sheet anchor of treatment. The value of faith and hope to the neurotic is surely evidence for, and not against, the dynamic conception of Freud.

To repeat, there may be and is much to criticise in the book, but little on the practical side to quarrel with. It is a book which will help many to an understanding of their neurotic patients and to wiser dealing with them, and even in carping, criticising fellow specialists it may help to counteract that tendency to myopia with which we are always threatened

MAURICE B. Wright.

Insanity and the Criminal Law. By WILLIAM A. WHITE, M.D. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1923. Pp. ix + 281. 8vo. Price $2.50.

"For a long period, for ages, the criminal was a man who did a certain act....Now it is realised that in order to commit a crime a certain particular state of mind is necessary" (p. 265)—and, we read in this book an excellent series of cases which show how blind the Law (or rather legal procedure) can be to the importance of these 'particular states of mind.'

Out of his large experience the author makes certain proposals for amending the procedure in cases where insanity is put forward by the defence. The suggestion that will commend itself to the layman as the simplest, and one that should have been adopted long ago, is that empowering the judge to call expert witnesses who may prepare written reports which are to be read in court and on which the experts may be cross-examined and the expert witnesses must examine the accused. This gives the expert witness a chance of making an uninterrupted statement of his view of the case and would tend to eliminate the 'hypothetical question,' which in fact is no hypothetical question at all. Considering the unfairness of the present system "the astonishing thing is not that the medical expert testimony is so bad, but that it is so good" (p. 58).

On the topic of Responsibility the author thinks that the standpoint of the Law is considered too exclusively and the delinquent is not considered enough (p. 96). At first one is inclined to agree with him but on reflection things are not so bad as they at first appear. The most important attribute of the Law is its certainty, if unconscious motives can be put forward in the Courts regularly and with success the criteria would become too complicated for the popular judgment, the Courts would lose the popular confidence they now enjoy and the neurotic satisfaction in Order, till then enjoyed by civilised society, would give way to an anxiety which might lead to graver instability. Unconscious motives cannot be regarded as other than uncertain by the public.

So long as man nourishes a sense of unconscious guilt so long will punishment be demanded by the public; but as a lunatic asylum is regarded as a prison the decision to certify instead of to hang is not likely to meet with insurmountable opposition. The question whether the Courts will realise the importance of the states of mind' is another matter. The author does not stress the danger of apparent arbitrariness in decisions if individual considerations are taken into account. In spite of these rather theoretical objections the practical value of the book stands on its own merits; the case histories are detailed and the discussion of them practical.

JOHN RICKMAN.

Talks on Psychotherapy. By WILLIAM BROWN, M.A., M.D. (Oxon.), D.Sc., M.R.C.P. (Lond.): University of London Press, Ltd. 1923. Pp. 96.

Price 2s. 6d. net.

In these "talks," originally given as extempore addresses at King's College, London, "an attempt is made to sum up in broad outline the present-day position in psychotherapy" (p. 5).

The author sees in analysis but the necessary stepping-stone to more important synthesis. Mental analysis recovers the lost past, transference"the emotional rapport which springs up between patient and physician" (p. 38) often assisting. Intellectual and ethical difficulties arise and the physician then by "psycho-therapeutic conversations" seeks through autognosis a re-synthesis of the patient's mind. Intellectual conviction and emotional acceptance of the new or regained knowledge are not necessarily accompanied by full power to live anew, but suggestion treatment, including auto-suggestion, now applied, will often supply the needed impetus to the patient to take his stand, consciously or unconsciously, upon the "general belief in a friendly universe" and to add self-control to self-knowledge (pp. 86-93).

Suggestion should be given in "a waking or semi-waking state... treatment by hypnotic suggestion is a bad method of treatment" and should be used only in "special situations... where every other method has failed." Yet for "reassociation and the recovery of lost memories," especially in hysterical cases, hypnotism is valuable; while abreaction, secured through hypnosis, results in complete recovery provided due care is taken to reassociate the recovered memory with the waking consciousness of the patient (pp. 26-35). The method of abreaction, originally used and described by Breuer and Freud, is now but seldom mentioned in Freudian literature, and the present tendency is to explain the beneficial effect of abreaction in terms of transference. A case is given in which cure by abreaction resulted when there was no possibility of transference and the author restates his conviction that "abreaction by itself has therapeutic value due, no doubt, to the reassociation of the mind and of the nervous system which it involves (pp. 36–41).

Turning from these more practical considerations to theoretical bases, we find psychology defined as "the science of the mind which considers the mind as a sequence of mental processes in time." In the swing back to the definition enshrined in the name psychology the present tendency is to replace "mind" by something "mental." How the mind works, rather than what the mind is, is the immediate problem. Further, "mental processes," unqualified, is too broad a basis, for "mental processes have values: logical values, aesthetic values, ethical values. And these values, although they have reference to mental processes in time, are themselves out of time, and in dealing with them we have to pass beyond the condition of causality itself-we have to pass into metaphysics." Here the free-will dilemma confronts the medical psychologist. Psychology as a science necessarily holds to the postulate of determinism but "this merely shows how inadequate psychology is as a complete explanation of mental process." Here too we have "one fundamental difference" between Freudian psychoanalytic" psychology and Jungian "analytic" psychology. "Freud is a determinist...Jung is not. Jung considers that mind as such is prospective; it does not work in a merely mechanical or deterministic way." Our author, while finding himself more often in agreement with Freud than

with Jung, here finds Jung in the right, but considers that "he has not gone far enough," and adds: “In his writings there is a vague mixture of science and philosophy which can only be satisfactorily replaced by a more thoroughgoing metaphysical investigation or treatment" (pp. 76-84). From which we gather that to a sound knowledge of medicine and psychology the mental specialist must add metaphysics or at least a working philosophy of life founded upon free-will. In agreement with this the book closes with a section on "Psychotherapy and the re-education of the Will" in which the author argues that the will of M. Coué, that loses in the conflict with imagination, is not "will" at all but only "wish"; for in "true or complete volition there can never be such conflict, since belief is an essential constituent in true volition" (p. 95).

On the other hand, the author seeks to travel as far as possible perhaps a little farther on the well trodden road of explanation in terms of matter and motion. In criticising the term "functional nervous disease" he argues that whenever there is functional disturbance there is always structural disturbance, in the form of altered synaptic resistance or changed molecular structure. This is probably good scientific explanation, but we find difficulty with the verdict: "It is absolutely inconceivable that any system...so complex as the human brain can remain structurally normal and function abnormally"; for, if mind be not matter in motion but something apart from and behind the chemical and physical changes of nuclear protoplasm in cerebral neurons, it is, we feel, quite possible to conceive a disordered or diseased mind that fails to use aright a perfectly ordered and physically and chemically fit nervous system (pp. 17-26). Further, while it may be convenient for psychotherapeutic practice to see in "mental and spiritual healing...but...different aspects of the same thing," it is possible that "the mind contains the spirit in itself" (p. 14) is only true in the sense that brain, being apparently a prerequisite for mind as we know it, may be said to "contain" mind. It is still tenable philosophically that the body-mind duad with its "psycho-physical powers" (p. 23) is but the tool of an immaterial extra-mental being whose failure in the use thereof sends him to the doctor as patient. It is possible that clothing, body, mind are successive sheaths shielding and obscuring a real being known to ancient philosophy as Spirit and to modern psychology as the pure Ego. All of which goes to show the difficulty of keeping psychotherapy within the bounds of medicine and psychology and the truth of our author's contention that "just as, on the one side, psychology is closely allied to biology and physiology and cannot be adequately studied without reference to all that we know in biology and physiology of the instructive basis of behaviour, so, on the other side, we cannot do full justice to the mind unless we are prepared to pass beyond psychology to philosophy and to consider the implications of knowledge, of aesthetic appreciation, of moral obligation or responsibility" (p. 81).

R. J. BARTLETT.

Suggestion and Mental Analysis. By WILLIAM BROWN, M.A., M.D. (Oxon.), D.Sc., M.R.C.P. (Lond.). Third Edition. University of London Press, Ltd. 1923. Pp. 176. Price 3s. 6d. net.

That this "elementary and non-technical account of the relation between ...suggestion and auto-suggestion on the one hand, and mental analysis Med. Psych. III

23

(including the special Freudian system of psycho-analysis) on the other," has already reached its third edition would seem to indicate that there was real need of such an introduction to the voluminous literature of psychopathology and psychotherapy and that the author's contention "that a sound system of psychotherapy should satisfy the more moderate claims of both modes of thought" has been well received.

The first edition consisted of nine chapters on the treatment of the psychoneuroses by mental analysis, suggestion and hypnosis, and three, on "the philosophical background" containing a critical exposition of Bergson's philosophical views. In the second edition a chapter entitled "The Practice. of Psychotherapy" was added "to emphasize the fact of the incompleteness of present theories of suggestion and the need of further unbiassed investigation, and also to make clear the need of specialised training in neurology and psychiatry for the practice of psycho-therapy." In the third we find the always welcome addition-an index.

R. J. BARTLETT.

Some Contributions to Child Psychology. By MARGARET DRUMMOND, M.A. Edward Arnold & Co. Pp. viii + 151. Price 4s. 6d. net.

In this book Miss Drummond has set herself the important task of showing parents and teachers how to help young children to adapt themselves to the life of the community into which they are born. She states in the preface that she owes much to the work of Freud, Jung and others, and this is evident from her treatment of the subject. Impressed by the fact that a neurosis is ultimately an escape from reality and that the foundation for it is laid in early childhood, she considers that "psychologists and educationists should reconsider the whole question of the nature of imagination in childhood and the best means of training it." In this book Miss Drummond is concerned with the training of the imagination rather than with its nature. She points out the importance of providing suitable occupations for a child and suggests that 'self-enclosed' activities should be discouraged as far as possible. To be of value, imagination must be in vital contact with reality" (p. 82). Fairy tales are undesirable partly because they put wrong ideals before the child, partly because they hinder him in his instinctive search for the laws which govern his world. “In the early years the pull of magic is backwards not forwards" (p. 117). "The child from the first stands for the principle of reality....By our false education we lead him to worship false gods; we give him fairy stories when he asks for truth; we encourage him to find in phantasy a satisfaction which we basely tell him reality can not give" (p. 120). And when we ask why we feel the child needs fairy tales, we are told: "It is we who want the fairy tales, not the children. In their credulity we find vicarious satisfaction" (p. 112).

The book is, moreover, not confined to the training of the imagination. It also contains sound advice on a number of other problems, such as the self-assertiveness and the baseless fears of little children. In all these the results of modern psychological investigations are freely used and sufficient quotations are given to show the reader where he can go for more information. Here and there one feels that definitions are badly needed. This is particularly the case with terms like imagination and phantasy which easily lend themselves

to inconsistent interpretation. A bibliography would also have been helpful. These are, however, minor points. Like its predecessors the book makes very pleasant reading. It contains few technical terms and each point is illustrated by anecdotes from the personal observation of the author. It has not much to offer to the specialist, but should be a real help both to the parent and to the young teacher.

I. B. SAXBY.

The Mind in Action. A Study of Human Interests. By GEORGE H. GREEN. University of London Press. 1923. Pp. 168. Price 3s. 6d. net.

In the preface of this interesting attempt to deal popularly and briefly with "the dynamic conception of mind” the author lays it down that "what you cannot explain in everyday language you do not know." Anyone who has listened to Professor Eddington endeavouring to explain "in everyday language" the concepts of physics in the light of the theory of relativity will probably have had occasion to doubt this plausible assertion. And from the other point of view, anyone who has listened to the popular explanations of political, social and economic issues that are so fluently given in "everyday language" may, without undue cynicism, have come to the conclusion that it is precisely what you do not know that you can most easily explain "in everyday language." Interesting as this little volume is--in spite of its breathless style it suffers all through from the over-simplifications that are necessary in the attempt of the author to live up to his self-imposed test of knowledge. For example, the notion that instinct is a form of active interest may be usefully maintained, and valuable deductions may be drawn from it. But the notion becomes misleading when it is utilised for such plausible but inaccurate statements as the following: "When the dinner gong sounds while you are making a speech, you know that you may as well end your speech at once. All the interest that was directed towards you is now flowing in another direction altogether" (p. 26). Nevertheless the book is a genuine and not altogether unsuccessful attempt to give an outline of the mind at work in the simplest possible terms, and as an introduction to psychology for those who are wholly unaccustomed to the psychological point of view it may well be found helpful and suggestive. The inevitable danger is that the confident simplifications of mental processes which are required by the author's aim will tend to give the impression that a pictorial and notional representation of the mind in action is a much more accurate and reliable account of the extremely complex thing itself than is actually the case.

J. CYRIL FLower.

Mother and Son. By C. GASQUOINE HARTLEY. London: Eveleigh Nash and Grayson, 1923. Pp. 318. Price 7s. 6d. net.

This volume does not claim to be a scientific contribution to the complex subject of the 'Parent-Child' relationship; but neither is it merely another of the many compilations flung on the market by writers whose flair for expository opportunities is entirely journalistic. For Mrs Hartley has written