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The author begins the book with a study of the great Gnostics, Tertullian and Origen.
Tertullian is the introverted type whose intellectuality was so ardently inspired by a passionate zeal for Christianity that the intellect, his chief organ, eventually became his worst enemy. Schultz writes of him: “The passion of his thinking was so inexorable that again and again he alienated himself from the very thing for which he would have given his heart's blood.” Tertullian's subjective appreciation of the fanatical one-sidedness of his type led him to the “sacrificium intellectus" just as Origen's appreciation of his extraverted compulsion towards the sensuality of objective experience led him to the “sacrificium phalli.” Tertullian's sacrifice enabled him to realize the sheer irrational dynamis of his own soul, while Origen's self-mutilation gave him a release from the daemonic bondage to the object and enabled him to yield himself unafraid to the riches of Gnostic thought.
The author then proceeds to show that the theological disputes of the Early Church also originated in a fundamental psychological antithesis, and that behind the assumptions upon which the battle of dogmas spent itself lay this same problem of types.
In the classical age the type problem is revealed in the antithesis between the Cynic-Megarian philosophy on the one hand, and the Platonic world of ideas on the other. To the introverted standpoint the reality of the idea represents the reality of the subject, while to the extraverted standpoint generic concepts or universal ideas are merely“ nomina.” To the Nominalist the generic concept was merely a "flatus vocis," and the derision expressed in this epithet is a striking indication of the typical extraverted valuation of a subjective reality. For him it lacks everything that is tangible, concrete, and real, and hence is “nothing but sound and smoke.” The underlying difference of standpoint has existed since the beginning, and whether we are speaking of the Cynic versus the Platonist, or the medieval Nominalist versus the Realist, or the present-day Realist versus the Idealist, it is at bottom always the same problem. The man with the extraverted attitude must, by his very nature, interpret the nature and meaning of life in terms of objective reality, while the man with the introverted attitude is equally constrained to interpret it in terms of subjective reality.
“If," as Jung points out, the opposition between Nominalism and Realism l'esse in re' as against ‘esse in intellectu') were merely a matter of logicointellectual compromise it would be incomprehensible why no terminal solution other than paradox is possible.” But since it is a question of psychological opposition a one-sided intellectual formulation must always end in paradox, simply because the intellect, as representing only the rational side of the psychic duality, is thereby incapable of providing the mediatory formula wbich could do justice to the real nature of both the opposing psychological attitudes. A formula derived from the side of the abstract must be altogether lacking in the recognition of concrete reality. For the solution of this antithesis a third intermediate standpoint is needed, the "esse in intellectu” lacks tangible reality, the “esse in re the mind.
“Idea and thing come together, however, in the psyche of man which holds the balance between them. What would the idea amount to if the psyche did not provide its living value? What would the objective thing be worth if the psyche withheld from it the determining force of the sense impression? What indeed is reality if it is not a reality in ourselves, an ‘esse in anima';
“Living reality is the exclusive product neither of the actual, objective behaviour of things, nor of the formulated idea; rather does it come through the gathering up of both in the living psychological process, through the esse in anima.' Only through the specific vital activity of the psyche does the sense perception attain that intensity, and the idea that effective force, which are the two indispensable constituents of living reality.”
I have quoted these passages because they constitute the essence of Jung's contribution to philosophy. Herein lies the conclusive argument that the division can never be resolved by a discussion of Nominalist and Realist arguments (or however the typical opposition may be styled) but only in that peculiar activity of the psyche which Jung terms “creative phantasy," wherein the actual and tangible and the abstract and eternal are merged in a perpetually creative process.
We are forced to conclude therefore that the heterogeneity of the psyche is basic; accordingly it must demand a plurality of principles for its interpretation. Hence the explanations of every psychological formula which is based upon the assumption of psychic uniformity will be lacking in general validity, just as much as a one-sided philosophic standpoint must fail to provide a statement of reality that can gain universal sanction.
The systems of Freud and of Adler are criticized from this point of view. Both systems entirely ignore the problem of types and assume the existence of a basic psychic uniformity, which assumption leads the authors to interpret every other possible psychic process in terms of their own. The explanations of the one are sensed as a violation of the fundamental principle of the other, and the acute antagonism existing between the two standpoints is convincing evidence of the fundamental heterogeneity which both so strangely ignore. The one system in reducing all psychic activity to the element of sexuality, and the other to the element of power merely express and represent the typical psychologies from which they respectively spring, and the validity of either system is thereby restricted to individuals of the same type.
An important chapter is devoted to a discussion of Schiller's ideas as revealed in his Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man and of Schiller's own conflict between the poet and the philosopher in himself. Schiller's deep sense of his own personal conflict gives a particular value to his attempt to find a solution of the problem.
Then follows the most significant chapter in the book. It is based on an analytical study of Spitteler's Prometheus and Epimetheus in which the type antithesis is presented in a luxuriant mythological setting and where the attempt at solution is symbolized in the jewel fashioned by Pandora, the soulfigure of Prometheus, who represents the creative introverted element existing, potentially, at least, in every individual. This mythological presentation of the problem is compared with analogous conceptions in the religious systems of India and China. The author shows that the aim of all these systems is, through the exercise of a conscious technique, to release the disciple from the conflict of the opposites, and that in every case the efficacy of the redeeming symbol, whether it be Brahman, or Rita, or Tao lies in its power of reconciling the conflict of opposites. From these conceptions Jung returns to the West and discusses the relativity of the idea of God in Meister Eckehardt, and shows how this medieval German mystic had a purely psychological conception of God. Jung also discusses the Grail legend (a survival from the Middle Ages whose potency for the world of to-day is demonstrated by the impressive appeal of Wagner's Parsifal) and he relates the significance of this legend to
the whole Chivalric tradition and the growth of the worship of the Virgin. This analysis leads him to the conclusion that the religious significance of woman is due to the fact that woman embodies the soul of man. She is the personification of his unconscious. Hence the service of woman is the service of the soul. Having thus brought the religious conceptions of East and West into harmony with the concepts of modern psychology the author returns to a discussion of the significance of the reconciling symbol in Spitteler's poem, and he is now able to show that notwithstanding its classical mythological setting, the problem which the poet's intuition has seized is essentially the religious problem. It is the poet's unconscious response to the world's need.
It is quite impossible to make an objective judgment of this inspiring contribution to the most urgent problem of our time. As far as my knowledge goes it is the first serious attempt to bridge the gulf between psychology and religion. As long as science is wholly confined to the world of objective facts, and religion to the realm of subjective experience, an impassable gulf must divide them. To bridge this gulf both science and religion must relinquish their absolute claims. The acceptance of the relativity of the idea of God inevitably involves the relativity of the claims of empirical science. To empirical science the religious problem is a closed door, because it denies to subjective reality the same validity it gives to the world of concrete facts. Psychology, if it is to deserve the name, must advance beyond the limits of empirical science and enquire into the nature of man as a subject. The idea of God, or “supreme psychic value," is a psychological fact which demands a psychological formulation. This extension of the realm of science does not necess
essarily mean an encroachment upon the essential values of religion. Science is knowing, religion is being, and these are for ever incommensurable states. What the religious emotion may be in itself is as much beyond the limits of intellectual cognition as is the essence of feeling. But the religious process, regarded merely as a process should fall within the range of science, and Jung's formulation of the "transcendent function” is the first attempt to embrace the religious process in a scientific concept. With this concept nothing mysterious is intended, but merely a combined function of conscious and unconscious elements or, as in mathematics, a common function of real and imaginary factors. In religious symbolism it is expressed as the God-renewal emerging from the conflict of the opposites. Bergson expresses the same idea when he says "the idea arises from the edge of conflict." Jung regards this function as a basic psychological principle by which successive transformations of the libido take place. The result of the conflict between a conscious and unconscious antithesis finally emerges as a new attitude. But this can only take place when the stands resolutely detached from either side, for when it becomes identified with either side the opposite is again repressed and the conflict begins again, albeit on a new level.
In Chapter VI Jung discusses the type-problem in psychiatry with special reference to Otto Gross' hypothesis of the primary and secondary functions and the two corresponding types or personalities which Gross describes.
Chapter VII is devoted to a discussion of the type-problem in aesthetics particularly with regard to the two typical attitudes described by Worringer as “feeling into” and “abstraction.”
In another chapter a work by Fourneaux Jordan is analysed (Character as seen in Body and Parentage) from the point of view of typical characters and the whole question of the criteria of judgment is carefully discussed.
The Apollonian-Dionysian antithesis elaborated by Nietzsche in his “Birth
of Tragedy” is the subject of another chapter and throughout the book there are numerous references to Nietzsche's psychology and ideas. Nietzsche as the advocate of power, and Wagner as the advocate of love are clearly figures of immense significance for minds of the present epoch, for the clash of these two elemental forces represents in a very special degree the problem of our time.
Pragmatism and William James' characterological classification are the principal themes in the chapter on the type-problem in modern philosophy. James' characters are seen to fall broadly within the categories of extravert and introvert but they are criticized as being conceived too exclusively from the intellectual standpoint.
The chapter on the type-problem in biography deals principally with the biographies of famous scientific investigators as treated by Ostwald, who succeeds in establishing two distinct types, the Classic and the Romantic, which are shown to correspond with the extraverted and introverted attitudes.
But it is in his general description of types that Jung's amazing psychological finesse is most in evidence. With absolutely sure touch he draws in the general character while omitting the particular and individual. From thousands of individuals he has selected just those characters which are typical. Every feature of these Galtonesque portraits bears witness to a range of psychological experience and an intuitive capacity that is surely unique in the literature of science.
In every type-portrait the conscious attitude is tellingly contrasted with the attitude of the unconscious. The conscious man is, as it were, distinguished from his shadow, and so completely has Jung taken into account his own psychological disposition that it would be hard to tell from these portraits to which type he himself belonged. This fact is itself the best evidence for the whole argument of the book which the author eloquently summarizes in his conclusion, wherein he reasons, that in view of the basic heterogeneity of the psyche no common ground of understanding can be reached in any sphere until the problem of types has been generally recognized. Not only is the recognition of this problem essential for the purpose of regulating acute differences in standpoint, it is also the pre-condition of any general comprehension of that immense query, alike in medicine as in every other branch of knowledge, which we vaguely term the “individual factor."
Not the least valuable contribution of this great work is the final chapter containing fifty-seven comprehensive definitions of the principal psychological concepts employed by the author. This is an example which other writers in this sphere would be wise to follow, especially in view of the fact that a great deal of the literature has to undergo the process of translation, thereby inevitably introducing an added element of ambiguity and doubt as to the exact meaning of the author's original concept.
This work is an important departure from the general view-point of psychoanalytical literature, which tends to regard the psychic process from the standpoint of the basic uniformity of its elements, and to disregard the equally essential heterogeneity of the differentiated psyche. It is an attempt to consider the psyche as a whole and not merely the elementary mechanisms into which psychic activity can be resolved. The book has a range of view and a wealth of thought which is liable to evade the grasp of a specialized mentality. Like every great work it is proof against every superficial attempt to glean its content, the essence of which may indeed require the lapse of many decades for its full significance to be generally appreciated.
H. G. BAYNES.
Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis. By Prof. Sigm. FREUD, M.D., LL.D.
Authorised English Translation by JOAN RIVIERE, with a Preface by
In giving us this translation of Freud's Introductory Lectures on PsychoAnalysis, Mrs Riviere has done a signal service to psychology and conferred upon English readers an inestimable boon. Not a little of the misunderstandings which have accompanied the spread of Freud's views in Englishspeaking countries may be traced to the faulty and inadequate translations of psycho-analytical literature which have often been offered to English readers. This volume is one of the few translations of Freud's works which make us feel that the translator is at home in both languages, and the consequent ease in understanding what the author means is very welcome.
This translation has been before the public for over a year and is no doubt well known to most of our readers. Both to the beginner and to the advanced student it has proved the most helpful single work of Freud; for not only does it present, in the first and second sections, an incomparable account of the foundations on which psycho-analytical practice and theory have been built up, but, in the last section, it brings to our notice the most recent developments of the science in its application to the treatment of the neuroses. Here also we find adumbrations of some of those more speculative hypotheses which of late years have set the seal on Professor Freud's reputation as one of the profoundest thinkers of our time.
It had originally been our intention to review this book in the ordinary way, as we might review any other volume issuing from the press. But a little consideration made it plain that this would be an almost impossible task. A merely descriptive notice would have been an impertinence to our readers, for all the fundamental conceptions contained in the book have been known to us for many years through the earlier works of Freud himself and those of other psycho-analysts. On the other hand, a critical notice would have been an impertinence to Professor Freud, for all that is new in the book is for a time exempt from criticism; and until what is new has been put to the test of experience we may ask, in the author's words, “Of what use is the most excellent judgement where there is no knowledge of the subject under debate?”
T. W. M. Remembering and Forgetting. By T. H. PEAR, M.A., B.Sc., London; Methuen
and Co., Ltd., 1922. pp. xii + 242. Price 7s. 6d. net.
“It was necessary to compress into a few lectures enough information about ordinary remembering and forgetting to enable officers of the R.A.M.C. to estimate the abnormality of these functions in their patients. It might have been better if the book had appeared in that shape” (p. vii). We are inclined to agree. Additions--made, at least partly, to help the uninitiated, interest the general reader and “appeal to the athlete, the mathematician, the musician and the writer" (p. xii) “have naturally obscured the original outlines of the Med. Psych. III