chicken's sanction for not always pecking the nastytasting worm when it sees it.

But "ideas" are not so easily dropped as tendencies in regard to objects. It is true we forget most of our experience. Experience that

has had interest for us, however, we do not forget, if we are normal, however much we should like to. The unpleasant fact stands out in retrospect, or is brought to mind by present association; we cannot escape it, as we can escape from objects. Ça y est; ça y reste. Coelum, non animum, mutant, qui trans mare currunt.

So much for the normal individual. The abnormal has another way of dealing with past unpleasant experience, the fabled manner of the ostrich. If there is anything he is interested to "forget," he "forgets" it. He is really remembering to ignore it, like the wise chick. In his retrospects he develops a blind spot for this particular experience. (It is probable we all do it.) We call in the Second Law, which normally should have no jurisdiction in the world of ideal experience, to keep us unconscious of what is tending "towards consciousness" through the operation of the First Law, to inhibit a reaction which would otherwise occur. (The occurrence of an idea is a reaction.)

The most typical cases perhaps are those referring to sexual matters. These matters have a primary interest for all, while a prohibition attaches to them secondarily. The natural man is interested in sexual matters; the conventional man is interested to ignore what interests him as a natural man.

The simple repression is just a blind spot in an individual's ideal world, a negative hallucination. But there is another way than the ostrich's of dealing with unviable ideas. We may either be blind to what we would not see, or we may look at something else. The disputant, whose opponent's meaning is ambiguous in form, if not in fact, is at liberty to choose the meaning which best suits himself,-"'tis a law in disputation."

Consider now the ease with which objects are "associated." Do we not often find it difficult to say how an idea “came into our head," and discover, after much searching and perhaps retraversing, in fact or in imagination, our recent sense-experience, that a certain part of that sense-experience had suggested to us, not the idea of the particular sense-object presented, but the idea of an associated object? We had looked at A and thought of B, and A had never been explicitly in consciousness at all. And this too when we had no interest in ignoring A as far as we can see. Now let A be an idea in which the individual (1) is primarily interested (First Law), and which (2) he is interested to ignore, as an unpleasant idea (Second Law). The first condition determines the recurrence of the tendency A; the second inhibits A and thus allows the substitution of B. B becomes an obsessive idea. (Freudians will

note that this is "pure Freud," with the substitution of my First Law for libido and my Second for the censorship.)

An obsessive idea is a phenomenon quite analogous to the case of shell-shock. We can convert each into terms of the other, and say either that the abnormal bodily reactions of the shell-shock patient are physiological "obsessions," or that the obsessive idea is as physiological a reaction as those of shell-shock, only it is a reaction of the higher functions of the organism. The obsessive idea is at the same time a testimony to the superficial plausibility of the automaton theory of mind of the pure materialists, and its obvious condemnation. Physiology in its highest manifestations is still physiology. Normal thinking is not of the type of the recurrence of obsessive ideas.

Hence it is that the cure for both states is the same, the discovery to the patient of the occasion of his reactions. The individual thus becomes at unity with himself; there is a cessation of the aberrant physiological reactions determined by the improper operation of the Second Law.

The same aetiology would apply to certain hallucinations, organic sensations and motor tics. They are obsessions, tendencies not apparently appropriate to the situation. The repetitive nature of obsessions corresponds to the repetitive nature of normal tendencies, of the "normal obsessions," for instance, in regard to food and sex, in a word to the repetitive nature of life. We need hardly point out the omnium gatherum nature of the term "obsession."

IV.

So far I have dealt with what may be called psychological neuroses, i.e. with changes of standard of viable equilibrium as between psychological reaction and its conditions. I have not dealt, except to glance at it in connection with neurasthenia, with the relation of physiological reaction and its conditions. Is there such a thing as a physiological neurosis?

Whatever we may call it, there is certainly in physiological activity a type of abnormality exactly analogous to that which, in psychological activity, is called a neurosis. What is pure idiosyncrasy but a “functional" disorder of the organism as physiological activity? (We say "pure" because idiosyncrasies may be of psychological origin.) Most people can eat shell-fish or eggs without untoward consequences, but some people cannot. Their bodies react to these articles of diet in an abnormal way, find them unviable. Such reactions are physiological neuroses, alterations of the normal standard of viable equilibrium as between physiological activity and its conditions.

The relation between physiological activity and its conditions is not so complex, so various, as that between psychological activity and its conditions, but it is perhaps more baffling. For in the latter case we may consider first the relation of the psychological activity to its external conditions, and thus give a specious simplicity to the relation, which we complicate later by considering the internal conditions, the body. We can as it were distinguish a Soul to be the informing principle of the lifeactivity, a Conscious Subject which reacts to its environmental conditions, and which can be called hyper- or hypo-aesthetic. In the former case we cannot. We have a bio-chemical activity in which it is as hard to suppose a Soul as in a chemical reaction. It seems impossible (except for a monadologist) to separate, even in thought, physiological activity and its conditions.

But the appearance of a Soul or Mind or Conscious Subject is simply due to the operation of the tendency to viable equilibrium, the real informing principle of life-activity. And this tendency operates no less in physiological than in psychological activity. When it operates aberrantly, we have the physiological neuroses, which are not intelligible, any more than the psychological, as long as we keep within the circle of material conditions, in our attempts to understand them.

If a physiological process proceed abnormally because of some demonstrable abnormality in its conditions, this constitutes an organic derangement, about which no one has any difficulty whatever. But it is also possible for physiological process to proceed abnormally when all the conditions before and after birth are normal (not appear to be normal, but are normal, a thing we can suppose for the argument's sake) except the internal physiological conditions of the fertilized ovum itself. The individual manifestation of life is degenerate. This is one condition of the occurrence of functional physiological derangement, of physiological neurosis. The organism's physiological standard of viable equilibrium is altered from the normal. Development in such cases proceeds aberrantly, resulting in all the anatomical malformations and disproportions called stigmata of degeneracy. Such mal-development is physiological neurosis. To refer the abnormalities to one another, as when cretinism is referred to thyroid insufficiency, or neurasthenia to loss of muscular tone, shows the medical man as poor a natural philosopher as the people who proposed to live by taking in each other's washing showed themselves poor economists. All the abnormalities present are the effect of the degenerate condition. Families, human and other, can die out; a race can be sick; and the neuroses, physiological and psychological, are symptoms of this racial sickness.

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