of suggestion as a non-rational process. Psychotherapy knows the practical value of suggestion as a method of mental healing, and accustomed to the relation between physician and patient it tends to regard the essence of suggestion as being the conscious and intentional communication, with some measure of authority, of an idea or ideas by someone possessing prestige to a subject capable of being thrown into a receptive state by this means. When the systematic psychologist comes along and tries to present a synthetic view by combining the particular contributions of these various schools the result is practically a return to the common sense usage which is too vague to be helpful-what Dr Rivers described as "a tendency to make the scope of suggestion so wide as to include nearly every process by which one mind is acted upon by another mind, by an object of the environment, or even by itself (autosuggestion)1."

It is obvious that the facts of suggestion are far older than any psychological account of them; the existence of the word in common speech is sufficient evidence that they were at least in some measure recognised. In his contribution to the Symposium2 on "The Relations of Complex and Sentiment" prepared for the Meeting of The British Psychological Society in Manchester, July 1922, Dr Myers wrote: "In order to reach greater precision, psychologists have attempted to change the meaning of these and other words in common use, but without paying enough attention to their current meaning or to the route by which they have come to acquire that meaning. It is too generally assumed that popular usage annihilates meaning. This is an error: it is always possible to define the words of common parlance, and it is of considerable psychological interest to study their significance." To rediscover what may be called the nuclear meaning of the term suggestion in common speech would probably put us on the way to discovering what is the real and essential meaning of the word, which is what psychology as a science seeks. A deeper analysis of the common usage reveals at once the fact that the more intelligent or rational signification is secondary, and that the primary element refers to something surreptitious. The veiled hint, the ambiguous phrase or gesture, the tone of voice and manner of address vaguely intimating something behind the obvious, the symbolic act or representation-these and similar indirect modes of conveying influence are commonly regarded as the

1 W. H. R. Rivers, Article "Psycho-therapeutics," Hastings' Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.

2 British Journal of Psychology, XIII. 2.

characteristic vehicles through which suggestion operates. And the result of successful suggestion in this sense is the stirring up in the recipient of activities or tendencies which are not rationally conditioned. The influence is carried in under the walls of the citadel and escapes the watchful eye of the sentry. Religious ritual, for example, does not make its appeal to reason, but to what is sometimes called "the aesthetic sense" which means that it is suggestion acting through the senses directly upon organised conative tendencies built out of primitive instinctive material. This evasion of the critical reason is the outstanding mark of suggestion. How then does it come about that at the same time the word is used in common speech for processes which are of a definitely rational character? Why do we, when asked for an opinion, frequently call the ideas we elaborate a 'suggestion'? Why is almost any contribution, short of an authoritative enunciation of a truth which is by common consent beyond dispute, nearly always offered as a suggestion? The value of the term in these and similar contexts is in its tentative nature. We 'suggest' possibilities; while we issue instructions, and we declare demonstrated truths. Thus however sure we may be in our own minds that what we have to offer is right and true we frequently do not wish to give the impression that we are too sure. "I tell you this that you may read, mark, learn and inwardly digest it" is the attitude of the self-assured teacher to the disciple. "I suggest this to you...take it for what it is worth, and let it influence you as much as it may have power to do" is the attitude of the more tentative adviser or fellow inquirer; and the fact is that the more tentative communication often has the bigger effect, and it is probably popular insight into this fact that has led to the common use of the word in what seems at first sight to be so different a meaning. There is something more involved, in other words, than is obvious in the form in which the communication is made. We may roughly sum this up by saying that the popular use of suggestion implies that it is the method by which indirect mental influence is exerted. Direct mental influence is aimed at in the endeavour to convince through reason, and is successful when conviction is logically implanted. Indirect influence means that which passes through channels other than or additional to the channel of

reason.

Most psychological discussions of suggestion start from this general conception, but very different conclusions are reached regarding such questions as the extent of the phenomena which may rightly be subsumed under the general heading, and what exactly are the mechanisms

involved in the process. It was chiefly through the therapeutic application of hypnotism, first by Braid, and still more by Liébeault, that suggestion became a matter of serious scientific investigation. Sir Francis R. Cruise1 records the fact that Liébeault told him that as a young practitioner he had been greatly impressed by the influence upon patients of the expression of a very decided opinion by the physician, and he set about to discover how this influence might be exercised more directly and specifically. In the course of investigation and trial he discovered that in artificially provoked sleep, or hypnotism, the suggestibility of a patient was immensely increased. Accordingly Liébeault made use of hypnotism in order to facilitate treatment by suggestion; and this process was of course, the deliberate passing into the mind of the patient of beneficial ideas by the physican. These ideas, passing into the mind of a hypnotised person without reference to his rational volition, undoubtedly operate in a manner wholly different from that in which they behave if merely presented to and accepted by the logical reason of a person in the normal state. The idea of being better from some pain, when lodged in the mind of a person in a hypnotic state tends to bring about, more or less permanently, the condition of being better, just as the idea of inability to move a certain limb or of insensibility in a given region brings about the corresponding functional disability. From these and similar facts, combined with the theory of ideo-motor action, it was a natural conclusion for the therapeutic school that suggestion consists essentially in lodging in the mind of a patient an idea or ideas which shall be free from interference and inhibition by other ideas. Thus Janet says: "In suggestion, each idea seems to develop to the maximum, to give all it contains in the way of images, muscular movements, and visceral phenomena. This complete development of all the elements contained in an idea is an essential characteristic of the phenomenon." For a normal person the development of his ideas depends on the exercise of attention and personality, but "In order that there may be suggestion, it is precisely necessary that all these normal causes of development should be wanting, and that the idea should seem to develop to the extreme, without any participation of the will or of the personal consciousness of the subject." On this view we get a sort of penny-in-the-slot theory of suggestion. We put a penny into the machine, and if it is in good working order, and not already choked by

1 Foreword to Treatment by Hypnotism and Suggestion, or Psycho-Therapeutics, by C. Lloyd Tuckey.

2 Pierre Janet, The Major Symptoms of Hysteria, New York, 1907, pp. 282, 284.

other peoples' pennies, we shall draw from the machine our penny's worth of chocolate, or what-not. So if we put an idea into the mind of a patient, and this idea is free from competition with others, it automatically sets in motion the psychological and physiological machinery which issues in action. The same conception is expressed by C. Baudouin1 in his account of the New Nancy School in the following words: "Suggestion is the putting into operation, by ourselves or by another, of the ideo-reflex power which exists in us all," and again by G. A. Coe2: "In deliberation there is mutual inhibition of two or more competing ideas....Suggestion, on the other hand, implies the absence, or relative lack, of such competition, inhibition and pause. All that is necessary is that attention should be withheld from some of the ideas appropriate to the given situation, and focussed, or 'narrowed down' to some one idea or coherent chain of ideas." According to this view suggestion depends upon (1) ideo-motor action—that is to say the theory that every idea naturally tends to pass into action; (2) the absence or inhibition of all other ideas which might interfere with or counteract the idea which is to be enacted. Now with regard to these two conditions Prideaux3 has already pointed out that "The term 'ideo-motor action' is a relic of the old psychology of ideas; for example, for Hegel, ‘an idea is a force, and is only inactive in so far as it is held in check by other ideas."" Analysis shews that it is not ideas that are active, but the affect which ideas may be the means of stirring up. In other words it is only such ideas as link themselves to interests or conative tendencies, which are emotionally toned, that tend to issue in action, and these interests and conative tendencies are capable of stimulation by other means than ideas-unless the word 'idea' is to be so extended in its meaning as to cease to have any specific reference. All definitions of suggestion, therefore, in terms of the communication of ideas are too narrow. They express at best only those features which are of interest and importance to the psychotherapist. Further, to quote Prideaux again on the second condition: "Suggestion has no capacity for inhibiting ideas, but, if we speak in terms of inhibition, is rather the consequence of the inhibition of inhibiting forces normally involved in volition." This is true only if suggestion is defined in terms of communicating ideas. If the process of suggestion is the setting in motion of conative ten1 Charles Baudouin, Suggestion and Autosuggestion, translated by Eden and Cedar Paul, 1920, p. 26.

2 George A. Coe, Article "Suggestion," Hastings' Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. • E. Prideaux, Article "Suggestion and Suggestibility," British Journal of Psychology, x. March 1920.

dencies, whether through ideas or otherwise it is obvious that an essential part of the suggestion is the calling up of the conative tendencies in sufficient power to bear down the opposition of contrary influences. Unless this be done, the suggestion does not take place. But as against the point of view of the theory we have been dealing with this criticism of Prideaux is important. Ideas as such do not necessarily inhibit other ideas, but may merely complicate the mental content at any time, and therefore the mere success in communicating an idea to the mind of another will fall short of having the value of suggestion, unless that idea is, by reason of its content or associations, the spark that ignites the explosive charge of conative tendencies. Janet relates the following complaint of a patient, which admirably illustrates the point1:

"A patient has sometimes answered me in a vulgar but quite characteristic way: 'Sir, I do not know the reason, but the thing did not take.' 'What do you mean? You did not understand what I said?'

'Yes, I understood quite well.'

'Then you do not wish to do that, you do not accept?'

'I accept all you please. I am quite ready to obey you, and I will do it if you choose; only I tell you beforehand that the thing did not take.""

It is interesting to note that Binet and Féré2, while sharing the ideational view of suggestion, yet lay emphasis on the secondary nature of the idea. "La suggestion est une opération qui produit un effet quelconque sur un sujet en passant par son intelligence. Toute suggestion consiste essentiellement à agir sur une personne par une idée; tout effet suggéré est le résultat d'un phénomène d'idéation; mais il faut ajouter tout de suite que l'idée est un épiphénomène; prise en elle-même, elle est seulement le signe indicateur d'un processus physiologique qui seul est capable de produire un effet matérial." And "la conclusion générale qui ressort de tous ces faits et de toutes ces expériences, c'est que la suggestion consiste à introduire, cultiver et renforcer dans l'esprit du sujet en expérience une idée...elle consiste dans le renouvellement psychique d'une excitation périphérique que le sujet a déjà eprouvée. Dès lors on comprend sa puissance; l'idée, à proprement parler, n'est qu'une apparence; mais derrière elle se cache l'énergie developpée par une excitation physique antérieure." We are not concerned to discuss the relation of mind and body, and therefore may leave aside the question whether "a physiological process alone can bring about a material effect,"

1 P. Janet, Major Symptoms of Hysteria, pp. 284–5.

2 Binet et Féré, Le Magnetisme Animal, Paris, 1887, pp. 128, 135–6.