animal propensities into glorious faculties" (p. 169). Another and a different set of values seems implicit in the following quotation: "a lack of ethical feeling is often an advantage. Some of our most successful public men would not be in the position they now occupy if they were too tender-hearted. On the other hand, a lack of intellect is always a drawback” (p. 162).

The last chapter is devoted to the treatment of moral failings. Stress is laid upon the physical basis of many moral defects and the importance of physical treatment in such cases is pointed out. On the psycho-therapeutic side Dr Hollander advocates suggestion, mental analysis and re-education. He considers psycho-analytic treatment to be a risky procedure for the physician (because of transference) and dangerous to the patient if undertaken by a layman. His attitude towards psycho-analysis may be judged from his comments on the following passage which he quotes from Stekel; "women who have not the courage to commit a sin against morality will steal some article which is of no value to them, as the symbolic fulfilment of a forbidden action, whereby the symbolic significance of the stolen article very often reveals the true nature of the instinctive action." Dr Hollander says: "We may well defer our opinion on this explanation until a psycho-analyst of the ultra-Freudian kind, who sees 'sex' in every abnormality, will give evidence in defence of a lady kleptomaniac. We shall then hear what the judge will have to say on the defence that the article stolen symbolically gratified the lady's sexual longings" (p. 199). A strange ground, truly, on which to base a scientific judgment!

T. W. M.

Studies in Psychoanalysis. By CHARLES BAUDOUIN. Translated by E. and C. PAUL. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1922. pp. 326.

"Monsieur Baudouin is already well known to the English public as the author of Suggestion and Autosuggestion, in which he acted as the evangelist of Coué. His new book Studies in Psychoanalysis is put forward as an attempt to show that the method of suggestion as set forth in his previous treatise may advantageously be combined with psychoanalysis, in the treatment of nervous disorders. He claims to have found from his personal experience that "a great deal of time and trouble is saved by the use of suggestion in conjunction with psychoanalysis."

Baudouin, however, is careful to point out that there is suggestion and suggestion, and while certain forms are incompatible with analysis others are commendable adjuvants. Thus the suggestion which increases repression is to be avoided. The latter he terms the 'vade retro' method of dealing with a symptom and recognises that it cuts off the shoots without touching the root of the evil; it is the 'ça passe' exorcism of Coué. The other form, what we might call positive suggestion, is termed by Baudouin the 'Veni Creator' method; it corresponds to Coué's formula "day by day in every way I get better and better." It is to this form of suggestion that Baudouin looks for help. He applies it to the overcoming of resistance, and to the guidance of the patient both during and after a course of analytical treatment. Though this is the gist of Baudouin's thesis he has a great deal more to discuss and many will find other of his points of greater value. The book is divided into two sections; the first, a theoretical exposition, occupies rather less than one-third of the volume. The second contains case histories of twenty-seven patients. The case histories

are clearly written and show as admirably as an elementary presentation well could a selection of common neurotic dispositions and how these are illuminated by psychoanalysis. They do not, however, give us any inkling as to how the author applies his method. One learns from them nothing of that unceasing collaboration between autosuggestion and psychoanalysis which is assigned as the raison d'être of their publication. The reviewer also failed to gain any more precise information than is given in Part I when visiting the Jean Jacques Rousseau Institute, attending the clinic there and conversing with Monsieur Baudouin early this year (1922).

In Part I Baudouin defines his aim as the production of a record of his own work which might interest experts, not the writing of a popular treatise for beginners. Yet he admits that the French as a nation are most backward in psychoanalytical knowledge and therefore feels it incumbent upon him to deal with general principles as most of his readers are in fact beginners. For this we may well be grateful since it has induced Baudouin to give us what is a most stimulating and suggestive discussion on several points. He tritely remarks that however tolerant and kindly psychoanalysts may be to their patients they seem to take a positive delight not only in violently upsetting the smug prejudices of the world in general, but also in clothing their theories in obscure neologisms. Certainly Baudouin himself is free from this reproach, for though he never lacks courage his statements are put forward with no less delicacy than force. After commending Victor Hugo for his frankness in the poem "Boaz endormi" he remarks "I find the idea that all poetry, all glory, all holiness have this (instinctive) lowly origin no more offensive than I find Darwin's idea (now generally admitted) of the descent of man."

Therefore, although addressed to so-called experts, Baudouin's book will fill a useful rôle in introducing some of the conclusions arrived at by analytical methods to the more intelligent of the laity without giving them an unnecessary mental dyspepsia. Baudouin's treatment of condensation and displacement in particular is stimulating. He regards symbolism as the natural outcome of the interaction of the laws of condensation and displacement, yet he finds the concept of the censor one of the most valuable contributions of Freudian psychology. Once these mechanisms exist they are at the disposal of the censor for disguisement and may have yet other functions. Freud himself has said "that which is to-day linked under the form of the symbol presumably constituted at the outset a conceptual and verbal unity." Once we agree that the dream is a regression to an archaic mode of thought we may anticipate disguise even though disguise is not purposive. Again the mechanism has a further utility in that it is the essence of creative imagination. For just as intelligence ensures our adaptation to the real so does imagination ensure the adaptation of the real to ourselves.

Baudouin would agree with Claparède in assuming for dreaming the same function as has Groos for play, namely, the exercise of certain activities which have a prospective value to the individual. Thus though Baudouin is sympathetic to Freudian psychology he seeks to discover a wider basis and utility for certain mechanisms.

This he expresses poetically by likening the dream to an orchestra in which a number of instruments are playing. The ear can, at will, follow the notes of one instrument or another, and various interpretations are possible. Only we must never lose sight of the plurality of meaning, never cease to attend to the orchestra as a whole.

The crux of Baudouin's thesis is the transference. He considers that psychoanalysts by admitting the transference have adopted suggestion willy-nilly and that they would be wise to recognise this and attempt to guide their suggestions. That the transference is the meeting place of psychoanalysis and suggestion has long been recognised and the whole question has been rather fully treated by Dr Ernest Jones (vide his Collected Papers) and others. It is therefore not necessary to enter into this matter here nor to confute the statement that transference itself takes the form that is imposed upon it by suggestion. In the course of his general exposition Baudouin briefly appraises the value of the tendencies of Adler and Jung. The attempted synthesis of the latter he regards as philosophical rather than scientific. He considers that the time for synthesis has not yet arrived, rather is further analysis first required. Each instinct requires to be studied separately and the utmost done to trace all its possible metamorphoses in the human psyche. This offers an interesting perspective to investigators and if it is undertaken we may expect a series of monographs upon the different instincts. Already we have Trotter's study of the herd instinct and Pierre Bovet's account of the combative instinct. Each instinct will, in Baudouin's opinion, be found to undergo a religious sublimation and he is interested to trace the history of their avatars. A general synthesis should only be undertaken as the crowning result of such researches. Looking at things in this light Baudouin may be said to view Adler's work as a monograph upon the Ichtriebe of Freud, while he tends to regard Freud's work as too exclusively concerned with the Sexualtriebe. In a footnote he says it is amusing to note that the names of these two men of science are symbolical of their respective theories: for Freude signifies joy (the pleasure principle), while Adler signifies eagle (will to power). Whatever our view may be there is no occasion for pessimism. All instincts have a rightful place in our make-up; the neuropath is out of harmony with the real only because he has become obsessed by one principle only. Fortunately, the other instincts are, like sexuality, capable of undergoing sublimation. On the whole Baudouin's outlook is sympathetic towards psychoanalysis, indeed he seems to fear that he may be accused of being a pan-sexualist. Possibly this attitude is influenced by what he knows of the readers to whom his work is addressed, yet his constant endeavour to weaken the sexual motive appears also as the expression of a personal need. The book, however, forms interesting reading and indicates the path along which the Latin mind is groping towards an understanding of psychoanalysis. There is a useful glossary and an adequate index.

ALFRED CARVER.

The Psychology of the Criminal. By H. HAMBLIN SMITH, M.A., M.D. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd. pp. 182. Price 6s. net.

This book is a valuable contribution to clinical psychology and may be recommended to all who are interested in social science as well as to professional students of Law and Medicine. It is an attempt to apply to the study of the criminal the new conceptions introduced into psychology by Freud and his followers, and the author's main contention is that the intensive investigation of individual offenders in the light of psycho-analytical theory is the road to the solution of the problem of criminality.

According to Dr Hamblin Smith "crimes are, from the legal point of view,

acts which, in the opinion of a particular society, at a particular time, are considered to deserve punishment by that society...a crime is an act which is legally wrong, and which is, essentially, an infringement of the criminal law. The question as to whether the act is 'morally' wrong does not come in” (p. 2). A review of the various theories of punishment leads the author to a consideration of the thorny problem of responsibility. He avows himself to be a thorough-going determinist and declares that "the metaphysical theory of the 'freedom of the will"" has no place in any scientific scheme. He rejects the idea that responsibility is something intrinsic to the individual, but regards it rather "as expressing the idea of the reaction of Society to a given act" (p. 10). In what he says regarding the relation of Society to the criminal, Dr Hamblin Smith illustrates the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of trying to adhere to strictly deterministic terminology when dealing with the facts of human conduct. He says: If Society chooses to decide that under special circumstances its normal reaction to some act will be modified, it is, of course, at complete liberty to do so" (p. 10). Yet, surely, to claim liberty of choice when we are speaking of the reactions of Society is even less defensible than when the reactions of the individual are in question. It would perhaps be well if it were more generally recognized that 'determinism' is just as much a metaphysical theory as the 'freedom of the will' and that with metaphysical theories the scientist quâ scientist has no concern. Determinism is a postulate of all scientific inquiry, and whenever we doubt the validity of its application to any problem we are doubting the possibility of solving such problem by the methods of

science.

The various theories of punishment that have, at one time or another, been put forward are here reduced to three: Retaliatory, Deterrent and Reformatory. The author believes that the comparatively unsuccessful result of reformatory punishment has been due to a failure to investigate fully the mind of the individual offender; and in such full investigation he sees the hope of the future.

Inquiry into the mental states of offenders is a very specialized matter, and this book contains Dr Hamblin Smith's experience in this direction. He hopes that his work may be of practical use to his fellow-workers who are engaged in the study of offenders, to magistrates and others whose daily work lies with offenders, and to social workers, teachers in schools and others.

The author insists on the importance of a complete physical examination of the offender before the investigation of his mental state is entered upon; but he does not labour this point and the greater part of the book is devoted to the methods employed in the investigation of the offender's mind. A broad division is made between the examination of the conscious mind and of the unconscious mind, and the methods employed in each respectively are described in some detail.

Not the least valuable part of the book is the description given of the mental tests used by the author himself in his examination of criminals. He believes the Binet and Terman schemes to be useful for work in Children's Courts, but in his own Court work he has to deal with no children under the age of 16 years and with comparatively few offenders between the ages of 16 and 18 years. He has therefore devised a series of tests, suitable for adolescents and adults, and he invites reports from any workers who give a trial to this scheme.

In entering upon his account of the investigation of the offender's unconscious mind the author prepares his readers for the standpoint from which the topic is viewed by stating at the outset that "this book is written, so far as

the subject of psycho-analysis is concerned, from the Freudian position." He makes it plain that, as a rule, modifications of Freud's views promulgated by others are regarded as resting upon a fundamental and irreconcilable difference from the views of Freud." Yet on some points there is evidence that he has not been uninfluenced by some of these innovations. His description of what we are to understand by the terms conscious, preconscious and unconscious is not as clear as we should have desired; and a predilection for the term complex, which is unfortunate in the present state of uncertainty regarding the most appropriate use of this word in psychology, leads to a blurring of some of the finer points related to the theory of repression and to the elements on which repression essentially bears.

On page 70 it is stated that "a complex may become repressed into the unconscious. The unconscious into which this repression takes place is regarded as being, in some respects, distinct from the primary unconscious.... It has been termed the 'secondary' or 'Freudian unconscious.' We should have been glad of the reference to Freud's works where this distinction is made. It is reminiscent of Tansley rather than of Freud.

66

On page 73 we are told that A repressed complex may escape into consciousness by taking the form of a physical symptom. In this case we get what is known as a 'neurosis' or a 'psycho-neurosis."" This is, to say the least, misleading, and the layman may be led to suppose that in every psychoneurosis there must be physical symptoms.

The brief reference to 'symbolism' on page 74 seems to the reviewer far from satisfactory. The disguise afforded by symbolism is here ascribed to the censorship; and to evade this activity it is said that "emotions, thoughts and memories strive to get into consciousness by clothing themselves in symbolic shapes." But this is not Freud's teaching; he explicitly states that symbolism is "a second and independent factor in dream-distortion, existing side by side with the censorship" (Introductory Lectures, p. 142).

Dr Hamblin Smith's chapter on "The Various Classes of Offenders" is very helpful and suggestive, especially in regard to the group of mental defectives. Recognizing the serious and far-reaching results of certifying a person as being mentally defective, he inclines towards giving the offender the benefit of the doubt whenever such doubt arises in the examiner's mind. He strikes a necessary note of warning of the danger of deciding on the results of mental tests alone. He does not believe that the mere failure to attain any particular standard of 'mental age' is, per se, enough to bring a person under the heading of mental deficiency. In every doubtful case we have to weigh all the factors and not that of intelligence alone.

But this relegation of the intellect to its proper place in relation to conduct appears to be forgotten by the author when he comes to deal with Moral Insanity and Moral Imbecility. He asks the question, "Is there such a thing as a 'moral sense,' apart from the intellect?" And he states his view that there is no such sense. He thinks that the doctrine of psychical determinism, to which he repeatedly avows his allegiance, renders any such position untenable.

If, as would seem to be the case, Dr Hamblin Smith is using the term 'moral sense' as it was used by the English Moralists of the eighteenth century, then it may be conceded that few at the present day would disagree with his conviction that 'there is no such sense.' But if he implies that there are no forces in the mind which are determinants of conduct other than those derived from the intellect, then there are good grounds for disagreeing with his con