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erotism, which results in a further reinforcement of the narcissism. If the primary narcissism has been released and re-animated directly, by concentration upon the idea of self, the process may be termed auto-suggestion; if it has been preceded by a stage in which the ego ideal is resolved into the earlier father ideal, the process may be termed hetero-suggestion.

If this view proves to be correct, then the old question of whether most hetero-suggestion is really auto-suggestion or whether most autosuggestion is really hetero-suggestion must be regarded in another perspective. It is, in the first place, a much less important problem than has often been thought, for that the essential agent in both is narcissism is a more fundamental consideration than the question of the particular way in which this has been mobilised in a given case. It is highly probable that the process of re-animating narcissism may proceed to varying depths in different psychological conditions; that suggestibility varies greatly in different persons is of course well known. The fact that primary narcissism is more fundamental than the father ideal itself, and our clinical experience that the chief part even in hetero-suggestion is played by agents within the subject's mind, are considerations which incline one not to contradict Baudouin's opinion that more weight must be attached to auto-suggestion than to hetero-suggestion, though one should add the modification that perhaps the latter process may prove in most cases in practice a necessary stage in the evocation of the former.

Freud1 thinks that the uncanny and enigmatic qualities that cling to the idea of hypnosis can be accounted for only by assuming that the regression to the infantile conception of the Father re-animates the inherited attitude towards the primal Father of the horde in savage times. The view here expressed could be brought into accord with this by supposing a similar re-animation of the well-known enormous narcissism of primitive man, with his absolute belief in the magical omnipotence of thought.

The theory here propounded perhaps throws some light on two further problems, the relation of hypnosis to sleep and to 'will-power' respectively. That the hypnotic state is psychologically exceedingly akin to sleep is well known, and is indicated in the very word itself. The fact has given rise to much speculation, but it should become more comprehensible when one recollects that sleep is the most complete expression of narcissism known, i.e. of the state which we here suppose to underlie that of hypnosis.

Without wishing to embark on a discussion of the nature of will, 1 Idem, op. cit. pp. 95-99.

I may briefly state my agreement with Lipps'1 view that the sense of will, and of striving or effect altogether, really emanates from a consciousness of inhibition, or put in more modern language—an intuition that in respect of the idea in question the conscious ego is inhibiting other, unconscious, mental processes. At all events it is plain that the will is specially connected with the conscious ego, and particularly the ego ideal. Most authors lay great stress on the practical importance, in both hetero- and auto-suggestion, of avoiding so far as possible any sense of effort, exercise of will-power or even of forced attention, and this might well be correlated with the view here expressed of the necessity for suspending the activity of the ego ideal. The exhortations of a patient's relatives that he should use his will-power,' or his 'self-control,' succeed only when the strength of the ego ideal is definitely greater than that of the repressed libidinal wishes, as it is in the normal. It is natural that the relatives should ask for this desideratum, but they overlook the fact that the very existence of neurotic symptoms shows that in all probability the two sides of the conflict are more evenly matched than they hope. It is only rarely that much can be accomplished by simple methods of reinforcing the ego ideal, i.e. the repressions.

Finally, the theory here advanced leads me to attempt some restatement of our formulations regarding the mechanism of mental healing in general. The essential problem is the fate of the repressed allo-erotic (usually incestuous) impulses which conflict with the ego ideal and constitute the important dynamic factor in every neurotic symptom. Only a part of them can be directly sublimated, a solution which the patient has already tried, though, it is true, under unfavourable psychological conditions. Now it would seem that all possible means of dealing with the situation therapeutically reduce themselves ultimately to two, and to two only. Either the libidinal energy of these impulses can be, more or less completely, re-converted into the narcissism from which they proceeded, this being effected by a regression in an auto-erotic direction, or else the assimilative capacity of the ego ideal can be raised. These two principles are, as will be shown in a moment, mutually contradictory and therefore to a large extent incompatible with each other, and this explains why it is fundamentally impossible to combine the two methods of treatment based on them, those of suggestion and psycho-analysis respectively. One may lay down the dictum that if the patient is not treated by psycho-analysis he will treat himself by means of suggestion, or-put more fully-he will see to it that he will get treated by means "Suggestion und Hypnose,” op. cit. S. 428, 472.


of suggestion whatever other views the physician may have on the subject.

When a neurotic patient comes for any kind of treatment he will soon transfer unconsciously on to the idea of the physician various repressed allo-erotic tendencies, i.e. he will take the physician as a love-object (provided, of course, that the treatment continues long enough). If the treatment is not psycho-analysis one of two things will happen. The patient may become aware of affection for the physician. Then probably symptoms will improve, libido being withdrawn from them and transferred to the idea of the physician. I suspect, however, that in these cases true educative treatment by suggestion or any allied method is rarely successful. What usually happens is that the improvement is dependent on continued contact with the physician, and even this has to be of a specially satisfactory kind. When the physician's attention is withdrawn the symptoms tend to reappear. The alternative to this course of events is that the allo-erotism regresses to the stage of narcissistic identification with the physician, that is, the father ideal. The educative suggestions then made are more likely to have a lasting effect, the reason being that the stage to which the patient's libidinal organisation is reduced approximates closely to that of true narcissism, so that when he leaves the physician he still has himself as a love-object. This is certainly the direction that most neurotics spontaneously take, for it spares them the suffering of symptoms, the distress at having to recognise their repressed allo-erotism, and the pangs of disappointed love. It is the great reason, as I hinted at the outset of my paper, why autosuggestion is so widely preferred to hetero-suggestion, with all its potentialities of allo-erotism. The practical drawback to auto-suggestion clinically is that it is in so many cases harder to mobilise the narcissism in this way than by means of hetero-suggestion. The drawback to any form of suggestion is that what peace of mind it gives is purchased at the expense of an important part of the personality being impeded in development, with consequent lack of stability; the allo-erotism that should progress to object-love, altruism and the various sublimations of life regress towards auto-erotism, with all its stultifying potentialities.

In psycho-analysis, on the other hand, the aim of the treatment is to effect some reconciliation—or at least tolerance-between the ego ideal and the repressed allo-erotism. As in other forms of treatment, the alloerotic transference tends to regress to a stage in which the analyst is identified with the father component of the ego ideal, i.e. with the father ideal, and this tendency has to be carefully watched by the analyst.

When the ego ideal begins to raise serious protests against accepting the repressed tendencies that are being brought to light by the analytic procedure, the well-known state of resistance ensues. Now the most securely entrenched form of resistance1, one to which there is a tendency in all analyses, is that in which the patient identifies the analyst with his real ego, projects on to him his own repressed mental processes, and then severely criticises him from the standpoint of his ego ideal. This situation is the most formidable met with in psycho-analytic work, for all object-relationship between analyst and patient may be suspended, and the analyst cannot proceed until this is re-established. As it is characteristically accompanied by such manifestations as arrogant conceit, the analyst often says that a limit has been set to analytic possibilities by the patient's narcissism, overlooking the vital consideration that the narcissism is not a primary one, but has been secondarily resorted to as a defence against repressed allo-erotism. It may be said, therefore, that the success of an analysis depends very largely on the extent to which the analyst can manage to preserve an object-relationship to himself in the patient's mind, for it is just this relationship that has to be brought to consciousness and harmonised with the ego ideal.

It will thus be seen that the aims of the hypnotist and the analyst are diametrically opposed. The former really seeks to strengthen the patient's narcissism, the latter to divert it into more developed forms of mental activity. The psychological situation (narcissistic identification) most favourable to the one aim is fatal to the other.

I have considered here the contrast between suggestion and analysis in its therapeutic aspects only. It is probable, however, that it is applicable over far wider fields. The contrast between auto-erotism and alloerotism on which it rests, i.e. between infantilism and adult life, may be correlated with the whole difference in outlook and conduct between the mental attitude of introversion and exclusion of reality, on the one hand, and adjustment to the world of reality on the other: between what may be called the Eastern and the Western methods of dealing with life.

1 An excellent description of the manifestations of this is given by Abraham, “Über eine besondere Form des neurotischen Widerstandes gegen die psychoanalytische Methodik," Internat. Zeitschr. f. Psychoanalyse, 1919, Bd. v. S. 173.


By C. G. JUNG.

NOTWITHSTANDING its difficulty, the task of discussing the relation of analytical psychology to poetic art provides me with a not unwelcome occasion for defining my standpoint in regard to the much debated question of the relation between psychology and art generally. In spite of their incommensurability, both provinces are doubtless closely interrelated, and these connections cannot remain uninvestigated. For they originate from the fact that, in practice, art is a psychological activity, and, just in so far as this is the case, it can and, indeed, should be subjected to a psychological consideration. Art, like every other human activity proceeding from psychic motives, is from this angle a proper object for psychology. This conclusion, however, also involves a very obvious limitation in the application of the psychological viewpoint: only that portion of art which consists in the process of artistic form can be an object of psychology, but that which constitutes the essential nature of art must always lie outside its province. This other portion, namely, the problem, what is art in itself, can never be the object of a psychological, but only of an aesthetico-artistic method of approach.

A similar distinction must also be made in the realm of religion; there also a psychological consideration is permissible only in respect of the emotional and symbolical phenomena of a religion, wherein the essential nature of religion is in no way involved, as indeed it cannot be. For were this possible, not religion alone, but art also could be treated as a mere subdivision of psychology. In saying this I do not mean to affirm that such an encroachment has not actually taken place. But whoever trespasses in this way clearly forgets that a similar fate can easily befall psychology, whose specific value and essential quality is entirely destroyed as soon as it is regarded as a mere brain activity, thus aligning it with other glandular activities, as a mere subdivision of physiology. In actual fact, this, as we all know, has actually occurred.

1 A paper read before the Gesellschaft für deutsche Sprache und Literatur, in Zurich, May, 1922. Translation by H. Godwin Baynes.

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