evidence. Dr Stassen with his wide experience in Belgium has seen only three cases incapacitated for more than six months-"these men returned to work before the end of twelve months." The table in question shows that the longer the duration of the illness, the more definitely psycho-neurotic in character it becomes. Whatever may be the significance and origin of the oscillation of the eyeballs, one may fairly safely insist upon the neurotic nature of lid spasm, and with some show of reason, of head tremor also. In cases up to twelve months' duration oscillation of the eyeballs is the commonest sign noted, its occurrence being in the proportion of 65 per cent., as compared with head tremor 35 per cent., and lid spasm 19 per cent. But in the cases lasting one to two years, the proportions change respectively to 42, 46 and 30 per cent., and in those lasting two to five years, to 22, 32 and 15 per cent. When the Committee state that the view taken of miners' nystagmus on the Continent is, on the whole, correct and that "The great majority of cases benefit by returning to work within from three to six months, and by continuing to work for at least six months before making a fresh claim for compensation," they are in effect admitting the psycho-neurotic basis of the disease. It would seem that they are a little inconsistent in declaring that a stricter standard based on physical signs should be adopted, in determining claims for compensation, whilst their evidence goes to show that these physical signs themselves are mere indications of a disease affecting the whole organism. It is true that the Committee themselves have not come to any decision as to whether the psycho-neurotic symptoms themselves are an integral part of the disease. They tell us that "The standard of physical signs which is in vogue in this country for deciding whether any case should be certified as suffering from miners' nystagmus, too readily admits psycho-neurotic cases," but if claims for compensation are to be determined by physical symptoms alone, what is one to make of the fact that "Several men with the most marked oscillation of their eyes, which they cannot keep still, even when looking down in daylight, refuse to stop work, and say they hate holidays, as they are more comfortable when working. One of these men plays cricket for his colliery." If oscillation is the crucial sign, should not such men as these be compulsorily retired? If not, what are the physical signs determining incapacity? Does not it all really amount to this, that physical signs are present in varying degree in large numbers of miners, only some of whom declare themselves to be incapacitated? In other words, the subjective symptoms are all-important to the medical man in coming to a decision.

As the Committee favour strongly the Continental practice of restricting compensation, on the ground that the incidence of nystagmus is thereby greatly reduced, it would be interesting to know whether Continental miners thus saved from nystagmus remain healthy men. It is a common observation in psycho-neurotic cases that the cure of one symptom frequently leads to the emergence of others, and it is conceivable therefore that on the Continent, whilst the incidence of nystagmus is reduced, there may be a rise in that of diseases classified under other names. On this point we have no information. One cannot cure a neurosis simply by driving the sufferer back to the environment which produced it. Would not it be possible to discriminate between cases mainly due to temporary stress, whether above or below ground, and those in which the man's vitality has been so far sapped that he will never be fit for underground work again?

Were further argument necessary to convince the Committee that it has

a long way to go, if it persists in attaching so much importance to physical signs, it is to be found on p. 22, where it is stated that "A pronounced divergence was found between the work which was being done and that which the men appeared to the examiner capable of doing when they were assessed on the basis of the amount of physical signs of miners' nystagmus present." The actual figures are too striking not to be quoted.

The precise meaning of these figures is not clear, but it is evident that the miner and the examiner were far from being of the same mind.

"Means should be established for re-assessing periodically the amount of incapacity present; this is purely a medical question, which should be in the hands of those who possess special experience of the disease" (pp. 23, 24). Did one of them make the above assessment? No wonder the legal profession and legislature are bewildered when they turn to the medical profession for guidance in compensation cases!

In a paper on Miners' Nystagmus read before the Medico-Legal Society recently, a barrister spoke of the great confusion of mind produced by the first report, and pleaded for greater clarity of thought in medical pronouncements. The reproach must be accepted.

W. INMAN.

Med. Psych II

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REVIEWS.

An Outline of Psychology. By WILLIAM MCDOUGALL, F.R.S., Professor of Psychology in Harvard College. Methuen & Co., Ltd. Pp. xvi + 456. Price 12s. net.

It would be difficult to overestimate the value and importance of this volume. Designed to introduce the student to his science, to furnish him with a profitable line of approach and a fruitful way of thinking of psychological problems, with a terminology as little misleading as possible, it admirably achieves this aim. But it does more than this, in spite of its author's disclaimer, and presents a compact yet lucid summary of the generally accepted facts and laws of normal psychology, which makes it a reliable text-book of the science. Its most characteristic feature, that which distinguishes it from most if not all other text-books, is the thorough-going consistency with which it adheres to one guiding principle, the principle that "purposive action is the most fundamental category of psychology." In an interesting introduction Prof. McDougall summarises in a masterly way the chief historical systems in psychology, such as the psychology of ideas, the atomistic or mosaic psychology, the fusion of the two with more recently acquired facts of brain physiology which constitutes so-called physiological psychology, and the thorough-going mechanical reflex theory which is modern "behaviourism." He indicates their respective short-comings, and persuasively argues the claims of purposive psychology to be a more accurate statement of the facts.

Conformably with this view, his opening chapters do not present the timehonoured sequence of Sensation, Perception, Mental Images and Ideas, etc., but are devoted to a detailed analysis of the behaviour of the lower animals, the insects, the vertebrates, including fishes and birds as well as the mammals and man. These make extremely interesting reading and give overwhelming proof of the pragmatic value of his central principle. Prof. McDougall enumerates the following seven marks of "behaviour," viz.: (1) a certain spontaneity of movement, (2) the persistence of activity independently of the continuance of the impression which may have initiated it, (3) variation of direction of persistent movements, (4) the coming to an end of the animal's movements as soon as they have brought about a particular kind of change in its situation, (5) preparation for the new situation toward the production of which the action contributes, (6) some degree of improvement in the effectiveness of behaviour, when it is repeated by the animal under similar circumstances, (7) a total reaction of the organism, as distinct from the partial reaction of reflex action. As regards mark (6), he writes: "No doubt, when such improvement may be observed, it provides the surest criterion; but, without this sixth mark, we may infer mental activity from the other five." (He is not considering mark (7) in this passage.)

On this basis, he proceeds to demonstrate the mutual implication of instinct and intelligence in all purposive activity. He also shows the necessity of distinguishing instinctive activity from the various motor mechanisms through which it may be manifested, and brings forward further arguments for his

well-known theory that emotion is the subjective side of instinct. He now gives a list of thirteen primary instincts and emotions as at the base of human behaviour.

The chapter on "Perceptual Thinking" does not appear until half-way through the book, and gains greatly in clarity by its late position. The discussion of space-perception, often so confused and confusing in introductory textbooks of psychology, is particularly clear and illuminating.

But the full strength of Prof. McDougall's position shows itself when he comes to deal with the problems of character and volition in the closing chapters of the book. Here we have a clear statement of the doctrine of the sentiments, and of the way in which the sentiments become organised to form the structure of character; and also the most complete psychological theory of volition. hitherto given, viz., McDougall's theory in terms of the working of the selfregarding sentiment.

In the final chapter the author summarises his view of purposive striving in the animal kingdom as a continuously graded series from the lowest to the highest forms of life in a paragraph so concise that I feel constrained to quote it in full. Within this graded series of the evolutionary scale the following stages may be distinguished: "(1) The vague, almost undifferentiated striving of the animalcule in pursuit of his prey. (2) The strivings of animals in which the instincts are sharply differentiated and directed towards specific goals that are vaguely anticipated by the creature. (3) The instinctive strivings of primitive man toward goals more fully imagined and anticipated; the strivings of instinctive desire. (4) The strivings of men prompted by desire for instinctive goals, but directed also to goals which are conceived and desired only as means to the instinctive goal. (5) Conduct of the lower level; that is, instinctive desire regulated and controlled, in the choice of means, by anticipation of rewards and punishments. (6) Conduct of the middle level; that is, the same instinctive impulses regulated in the choice of goals and of means by anticipation of social approval and disapproval. (7) Conduct of the higher level; that is, striving regulated in the choice of goals and means by the desire to realise an ideal of character and conduct, a desire which itself springs from an instinctive disposition whose impulse is turned to higher uses by the subtle influences. of organised society embodying a moral tradition."

Two general criticisms occur to one after a re-perusal of this book. In the first place, the author appears to have done but scant justice to modern physiological psychology, a branch of psychology upon which he himself has written so persuasively in the past and to which the work of Dr Henry Head and his collaborators has contributed so much of permanent value in recent years. He does indeed refer to this work, and with approval, but he makes no use of it in his general account of behaviour. Secondly, his strongly critical attitude towards the theories of Professor Freud appears to have prevented him from finding anything of value for normal psychology in the literature of psychoanalysis. But he promises us a second volume, on abnormal psychology, in which this omission may perhaps be made good.

In spite of these general criticisms one must admit that An Outline of Psychology is the most important introductory text-book on Psychology hitherto written. No serious student of the subject can afford to be without it. WILLIAM BROWN.

Primitive Mentality. By LUCIEN LÉVY-BRUHL. Authorised translation by LILIAN A. CLARE. George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. Pp. 458. Price 16s. net.

To every civilised approach, whether commercial, scientific or religious, primitive mentality has always presented an insoluble problem. Not that this precludes the possibility of a good working understanding between the representatives of such opposite racial types. There exist, on the contrary, abundant records of loyal and cordial relationship which seems to be based on a very genuine rapport. And yet the evidence is equally clear that personal relations always remain on the instinctive level, practically never advancing to any real understanding of that immense difference which characterises the workings of the two mentalities.

The practical conclusions of the two types are often identical, but the ways in which they are reached are poles asunder. This metaphor suggests the clue to the enigma which Prof. Lévy-Bruhl has set out to solve. The principle which rules the magical mind of the primitive is the psychological antipodes of the rational principle of civilised consciousness. With us the concept represents our mental currency, whereas to the primitive it is quite uncongenial. At the slightest attempt at any abstract ideation the primitive immediately succumbs. His mind declines to venture outside the magic circle of his intuitive representations.

When we remember that the concepts, time, space and causality, which form the very matrix of our experience, belong essentially to our conceptual reality, and are, therefore, outside the purely perceptual limits of the primitive mind, we can begin to realise the incommensurability of these opposite worlds of experience. Whereas we immediately infer natural or secondary causes behind the phenomenal world, the primitive only sees mystical, invisible forces at work. If a crocodile seizes a woman at the water's edge, this does not proceed from any natural appetite on the part of the crocodile, but is the manifestation of magical power directly attributable to some human agent.

The immediate convictions or certainties which underlie the whole complicated system of magical procedures and primitive beliefs are termed by Lévy-Bruhl "collective representations." This is an extremely valuable term, since it accurately describes both the character and the force of these prelogical forms of mental activity. Like his term participation mystique it embraces the real quality of primitive psychology, i.e. its group character.

As soon as we have recognised the fact that the individual savage has not yet attained a psychological existence distinct from that of his family or tribe, we have in our hand a key which can give us access not only to the magical mentality of all primitive races, but also to the unconscious mental processes of civilised man. We might go even further and say that until we can begin to understand the entirely irrational group character of primitive mentality we can form no true conceptions of our own unconscious processes. A sympathetic study of the one is the royal road to the other; for they are, in a sense, identical. In both cases we are dealing with states of mental activity which precede abstract ideation. Abstract ideas depend upon the possibility of an individual mind distinguishing itself in thought from its environment. Theoretically, conscious individuality, and with it the whole possibility of conceptual experience, came to birth at the moment when the first man perceived himself as an object, i.e. as an entity distinct from the rest of the world. The differentiation of a conscious objective function introduced a principle