psycho-analyst should have a very comprehensive survey of the patients' activities in every possible sphere. The importance of such observations will be fully realised in the interpretation of symptoms which are not merely isolated occurrences in the patient's life but form integrate portions of his whole personality. The importance of inference in psychoanalysis cannot be over-rated. The satisfactory interpretation of the symptoms is not a mere scientific pursuit but on this depends the cure of the patient. The cure however is not an absolute evidence of the correctness of the findings; on the other hand cure may not be established even when a symptom has been correctly interpreted.

Psycho-analytic interpretations must always be of the nature of theories. They must not be confounded with 'facts.' Psycho-analysis concerns itself with processes in the unconscious level of the mind and as such they can never be matters for direct perception, i.e. they can never be facts in the sense we have defined the term. A 'complex' is a matter for psycho-analytical investigation so long as it is unconscious. Directly it becomes conscious it ceases to be of interest to the psychoanalyst. The psycho-analytic physician does not concern himself much with conscious motives for action. It is extremely difficult to prove the correctness or otherwise of a factor which cannot be directly appreciated. Since a psycho-analytical interpretation must necessarily be of the nature of a theory it can never be directly proved. Its correctness can only be determined in terms of degree of probability. One interpretation is more likely than another but no interpretation is absolutely certain.

In judging the accuracy of an interpretation we ought to be guided by exactly the same principles as are employed in the formulation of a theory in any other branch of science.

I should like to emphasize some of these principles here. The first principle that should guide us in the selection of a theory is what is known technically as the 'economy of hypothesis.' According to this principle we should prefer a single and simple explanation to a multiple and complicated one; or, in other words, when a fact may be explained on a simple supposition there is no justification in explaining it as due to multiple factors. In actual practice this principle may not be valid in every case but this is the only safe guide from the standpoint of probability. I shall illustrate this by an example. Supposing I observe a branch of a tree swaying along with other branches and that a light wind is blowing at the time. I would naturally ascribe the movement of this particular branch to the influence of the wind but it may be quite possible that this movement is due to the manipulation of an

invisible string tied to the branch by some concealed person. Here the principle of the economy of hypothesis will not allow us to formulate any other explanation besides that of the wind and we would be only justified in bringing forward another explanation if the movement be different from that of the other branches which are being moved by the wind. Theoretically of course the movement must necessarily be different to some extent, but it may be quite impossible to notice it. In spite of such apparent fallacy however this principle is our only safe guide. If we stick to this principle we will be more often correct in the long run than if we assume all possible explanations to be valid. In all cases however we ought to be alive to the possibility of other explanations besides the one we assume to be true.

The theory of the string is therefore rejected as being more complicated than the theory of the wind. But supposing now I actually see the person manipulating the string the explanation ceases to be a theory and becomes a fact or direct perception.

The next principle may be described as the principle of familiarity. Of two theories the more familiar one is the more likely. When a fact may be explained by a known law of nature there is no justification in postulating an unknown force as an explanation. There is again a fallacy in accepting the principle as a certain guide. An explanation is not necessarily true because it is familiar.

The third guiding principle is the principle of extension. The more extended the application of a theory the greater the chance of its being true, i.e. the greater the number of facts that could be explained by a theory the greater is the chance of its validity. Supposing we have several series of occurrences and a different theory to account for the facts under each group and supposing we find a theory which would explain all the facts of the different groups taken simultaneously; under such circumstances we are certainly justified in accepting such a theory as valid. The possibility of individual explanations however is not absolutely excluded. It is quite likely that a particular occurrence is the result of simultaneous functioning of several factors each one of which is capable of bringing about the result acting independently. In such cases of multiple functioning or 'overdetermination' as it is technically called we must have independent evidence for each; otherwise the principle of economy of hypothesis is violated.

The fourth principle is the principle of analogy. When a theory has been proved to be valid in a large number of cases it is likely to be true also in any other similar case. The validity of a theory can only be

conclusively proved by direct appreciation, i.e. at the point when it ceases to be a theory. We know that fevers of the tertian type attended with rigor are due to malarial infection. This has been proved in a large number of cases by actual verification under the microscope. So that when we get a case of a similar type we are justified in bringing forward the theory that it is due to malarial germs.

A scientific theory is to be evaluated on the basis of the four general principles enumerated above, viz. (1) the principle of economy, (2) the principle of familiarity, (3) the principle of extension and (4) the principle of analogy. Even when a theory has conformed to all the above conditions it must not be taken to be absolutely true. It may be regarded only as highly probable.

Every psycho-analytic interpretation is usually met by another explanation by the patient. There is a tendency in every one of us to find out a cause of our actions and when the motive is unconscious some sort of rationalisation is almost always evident. The psycho-analytical interpretation thus always stands as a rival to some other explanation put forward by the patient. To assert its validity the following conditions therefore ought to be fulfilled:

(1) It must explain the action in a better and simpler manner than the explanation put forward by the patient.

(2) The interpretation ought to fit in with other events of the patient's life for which separate explanations are necessary from the conscious standpoint.

(3) The nature of the explanation should be more or less familiar in other spheres of life.

(4) The trustworthiness of the interpretation would be greater if it serves to explain dreams, myths, rituals, etc. and if it is supported by philological and other evidences.

(5) The explanation becomes very probable if it has been proved to be accurate in case of similar symptoms in other patients.

(6) The interpretation gains decided support in case of symptoms when such symptoms are removed after analysis.

(7) The interpretation may be admitted as true by the patient. The value of such admission is not always very great. When positive transference is very marked the patient is often willing to admit anything coming from his physician; this may bring about a cure in some cases but the truth of the interpretation is not necessarily proved. There is a type of intelligent patients who are willing to believe an interpretation because it happens to be supported by psycho-analytical authorities.

This belief in authority is not limited to patients but is shared by us all. We believe in many scientific doctrines on this ground. The value of admission by the patient is of course very great when such admission is the result of direct appreciation of the truth of the interpretation. But in such cases the interpretation ceases to be an interpretation and becomes a question of fact.

(8) All rival explanations ought to be less satisfactory than the given interpretation. If a conscious explanation is as good as the psychoanalytic interpretation we have no right to urge the acceptance of the latter. Of course in such cases the truth of such interpretation is not necessarily excluded.

As in the domain of bacteriology Koch's postulates must be fulfilled before an organism is definitely declared to be the causal factor of a disease, so in psycho-analysis an interpretation is correct only so far as it fulfils the above conditions. The place of free association in psychoanalysis requires to be indicated in this connection. Some psychoanalytic workers are under the impression that since we arrive at an interpretation by the method of free association it must necessarily be correct. This is an erroneous assumption. The free association method is a process which enables us to arrive at the correct solution of a symptom. It is not a proof by itself. The solution may as well be arrived at by other methods. The special value of free association lies in the fact that it not only serves to indicate the correct explanation where none is forthcoming by the ordinary methods, but acting as a bridge between the conscious and the unconscious planes of the mind it helps the patient to realise the nature of his symptom and the correctness of the interpretation. A patient may be logically convinced of the correctness of the interpretation but it is of very little use to him so long as direct appreciation is wanting, and free association has a much greater effect towards such realisation than any amount of logical argument. I shall now try to illustrate my remarks with reference to an actual case. Although the analysis was not deep sufficient material was gathered to illustrate the principles enumerated above. The case has the further advantage of being a comparatively simple one.

Mr S. C., a friend of mine, aged about 30, married, of an easy-going, happy-go-lucky temperament and showing occasional fits of temper is the subject. He is a member of a joint family. S. C.'s father suddenly developed an apoplectic stroke and remaining in a moribund condition for a few days died of the attack. During the whole period of his illness I had very good opportunities to observe S. C. The father's sudden

illness completely upset S. C. and he was rendered quite unfit to attend to the patient. S. C.'s two brothers did all that was necessary for the patient's comfort and S. C. could not be persuaded to render even simple services to the father on plea of incapacity. His excuse was that he had lost his head completely. S. C. was terribly anxious about his father's illness, more so than the other brothers, and would run to the attending physician several times a day with alarming reports about the patient's condition. He was continually apprehensive about his father's death. Twice he prevailed upon the attending physician to come and see his father whom he reported to be gasping and at the point of death. The physician on arrival could not find any such symptom and the other brothers reported that S. C. had been unduly nervous. On the last day of illness the attending physician came and pronounced his opinion that the patient was not expected to live more than three hours. On hearing this S. C. was eager to make all arrangements to carry the dead body to the crematorium and was on the point of sending for the bier when his brothers intervened and rebuked him for the indecent haste. When the father actually died he was loudest in his lamentations and was quite unconsolable. He accompanied the body to the crematorium and suddenly expressed a desire to throw away the costly ring he had on his finger into the adjoining river. When asked about this strange behaviour he said "What is the use of all this finery when the father is dead." His brothers tried to dissuade him but in vain and he did not even agree to make a gift of it to some poor person. Amidst protestations from everybody present he threw it into the Ganges. Within a week of his father's death he regained his normal mental balance-much sooner than was the case with his brothers. S. C. passes as a normal individual in society and regards himself as such. So we have no right to consider him as a patient. His somewhat queer behaviour during the period of his father's illness attracted my attention and I proposed an analysis about two months later. At first he would not agree but finally I prevailed on him to submit to an examination. As there was no symptom to be removed the purpose of the analysis was purely scientific.

The first thing I did was to ask him to give me a number of his dreams. He could not remember any and all efforts in this direction proved futile. After about a week he told me that he could remember a dream that he had dreamt about five or six months before. "He was walking barefooted with a shawl wrapped round his body." This was all that he could remember and he could not offer any explanation for