will have seriously to undertake the task of the deliberate restriction of its population. Unfortunately he does not give us any concrete proposals as to how this restriction is to be effected. "It is obvious," he says, "that a wise social regulation would aim at and would know how to secure through the agency of custom, of social institutions and, if necessary, of legislation, a restriction of reproduction among the citizens of the unenfranchised classa restriction as severe as the circumstances of the time may demand." This is hopeful, but too vague to be very helpful. Perhaps, however, in a future work McDougall may be induced to treat the quantitative problems with the same thoroughness as he has already treated the qualitative (eugenic) problems in National Welfare. These problems abound in difficulties both of a sociological and of a psychological order, as the present reviewer has endeavoured to show elsewhere in this journal (vol. II. pp. 225 ff.) and are well worth careful and detailed consideration at the hands of the social psychologist.

What is at once the most novel and the most daring of McDougall's proposals is reserved for an Appendix-an appendix which is very boldly entitled "Outline of the One and Only Practicable Plan for Bringing about the Disarmament of Nations and the Reign of International Justice." It is here maintained that the two chief obstacles to the successful working of the League of Nations (or any other similar body) are (1) the question of how the different nations are to be represented, (2) the question of how the League is to be provided with adequate sanctions. The first of these difficulties may be met, McDougall suggests, by allowing representation to each nation on the basis of its expenditure on education (which is indicative both of its cultural and economic status). The second and greater difficulty could be met by an international agreement to prohibit all national ownership of aircraft. A small but highly efficient international air force under the sole control of an international authority could then, without difficulty, enforce the decisions of that authority upon any recalcitrant nation. The scheme is fascinating in its simplicity and daring, and undoubtedly deserves careful study. It is earnestly to be hoped that, as McDougall suggests in his preface, even those readers who do not care for the philosophical discussions contained in the earlier part of the book, may nevertheless be interested in the practical suggestions contained in this appendix.

A second appendix is devoted to a consideration of post-war Anglo-French relations; the attitude of France being sympathetically dealt with. The book ends on a sinister note, calculated to enforce the great and immediate urgency of the problems that have been treated. "Thus Labour and Finance," we are told in the concluding words, "are combining to create in France a state of feeling which at any moment may send a thousand air-planes to destroy a defenceless London."

J. C. FLÜGEL.

The Appearance of Mind. By J. C. MCKERROW. (Longmans, Green and Co. Pp. xv+120.) Price 6s. net.

Aberrations of Life. By J. C. MCKERROW. (Longmans, Green and Co. Pp. 107.). Price 6s. net.

In these two books the author develops what is really a theory of the behaviour of organisms. The first book contains an account of the theory and the

arguments supporting it; while, in the second, the theory is applied to the consideration of certain physiological and psychological abnormalities.

Briefly, the author attempts to show that "Mind," i.e. the "Subject" of psychological theory, is not a reality, but must be replaced in our conception of reality by an "Immaterial Principle" as he terms it, though it is really a law (in the scientific sense), namely, "There is a tendency (in organisms) towards Viable Equilibrium" (p. 4). "Viable Equilibrium" is explained as meaning the equilibrium existing between a bio-chemical reaction (i.e. the reaction of an organism) and its conditions. "Viable" "able to live" (of the organism), and "supporting life" (of the conditions).

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I think that, with this definition of "viable," the law of tendency towards viable equilibrium is little (if anything) more than a tautology. But, if we grant that it has a more significant content than this, it becomes necessary to determine whether the author has really succeeded in substituting it for the concept of "Mind" or "Subject" and in showing the latter to be devoid of reality.

The argument proceeds in a somewhat rambling fashion; but, if the original premises were granted, many of the succeeding statements would be true. Unfortunately, however, the author appears to confuse throughout his work two very different things, namely the ability to describe the behaviour of organisms without explicit reference to a "Mind" or "Subject," and the ability to dispense altogether with the concept of mind in a theory of the ultimate nature of the universe in which the behaviour of organisms is one type of manifestation. For example, in a discussion of the association of ideas it is asserted that two ideas are "made contiguous, associated, not by a Thinking-Subject, but in accordance with law." But to say that two ideas are associated "in accordance with law" is merely to say that, as a matter of fact, two ideas which have once occurred in contiguity frequently occur again in contiguity. This does not help us much-it gets us no further than the observed fact, and it is quite irrelevant to the question whether this fact is rendered more intelligible, both in itself and in its relation to other facts, by the hypothesis of a "ThinkingSubject."

The subject may or may not exist, but you certainly cannot dispose of it by saying that the facts which it is called upon to render satisfactorily intelligible take place "according to law."

I do not, of course, wish to imply that there is nothing more in the author's argument than this, for quotations torn from their context are always liable to give a false impression of what they were really meant to convey; but I do mean that the author is far too ready to dismiss respectable psychological (and metaphysical) concepts by facile reference to "tendencies" and "laws" which, unless we are content to regard them as mere descriptions, themselves raise just the kind of difficulties which these concepts have been employed to surmount. In criticising the reasoning of Descartes (which, if valid, would be fatal to his theory) the author takes refuge in that fact which seems to afford such curious comfort to many modern thinkers who are trying to get rid of mind from the scheme of things-the fact that, if we look for a Knower or Thinker, i.e. an Agent, we cannot find it, we can only find Activity. But the plain answer to this is that if there be an Agent it is, ex hypothesi, not the kind of entity which could be discovered by searching, i.e. by careful observation of phenomena. The fact that it cannot be so discovered is therefore irrelevant to the question of its real existence, which can only be settled by the consideration of quite a different order of facts which it is unnecessary to discuss here.

The author's position is really summed up in a statement which appears on page 28 of Aberrations of Life. He says here that "organisms are not Persons attending to what they are interested in, they are bundles of appropriate tendencies-in-respect-of changes, 'objects,' 'signs."" This position is not a new one; and it comes to life at intervals though it has frequently been flogged apparently to death. The question is whether the existence of tendencies in such remarkably unified "bundles" can be made any easier to understand by means of some such concept as the "subject." It is so very difficult to give any meaning to the notion of a mere "tendency" per se. Surely there must be some entity which has the tendency; and you cannot replace this entity entirely by the tendency in a substantial explanation (as distinct from a description of the facts).

I have not considered these two books in detail. There is much in them that is interesting, and few people would be disposed to quarrel with most of the author's descriptions of psychological and physiological facts. But detailed consideration is unnecessary here, for the author's main contention stands or falls on general grounds; and, as I have attempted to show, I do not think he has in any way succeeded in establishing the thesis which he set out to demonstrate. C. A. RICHARDSON.

Love in Children and its Aberrations. By OSKAR PFISTER. Translated from the German by Eden and Cedar Paul. London: George Allen and Unwin. 1924. Pp. 576. 24s. net.

The intention of this large volume is to "make the assured and fruitful results of the modern study of unconscious mentation, and of the importance of the unconscious in mental development, accessible to the general reader...in as popular a vein as the subject permitted....It is intended to show the general relationships of the development of love, to explain how desirable ends can be attained, and how necessary changes can be effected. My aim is to induce parents to conceive their educational tasks in a very different way from that demanded of them by the exponents of the traditional science of education." The author rightly says that this is a difficult task on which he has embarked; and we in our turn can say that it is a task on the whole well achieved. Although popular, it is weighty and serious in presentation, and shows very clearly how difficult the business of getting properly educated is, and how complicated and delicate the process of normal emotional development. We are introduced to the subject by a survey of the history of the problem of love, and of love in children as treated in educational science; and then carried on through a study of the normal and abnormal development of love, of formative forces and experiences, to the training of love in children and the treatment of love's disorders. The author's wide and varied experience as an analyst and a pastor are drawn upon for a wealth of illustrative material at every point, and the discussion of the educational aspects of the problem reveals his practical wisdom. It would perhaps seem an ungrateful task to offer criticism of so solid and dignified a popular volume; and yet we could wish it more solid, from the point of view of psychological science.

For it undoubtedly suffers on the theoretical side, not merely from the limitations imposed by its popular character, but from the almost passionate desire of the pastor to make clear the ethical value and significance of psycho

analysis. We are constantly hearing of "higher interests," and "higher powers," but we are not shown what is their source, nor their relation to the "lower" sensual desires. After all the broad discussion of "Love" we remain clouded as to what relation "love" bears to sexuality, and "parental and filial affection" and "the love of God" to sexual love, no use being made of the concept of erotic impulses which are 'inhibited in their aim' (zielgehemmte). Although we are given a clear summary of much of Freud's sexual theory, with verbal approval, we cannot help feeling that it has not been fully assimilated into the inner texture of the pastor's thought about love relationships. We are expressly told that "psycho-analysis does not claim that it is competent to remedy all the aberrations of the love sentiment"; and we have the impression that the over-anxious repetition of apologetics of this type are an index of failure to deal with the "higher" impulses in strictly psychological terms.

One other serious criticism must be made. Reading through the case after case described so dramatically to illustrate the various points of the discussion, one would undoubtedly get the strong impression, if one did not already know better, and know that the author must know better, that the mechanism of the psycho-analytic cure was to "make clear the meaning of" the symptoms. Such a passage as the following shows an altogether too intellectualistic interpretation of the therapeutic processes, an interpretation that is only too misleading to the general public, and leads not only to misunderstanding, but to malpractice. "The aim of the analysis was to show the patient the historical origin of his symptoms;...to show him what in his youth he was giving expression to and aiming at; I had to disclose to him the nature of his hostility to the teacher, the unwholesome and cruel attitude of mind that led him to call up the haunting spectre of this teacher as the devil. But also I had to prove to him that his anxiety, which led him to play the timid child, had as its aim to save him from the energetic utilisation of his powers, and thus to secure a gain out of illness. I had to bring into light these unethical manoeuvres against the teacher and himself. When this had been done, the patient's own moral judgment set to work, and made him abjure such conduct...." That this is the author's general view of the dynamics of the cure is the impression one gains, an impression which is not lessened by the direct discussion of "The Concept and Aims of Psychoanalysis" on pp. 513 et seq. Not until later, p. 533, do we come upon any important recognition of the function of the transference in the process of analysis. On p. 534 Dr Pfister straightforwardly admits that in his earlier writings and his earlier practice he did lay too much emphasis upon the intellectual interpretation of symptoms, and overlooked the analytic significance of the transference. One cannot but respect such honesty and elasticity of mind; and yet, even the statement here is not entirely adequate to the matter under consideration. Even in a popular book, it should be possible to make clearer the detailed psychological processes that occur during the course of analysis, leading to the "cure"; and especially, the all-important function of the transference, since it is with regard to this that so much misunderstanding is found, not only among the people who have just heard of psycho-analysis, but also among its serious critics, and especially among semi-qualified practitioners. It is, moreover, a matter of first-rate importance for all educational problems, since, as the recent work of Freud has shown, it affords the key to the formation of the "ego-ideal," and therefore to all "moral" development and social psychology.

SUSAN ISAACS.

The Daydream. A Study in Development. By GEORGE H. GREEN, B.Sc. (Lond.), B.Litt. (Oxon.). London: University of London Press, Ltd. Pp. 304. With Diagrams. Price 6s. net.

Mr Green's previous contribution to educational psychology is such as to demand the most respectful consideration and to justify high expectations.

"It is customary to say in these days that we are just beginning to know the minds of children. We probably boast too much. We forget, as we reach one stage, what the former was like. And such forgetting is necessary to progress, which must look to the future rather than to the past; considering that all of the past that matters is embodied in the present. We are perhaps learning that if we want to understand children something that is perhaps not really necessary, except in the case of parents and teachers—we must go to the child himself and consider his acts and sayings apart from our own prejudice” (p. 289). This possibly indicates the point of view from which Mr Green approaches his subject.

In the Daydream Mr Green studies phantasy, both in the child and in the adult, as a typical product. He rightly regards as the chief determinant of the phantasy the stage of emotional development of the dreamer. He offers a very valuable formula for the recurring theme "by the help of persons who admire me, and who are placed in a position to assist me, I am placed in an advantageous position."

Any one who has studied phantasy at all extensively will realise the very frequent applicability of this formula. In Chapter III the excellent schema of a typical fear phantasy is set forth:

Darkness (in which I can do nothing properly, and where

I run into things and hurt myself)

Laughter (of adults at my mistakes)

Jumping at me (I am caught unawares, and cannot know

at once what to do)

Bigness (I am helpless in the presence of big things)
Discovery (I am sometimes seen doing things, which I did

only because I thought I could not be seen)

HUMILIATION (my feeling when I am helpless)

At the same time Mr Green seems to have gone rather far in regarding phantasy as reducible to constant types. Discarding the method of Varendonck, he has rather gone to the other extreme.

Some will think that Mr Green is not quite wide enough in assessing the factors which determine the actual content of the daydream. It is obviously true that the daydream fills the gap between aspiration and reality for the dreamer, and for a large range of daydreamers we may take the aspiration and reality as being respectively typical. But this does not cover an important minority of cases in which either the dreamer's aspirations are exaggerated, or the actuality of his situation is abnormal. For instance, the girl's phantasy of becoming a boy is not one that can be recorded merely as a product of a certain stage of development. It is essentially a product of the girl's environment-one in which for some reason the male sex is more highly valued or privileged. Similarly, the phantasies that emerge from physical abnormalities, e.g. gigantism, dwarfism, etc. have little relation to the stage of development. In short, the author tends to slur the compensatory value of the phantasy and regards it more as a normal concomitant.

Mr Green throughout this volume shows himself a confirmed Freudian, but