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Psychological Types or the Psychology of Individuation. By C. G. JUNG. Translated by H. GODWIN BAYNES. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd. Pp. xxii + 654. Price 25s. net.
The task of reviewing a work of the first magnitude must always bring the reviewer face to face with his limitations, but when, as in the present case, the range of the book embraces the profoundest philosophical and psychological speculations, this consciousness may amount almost to disability. To offset this critical disability the present writer can only claim a very special intimacy with the work, which gives him a certain justification for discussing or rather describing its contents.
The ground-theme of the book is the basic psychological antithesis which the author has termed extraversion and introversion. In previous contributions he had identified extraversion with feeling and introversion with thinking; but this point of view, though genetically correct, proved true in practice only when the concept of feeling was limited to the objective relation, and that of thinking to the particular kind of thinking which is abstracted from the object. Deeper investigation, therefore, proved the necessity of relinquishing the criterion of function and of describing the fundamental type antithesis in terms of libido-mechanisms. In extraversion the habitual tendency of the libido flows from the subject towards the object, so that in this type the objective factor always tends to predominate. Whereas in introversion the libido flows from the object to the subject and the subjective factor becomes the paramount consideration.
In every individual the two mechanisms are constantly present, at least potentially (Jung compares them with the systole and diastole of cardiac activity) but one mechanism, whether from inborn disposition, milieu influences, or profound physiological causes as yet unknown, tends to find greater favour than the other and gradually becomes the predominant or habitual attitude. The fundamental differentiation represented by these opposite mechanisms has its physiological as well as its psychological manifestations, and the author draws attention to the fact that homologous phenomena can easily be demonstrated throughout the animal and vegetable kingdoms. I use the term "homologous" advisedly because what Jung is here describing are general attitudes or preconditions of psychological differentiation, hence something that is just as radical as the differentiation of sex. The extraverted and introverted he calls general attitude types, by which nothing more is said than the words imply, namely, a general tendency of the libido to follow either an outward or an inward course.
His further typification is based upon the particular basic function with which the individual is mainly identified for purposes of adaptation. The four basic functions which constitute, as it were, the ground-structure of the psychological house are thinking, feeling, intuition and sensation. The first pair are rational functions and, when directed by the will, conform to definite rational criteria. The latter pair are irrational or arational functions and have no relation to rational judgment. The author can provide no rationale for his
choice of these four basic functions. They simply emerge as psychic elements and, as is also the case with physical elements, their sole justification is experience. The author regards them as four cardinal points of the psyche, equally necessary for psychic orientation as are the corresponding points of the compass for the purposes of terrestrial orientation. The nature of consciousness demands this fourfold differentiation, and everyone who has had any practical experience of dream-analysis must long since have recognized this fourfold principle, which almost invariably appears in one form or another whenever the need for further individual differentiation or a new psychic orientation begins to manifest itself.
Any one of the four basic functions may become the main function of adaptation, and in each event a characteristic psychology will result. There is also the further possibility that each function-type can be either extraverted or introverted, which we may so that we arrive at eight typical classes of individuals, among find every possible variation of the general type. In Chapter X Jung has portrayed the general characteristics of these eight typical psychologies with incomparable subtlety and skill. The particular character of the leading function, ie, whether rational, viz. thinking and feeling, or irrational, viz. intuition and sensation, provides yet another classification into rational and irrational types.
As we might suppose, the incidence of extraversion and introversion has no sort of relation to sex, social level or parental types. Apparently the distribution is entirely accidental. But with regard to the function-types Jung finds that the feeling types occur more frequently among women, while the thinking
types are more common among men.
general attitude produces such profound modifications in the character and aim of the various functions that it is not to be wondered at that Jung was at first misled in his earlier descriptions of the types. For example, thinking in the extraverted attitude, occupied as it is with objective facts and data, presents an entirely different aspect to the thinking of the introverted attitude, the character of which is entirely determined by the subjective factor. In both cases it may be true thinking, i.e. governed by the laws of logic, yet its whole aim and quality is so profoundly influenced by the underlying extraverted introverted attitude that the same rational function will commonly lead men of opposite types to diametrically opposite conclusions. Similarly with feeling, intuition, and sensation. In practice, therefore, it is essential that the of the main and auxiliary functions should not be misunderstood. general-attitude type should first be considered in order that the character
The author lays stress upon another very essential difficulty in function all the four basic functions at the same level of differentiation. Were such an and type-analysis, which arises from the fact that in no individual do we find individual possible he would be in a state of suspension, since no orientation would be possible at all unless one function were given capital value. But the result of this most-favoured-function tendency of the psyche is that the two functions which participate in the activity of the consciousness become are not only relatively inferior but acquire certain of the negative and primitive characters of repressed elements generally.
of these repressed and, therefore, inferior functions is a psychological tour de Jung's delineation of the negative character and subtle subliminal influence force. In these portraits there is a mastery of cunning line and suggestive
shading which not only reveal an astonishing intuitive insight but also a great artistry in the selection and use of the intuitive material.
It may well be asked why, if the four basic functions are inherent in the structure of the psyche, should two of them normally exist in a state of relative repression. It is, of course, only another expression of the radical duality of the psyche that the basic functions should also be grouped into pairs of opposites. The rational pair are thinking and feeling, the irrational intuition and sensation. Thinking that is differentiated and true to its own principle is essentially incompatible with feeling. Feeling values must be rigorously excluded if thinking is to be pure thinking. And thinking values are equally prejudicial to pure feeling. Hence an attitude that is orientated by either of these values must necessarily tend to repress the other. Intuition and sensation are similarly opposed. Sensation is focussed upon the concrete superficies of the object, while intuition is constantly peering through or beyond the external appearance of things to glimpse the further possibility that lies beyond. Hence a sensational attitude will tend to exclude intuition and vice versa.
The rational and irrational functions because they are different in nature can, however, co-operate harmoniously together, wherein one becomes the main or decisive function while the other serves as auxiliary. These combinations produce familiar and characteristic psychologies, as, for instance, where thinking is combined with intuition in the speculative philosopher or scientist, or intuition with feeling in the poetic and artistic temperaments. Where the artist is influenced more by the quality and texture of his medium than by the possibilities contained in his creative vision we may find the combination of sensation and feeling. Where sensation is the primary function the thinking or feeling associated with it has always a very concrete and substantial quality and shows the greatest difficulty in appreciating the nature of an abstraction. It will perhaps have been perceived that Jung gives to the function he calls feeling a very definite meaning, which does not wholly correspond with the sense in which we commonly use the term. In his acceptance of the term, feeling is a directed and rational function. It is a function of judgment which refers to a definite criterion of value. Feeling-values are related to an absolute principle just as much as thinking values. Furthermore every dynamic collective idea, such as justice, fatherland, God, etc., is just as much feeling as thought.
I have dealt at some length with this aspect of the book because, although it is not its most absorbing or most essential content, it is nevertheless on the basis of this typification that the main theme must be discussed.
Jung's investigation of the type-problem has already inspired other writers who have worked under him to elaborate the same theme from the angle of their own type. Dr Beatrice Hinkle's article on Psychological Types, reviewed in this Journal1 by Dr Constance Long, is a very good extraverted elaboration of Jung's system of types, and is, of course, derived from his ideas.
The main body of the book is devoted to an exhaustive investigation of the type problem in all its various manifestations throughout the whole range of human culture. He shows that the type problem has always had a certain subjective appreciation by leading minds in every cultural epoch, but that until objective psychology (which is only of recent growth) came into existence the problem of types could never be apprehended as an objective problem.
1 Vol. II, part iv, p. 329.
The author begins the book with a study of the great Gnostics, Tertullian and Origen.
Tertullian is the introverted type whose intellectuality was so ardently inspired by a passionate zeal for Christianity that the intellect, his chief organ, eventually became his worst enemy. Schultz writes of him: "The passion of his thinking was so inexorable that again and again he alienated himself from the very thing for which he would have given his heart's blood." Tertullian's subjective appreciation of the fanatical one-sidedness of his type led him to the "sacrificium intellectus" just as Origen's appreciation of his extraverted compulsion towards the sensuality of objective experience led him to the "sacrificium phalli." Tertullian's sacrifice enabled him to realize the sheer irrational dynamis of his own soul, while Origen's self-mutilation gave him a release from the daemonic bondage to the object and enabled him to yield himself unafraid to the riches of Gnostic thought.
The author then proceeds to show that the theological disputes of the Early Church also originated in a fundamental psychological antithesis, and that behind the assumptions upon which the battle of dogmas spent itself lay this same problem of types.
In the classical age the type problem is revealed in the antithesis between the Cynic-Megarian philosophy on the one hand, and the Platonic world of ideas on the other. To the introverted standpoint the reality of the idea represents the reality of the subject, while to the extraverted standpoint generic concepts or universal ideas are merely "nomina." To the Nominalist the generic concept was merely a "flatus vocis," and the derision expressed in this epithet is a striking indication of the typical extraverted valuation of a subjective reality. For him it lacks everything that is tangible, concrete, and real, and hence is "nothing but sound and smoke." The underlying difference of standpoint has existed since the beginning, and whether we are speaking of the Cynic versus the Platonist, or the medieval Nominalist versus the Realist, or the present-day Realist versus the Idealist, it is at bottom always the same problem. The man with the extraverted attitude must, by his very nature, interpret, the nature and meaning of life in terms of objective reality, while the man with the introverted attitude is equally constrained to interpret it in terms of subjective reality.
"If," as Jung points out, "the opposition between Nominalism and Realism ('esse in re' as against 'esse in intellectu') were merely a matter of logicointellectual compromise it would be incomprehensible why no terminal solution other than paradox is possible." But since it is a question of psychological opposition a one-sided intellectual formulation must always end in paradox, simply because the intellect, as representing only the rational side of the psychic duality, is thereby incapable of providing the mediatory formula which could do justice to the real nature of both the opposing psychological attitudes. A formula derived from the side of the abstract must be altogether lacking in the recognition of concrete reality. For the solution of this antithesis a third intermediate standpoint is needed, the "esse in intellectu" lacks tangible reality, the esse in re" the mind.
"Idea and thing come together, however, in the psyche of man which holds the balance between them. What would the idea amount to if the psyche did not provide its living value? What would the objective thing be worth if the psyche withheld from it the determining force of the sense impression? What indeed is reality if it is not a reality in ourselves, an 'esse in anima'?
"Living reality is the exclusive product neither of the actual, objective behaviour of things, nor of the formulated idea; rather does it come through the gathering up of both in the living psychological process, through the 'esse in anima.' Only through the specific vital activity of the psyche does the sense-perception attain that intensity, and the idea that effective force, which are the two indispensable constituents of living reality."
I have quoted these passages because they constitute the essence of Jung's contribution to philosophy. Herein lies the conclusive argument that the division can never be resolved by a discussion of Nominalist and Realist arguments (or however the typical opposition may be styled) but only in that peculiar activity of the psyche which Jung terms "creative phantasy," wherein the actual and tangible and the abstract and eternal are merged in a perpetually creative process.
We are forced to conclude therefore that the heterogeneity of the psyche is basic; accordingly it must demand a plurality of principles for its interpretation. Hence the explanations of every psychological formula which is based upon the assumption of psychic uniformity will be lacking in general validity, just as much as a one-sided philosophic standpoint must fail to provide a statement of reality that can gain universal sanction.
The systems of Freud and of Adler are criticized from this point of view. Both systems entirely ignore the problem of types and assume the existence of a basic psychic uniformity, which assumption leads the authors to interpret every other possible psychic process in terms of their own. The explanations of the one are sensed as a violation of the fundamental principle of the other, and the acute antagonism existing between the two standpoints is convincing evidence of the fundamental heterogeneity which both so strangely ignore. The one system in reducing all psychic activity to the element of sexuality, and the other to the element of power merely express and represent the typical psychologies from which they respectively spring, and the validity of either system is thereby restricted to individuals of the same type.
An important chapter is devoted to a discussion of Schiller's ideas as revealed in his Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man and of Schiller's own conflict between the poet and the philosopher in himself. Schiller's deep sense of his own personal conflict gives a particular value to his attempt to find a solution of the problem.
Then follows the most significant chapter in the book. It is based on an analytical study of Spitteler's Prometheus and Epimetheus in which the type antithesis is presented in a luxuriant mythological setting and where the attempt at solution is symbolized in the jewel fashioned by Pandora, the soulfigure of Prometheus, who represents the creative introverted element existing, potentially, at least, in every individual. This mythological presentation of the problem is compared with analogous conceptions in the religious systems of India and China. The author shows that the aim of all these systems is, through the exercise of a conscious technique, to release the disciple from the conflict of the opposites, and that in every case the efficacy of the redeeming symbol, whether it be Brahman, or Rita, or Tao lies in its power of reconciling the conflict of opposites. From these conceptions Jung returns to the West and discusses the relativity of the idea of God in Meister Eckehardt, and shows how this medieval German mystic had a purely psychological conception of God. Jung also discusses the Grail legend (a survival from the Middle Ages whose potency for the world of to-day is demonstrated by the impressive appeal of Wagner's Parsifal) and he relates the significance of this legend to