on every gallon of rum they sell, and every barrel of flour they buy in our ports. By making the subsistence of their people in the Islands more expensive, they aid the efforts of rival nations to furnish the commodities of their Islands to others, and even to their own subjects. This kind of policy is so bad, that I am persuaded the British Ministers cannot seriously intend the prohibition, although I am equally convinced, that a regard to the national prejudices renders it unavoidable at present. I do not, therefore, think we should labor to undo what is done, but leave things a while to their own course. And as to a treaty of commerce, I think the best way is to make no treaty for some time to come, and if we tell them that we will make no treaty, they will be much more desirous of it than we ought to be. 'Mr Adams seems to be in opinion with you, as to the necessity of sending a Minister to England, as indeed he does on some other points. He will, I suppose, be the man, for sundry reasons, which I might assign, but he will have serious cause to repent of the appointment under present circumstances. Nothing would have more unfavorable effects, than to send a Minister, who should feel himself attached or opposed to any of the parties, by which that nation is rent asunder. We should hold them in equal indifference of sentiment, with equal appearance of confidence, paying to the Ins a respect due to their places, but which neither Ins or Outs are, or can be, entitled to on the score of their merit and virtue, at least from us. As we may not easily find a man capable of this conduct, perhaps the best Minister is no Minister, for the want of one will show, that we are not precipitate in a desire of close connexion, and that, however the old mercantile habits may have revived commercial intercourse, the government has a proper jealousy and caution. This circumstance, also, must work favorably on our politics with other powers, and give weight and dignity to the Ministers we do send. I am, &c. On the second of October he wrote to an American gentleman, who had lately gone to London. You will, I suppose, have found the government rather indisposed towards us, and by what we have seen of their conduct, it appears not improbable that, in our turn, we shall become indisposed towards them. My consolation on the present system of the European powers, is, that they will operate as a band to our union. We read fables in youth, and have not in age the temper to profit by them. Nay, we almost forget, when charged with great affairs, that it was the sun, and not the wind, which made the old man throw off his great coat France, not liable as England is to mercantile influence in the operations of state, would be mad to imitate that imperious rival. But it is not impossible that she may be so mad, for I believe her rulers have not the best information from this quarter. I judge by the conversation of M. de Marbois, who is as much and as blindly attached to a restrictive system for their Islands, as you can easily conceive.' From the time that there had been a prospect of peace, Mr Morris had given much attention to the subject of West India trade, and had convinced himself of the impolicy of restrictive regulations, both in regard to England and France. Indeed, when he wrote the above letter, he was engaged in drawing up a paper for the consideration of the French Minister, M. de la Luzerne, entitled, 'Ideas of an American on the Commerce between the United States and the French Islands.' The point of his argument is, that it will be advantageous alike to France and her Islands, to leave the commerce of the latter open to the United States. He lays it down as an axiom, that the Islands themselves must flourish, in proportion to the facility with which they can obtain the means of subsistence. Make subsistence cheap to the inhabitants, and their produce will be cheap in the same proportion, more lands will be cultivated, the population and the amount of produce increased. Hence a greater demand for the commodities of France, and the means of paying for them; and hence an increase to the internal wealth, revenue, and navigation of that country. But the question occurs, whether it will be expedient for France to permit this commerce with America to be carried on in American bottoms? The advocates for restriction say no. The objection is advanced, that if the Americans are permitted to carry away the produce of the Islands for their own use, they will not be contented with the privilege to this extent, but will take away more than they want, and thus elude the commercial regulations with reference to France and her Islands, and become the sole carriers of the Islands to all parts of the world. To obviate this objection, according to the doctrine of the restrictionists, the trade between the Islands and the United States must be carried on in French bottoms only. This doctrine is at variance with the fact, that the commerce cannot be carried on with any chance of advantage by vessels sailing from Europe to America, thence to the Islands, and thence again to Europe. Owing to the nature of the navigation among the Islands, and on the American coast, the articles from the United States must be carried in small vessels, navigated by few men. This has been proved by long experience. But this kind of craft is not suited to the commerce from the Islands to Europe, any more than the large ones are from America to the Islands. It follows, that if the Islands are to be supplied by the intervention of large vessels from Europe, the price of the supplies will be increased, and the prosperity of the Islands, and the value of their commerce to France, proportionately diminished. This may be illustrated by an example. The produce shipped directly from America to Europe employs many more vessels, than are wanted to bring back articles from Europe to America. Two hundred large ships are required to transport the tobacco from the Chesapeake, and these two hundred are sufficient to bring the annual supplies from Europe for all America; but tobacco does not employ more than one fifth of the shipping engaged in the commerce between America and Europe. It follows that a large portion of the returning ships come empty. And heretofore this has been so remarkably the case, in regard to the tobacco ships, that goods have been freighted from Great Britain for a mere trifle, and sometimes for nothing. It must be considered, also, that a voyage from France to the West Indies can be performed with great certainty in a given time, by reason of the tropical winds, but to the United States it will be more uncertain and longer. Of two vessels, therefore, sailing at the same time, one for the United States and the other for the Islands, the expenses of the former at the end of the voyage, taking into consideration the risk of the ship, the crew, repairs, and provisions, will exceed those of the latter in the amount of one fourth of the cargo, which she is to receive in the United States for the Islands, and still she has another voyage to perform before she arrives at the point of destination. The result is, that the price of supplies thus carried to the Islands, is enhanced, at least one fourth, beyond what it would be, if the same supplies were transported directly from the United States in American bottoms. This expense must be borne by the merchant, who fits out the ship, or the planter who consumes the produce, and it yields no returns to anybody. But allow a free competition, and this expense will not be incurred at all; in other words, no merchant will send a ship from Europe to take American produce to the Islands. For the same reason, no one will send a ship from the United States to the Islands, for the purpose of taking freight there for Europe, and returning thence to America. The circle is the same, let it commence at whatever point it may. And this is a conclusive answer to the objection, that if the trade is thrown open to the Americans, they will take away more produce than their own market demands, and become the carriers from the Islands to Europe. Natural causes prevent it. Moreover, if it is hoped or expected to increase the number of French seamen, by undue restrictions on the colonial commerce, the end will be defeated by the very means used to attain it; for, if a free trade be allowed, the produce of the Islands will become so much more abundant, that, after deducting all that can possibly be carried away by Americans, there must still remain such a surplus, as will require a great increase of French shipping to take it to Europe. Such is a summary of the facts and reasonings used to convince the French Minister, that the restrictive policy of his government was founded on erroneous principles, and that a system of free trade, between the French: West India Islands and the United States, would be mutually advantageous to the two nations. CHAPTER XVI. PEACE. ILLUMINATION IN MR MORRIS VISITS MORRISANIA AFTER THE RESTRICTIONS.-M. DE CHASTELLUX-PAMPHLET ON THE BANK.-MR MORRIS'S PLAN OF A NEW COINAGE.—PURCHASES THE ESTATE OF MORRISANIA. THE preliminary articles of peace having been signed, and hostilities suspended, Mr Morris returned to New York, and visited his mother at Morrisania, after an absence of almost seven years. He writes to Mr Robert Morris; 'I arrived at this place last evening, in company with my uncle, and after making a dinner at six o'clock we drank your health in Cape wine, which has stood on a shelf in this house twenty years to my knowledge, and how much longer I know not. We will drink no more of it, but leave the remnant till you and Mrs Morris can accompany me hither.' He reached home in season to advise and assist his mother, in presenting her claims for depredations committed at Morrisania by the British army during the war. The estate was within the British lines, and |