in all ages and in all places *, by the unlearned part of all civilized people, and by the almoft general confent of all the moft barbarous nations under heaven; from a tradition fo ancient and fo univerfal,' as cannot be conceived to owe its original either to chance or to vain imagination, or to any other caufe than to the Author of Nature himfelf. And the most learned and thinking part of mankind, at all times and in all countries, where the ftudy of philofophy has been in any measure cultivated, have almoft generally agreed, that it is capable of a juft proof from the abftract confideration of the nature and operations of the foul itself. That none of the known qualities of matter can, in any poffible variation, divifion, er compofition, produce fenfe and thought and reafon, is abundantly evident; as has been demonftrated in the former + difcourfe. That matter confifts of innumerable, divifible, feparable, and for the most part actually disjoined parts, is acknowledged by all philofophers. That, the powers and faculties of the foul being the moft remote and distant from all the known properties of matter that can be imagined, it is at least a putting great violence upon our reafon, to imagine them fuperadded by Omnipotence to one and the fame fubftance, cannot easily be denied. That it is highly unreafonable and abfurd, to suppose the foul made up of innumerable confcioufneffes, as matter is neceffarily made up of innumer able parts; and, on the contrary, that it is highly reasonable to be lieve the feat of thought to be a fimple fubftance, fuch as cannot naturally be divided and crumbled into pieces, as all matter is manifeftly fubject to be, muft of neceffity be confeffed. Confequently the foul will not be liable to be diffolved at the diffolutich of the body; and therefore it will naturally be immortal. All this feems to follow, at leaft with the highest degree of probability, from the fingle confideration of the foul's being endued with fenfe, thought. or confciouinefs. "I cannot imagine," faith Cyrus (in that speech which Xenophon relates he made to his children a little before his death)," that the foul, while it is in this mortal body, lives; and "that when it is feparated from it, then it fhould die. I cannot "perfunde myself, that the foul, by being feparated from this body "which is devoid of fenfe, fhould thereupon become itfelf like"wife devoid of fenfe: on the contrary, it feems to me more rea "fonable to believe, that, when the mind is feparated from the body, it fhould then become most of all fentible and intelligent:" thus he. But then further; if we take alfo into the confideration all the higher and nobler faculties, capacities, and improvements of the foul; the argument will ftill become much stronger. "I am Et primum quidem omni antiquitate, &c" Cic. Tufc. Queft. lib. I. † Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God. See alfo a Letter to Mr. Dodwell, with the feveral Anfwers and Replies. τοῦ τοῦ ἔγειε, ὦ παῖδες, ἐδὲ τῦτο πώποτε ἐπείσθην, ὡς ἡ ψυχὴ ἕως δν ἐν θνητῷ σώματική, Οι· δὲ τότε ἀπαλλαγή, τέθνηκεν οὐδί γε ὅπως ἄφρων ἐσαι ἡ ψυχὴ ἐπειδὰν τὸ ἀφεονέκ σώματος δίχα γένηται, ἐδὲ τπτο πέπεισμαι. Αλλ' ὅταν α' κραπ Θ· καὶ καθαρός, ὁ γᾶς ἐκκριθῆ τότε καὶ φρονιμώταῖον εἰκὸς εἶναι. Cyrus apud Χen, N 2 perfuaded," "perfuaded," faith Cicero, "when I confider with what fwift« nefs of thought the foul is endued, with what a wonderful me"mory of things paft, and fore-caft of things to come; how many arts, how many fciences, how many wonderful inventions it "has found out; that that nature, which is possessor of such facul"ties, cannot be mortal." Again: "the memory," faith + he, " which the foul has of things that have been, and its forefight of " things that will be, and its large comprehenfion of things that at "prefent are, are plainly divine powers: nor can the wit of man "ever invent any way, by which these faculties could poffibly come "to be in men, but by immediate communication from God." Again; "though we fee not," faith the," the foul of man, as in "deed neither are we able to fee God; yet, as from the works of "God we are certain of his being; fo from the faculties of the "foul, its memory, its invention, its fwiftnefs of thought, its noble "exercise of all virtues, we cannot but be convinced of its divine "original and nature," And, fpeaking of the ftrength and beauty of that argument, which, from the wonderful faculties and capacities of the foul, concludes it to be of an immaterial and immortal nature; "Though all the vulgar and little philofophers in the "world," faith She,« for fo I cannot but call all fuch, as diffent "from Plato and Socrates and those fuperior geniuses, should put "their heads together; they will not only never, while they live, "be able to explain any thing fo neatly and elegantly; but even "this argument itself, they will never have understanding enough "fully to perceive and comprehend, how neat and beautiful and "ftrong it is." The chief prejudice against the belief of the foul's exiting thus and living after the death of the body; and the fum of all the objections brought against this doctrine by the Epicurean philofophers of old, who denied the immortality of the foul; and by certain Atheistical perfons of late, who differ very little from them in their manner of reasoning; is this: that they | cannot ap «Quid multa? Sic mihi perfuafi, fic fentio; quum tanta celeritas animorum fit, tanta "memoria præteritorum, futurorum providentia, tot artes, tantæ fcientiæ, tot inventa ; non poffe eam naturam, quæ res eas contineat, effe mortalem." Cic. de Senectute. + "Quod & præterita teneat, & futura provideat, & complecti poffit præfentia; hæc divina funt. Nec invenietur unquam, unde ad hominem venire poffint, nifi a Deo." Idem, Tufc. Quæft. Lib. I. I "Mentem hominis, quamvis eam non videas, ut Deum non vides; tamen, ut Deum "agnofcis ex operibus ejus, fic ex memoria rerum & inventione & celeritate motus, omni"que pulchritudine virtutis, vim divinim mentis agnofcito." Id. ibid. "Licet concurrant plebeii omnes philofophi (fic enim ii qui a Platone & Socrate & ab illa familia'diffident, appellandi videntur): non modo nihil unquam tam eleganter ex"plicabunt, fed ne hoc quidem ipfum quam fubtiliter conclufum fit intelligent.” Id. ibid. Si immortalis natura anima eft, "Et fentire poteft fecreta a corpore noftro; At neque feorfum oculi, &c." Lucret. Lib. III. "Quod autem corpus animæ per fe? quæ materia? ubi cogitatio illi? quomodo vifus? "auditus? aut qui tangit? qui ufus ejus? aut quod fine his bonum ?" Plin. lib. VII. "Neque aliud eft quidquam cur incredibilis his animorum videatur æternitas, nifi quod nequeunt qualis fit animus vacans corpore intelligere, & cogitatione comprehendere." Cic. Tufc. Quæft. lib. I. prehend prehend how the foul can have any fense or perception without the body, wherein evidently are all the organs of fenfe. But neither * can they any better apprehend or explain how the foul in the body (that is, the body itfelf, according to their opinion) is capable of fenfe or perception, by means of the organs of fenfe. And befides: this argument, that the foul can have no perception, when all the ways of perception that we have at prefent ideas of are removed; is exactly the very fame argument, and no other than what a man born blind might make ufe of with the very fame force, to prove that none of us can poffibly have in our prefent bodies any perception of light or colours; as I have explained more particularly in the + former difcourse. THE NATURAL CREDIBILITY OF THE SOUL'S BEING IMMORTAL, OF GREAT USE TO THE WISER HEATHENS. This confideration, of the foul's appearing in all reafon to be naturally immortal, afforded great pleafure and fatisfaction to the wifeft and fobereft men in the heathen world; was a great fupport under calamities and fufferings, especially under fuch as men brought upon themselves by being virtuous; filled them with great hopes and comfortable expectations of what was to come hereafter; and was a mighty encouragement to the practice of all moral virtue, and particularly to take pains in fubduing the body and keeping it in fubjection to the reafon of the mind. Firft, it afforded great pleasure and fatisfaction to the wisest and sobereft men in the heathen world, from the bare contemplation of the thing itself. "No"body," faith Cicero, " fhall ever drive me from the hope of immortality: and, if this my opinion concerning the immortality of the foul fhould at laft prove an error; yet it is a very "delightful error; and I will never fuffer myself to be undeceived "in fo pleafing an opinion, as long as I live." Secondly, it was a great fupport to them under calamities and fufferings, especially under fuch as men brought upon themfelves by being virtuous: "these and the like contemplations," faith | Cicero, "had fuch an "effect upon Socrates, that when he was tried for his life, he "neither defired any advocate to plead his caufe, nor made any "fupplication to his judges for mercy; and, on the very last day of "his life, made many excellent difcourfes upon this fubject; and "a few days before, when he had an opportunity offered him to "have escaped out of prifon, he would not lay hold of it. For " "Quafi vero intelligant qualis fit in ipfo corpore.-Mihi quidem naturam animi in"tuenti, multo difficilior occurrit cogitatio, multoque obfcurior, qualis animus in corpore "fit, quam qualis cum exierit." Id. ibid. + Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, p. 76, 77. "Quod fi in hoc erro, quod animos hominum immortales effe credam, libenter erro; "nec mihi hunc errorem, quo delector, dum vivo, extorqueri volo." Idem, de Senectute. "His & talibus adductus Socrates, nec patronum quæfivit ad judicium capitis, nee "judicibus fupplex fuit; & fupremo vitæ die, de hoc ipfo multa differuit, & paucis ante "diebus, cum facile poffet educi è cuftodia, noluit.-Ita enim cenfebat, itaque differuit, duas effe vias, duplicefque curfus animorum è corpore excedentium, &c." Id. Tufc. Quæft. lib. I. N 3 << Thus thus he believed, and thus he taught: that when the fouls of "men depart out of their bodies, they go two different ways; the "virtuous to a. place of happinefs, the wicked and the fenfual to mifery." Thirdly, it filled them with great hopes, and comfortable expectations of what was to come hereafter: "O happy day,” faith the good old man in Cicero *, “when I fhall go to that bleffed "affembly of spirits, and depart out of this wicked and miferably "confused world!" Lattly, it was a mighty encouragement to the practice of all moral virtue, and particularly to take pains in fubduing the body, and keeping it in fubjection to the reafon of the mind: "We ought to fpare no pains," faith + Plato, "to obtain "the habit of virtue and wisdom in this life; for the prize is no"ble, and the hope is very great." Again; having reckoned up the temporal advantages of virtue in the prefent world, he adds; but we have not yet mentioned the greatest and chiefeft re"wards, which are propofed to virtue; for what can be truly great "in fo fmall a proportion of time, the whole age of the longest "liver in this our prefent world being inconfiderable and nothing " in comparison of eternity?" And again; "Thefe things," faith he §, "are nothing, either in number or greatnefs, in comparifon "with thofe rewards of virtue, and punithntents of vice, which "attend men after death." And, to mention no more places: "They," faith he , "who in the games hope to obtain a victory "in fuch poor matters, as wreftiing, running, and the like, think "not much to prepare themfelves for the conteft by great temperance and abitinence; and fhall our fcholars, in the ftudy of virtue, not "have courage and refolution enough, to perfevere with patience, ❝for a far nobler prize?" Words very like thofe of St. Paul, 1 Cor. ix. 24. "Know ye not, that they which run in a race, run all; and every man that triveth for the maftery, is temperate in all things? "Now they do it to obtain a corruptible crown, but we an incor«ruptible.' 2. THE ARGUMENT FOR A FUTURE STATE, DRAWN FROM MEN'S NATURAL DESIRE OF IMMORTALITY, Another argument, which may be ufed in proof of a future ftate," fo far as to amount to a very great probability, is that neceflary defire of immortality which feems to be naturally implanted in all men, with an unavoidable concern for what is to come hereafter. If there be no exiftence after this life; it will feem that the irrational creatures, who always enjoy the prefent good without any care or "O præclarum diem, quum in illud animorum concilium cætumque proficifcar, & quum ex hac turba & collusione difcedam !" Idem, de Senect. + Χρὴ πάντα ποιεῖν, ὦ σε πρεβῆς καὶ φρονήσεως ἐν τῷ βίω μετασχεῖν· καλὸν γὰς τὸ ἄθλος, καὶ ἡ ἐλπὶς μεγάλη. Plato n Phaedone. † Καὶ μὲν τά γε μέγισα ἐπίχειρα ἀξελῆς καὶ προκείμενα ἆθλα ἐ διεληλύθαμεν.—Τὶ δ ̓ ἂν γε ὀλίγω χρόνω μέγα γένοιτο; πάς γὰρ ὗτός γε ὁ ἐκ παιδός μέχρι πρεσβύτε χρόνος προς πάντα λίγοι τι τις ἂν εἴη. Plato de epubl. lib. X. § Ταῦτα τοίνυν ὐδὲν ἐςιπλάθει ἐδὲ μεγέθει πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ἀτελευτήσαντα ἑκάτερον περιμένει. Idem, ibid. | Οἱ μὲν ἄρα νίκης ἕνεκα πάλης καὶ δρόμων καὶ τῶν τοιύτων, ἐτόλμησαν ἀπέχεσθαι. οἱ δὲ ἡμέτεροι παίδες αδυνατήσεσι καρτερεῖν, πολὺ καλλίονΘ ἕνεκα νίκης. Plato de Legib. lib. VIII. folicitude folicitude for what may happen afterwards, are better provided for by nature than men, whofe reafon and forefight, and all other those very faculties, by which they are made more excellent than beafts, ferve them, upon this fuppofition, fcarcely for any other purpofe than to render them uneafy and uncertain and fearful and folicitous about things which are not. And it is not at all probable, that God fhould have given men appetites, which were never to be fatisfied; defires, which had no objects to anfwer them; and unavoidable apprehenfions of what was never really to come to pafs. 3. ANOTHER, DRAWN FROM MEN'S CONSCIENCE OR JUDGEMENT OF THEIR OWN ACTIONS, Rom. ii. 14, 15 Another argument, which may be brought to prove a future ftate, is, that confcience which all men have of their own actions, or that inward judgement which they neceffarily pafs upon them in their own minds: whereby they that "have not any law are a law "unto themfelves, their confcience bearing witnefs, and their "thoughts accufing or elfe excufing one another." There is no man, who at any time does good and brave and generous things, but the reafon of his own mind applauds him for fo doing; and no man at any time does things bafe and vile, difhonourable and wicked, but at the fame time he condemns himself in what he does. The one is neceffarily accompanied with good hope and expectation of reward; the other with continual torment and fear of punishment. And hence, as before, it is not probable, that God should have fo framed and conftituted the mind of man, as neceffarily to pafs upon itself a judgement which fhall never be verified, and ftand perpetually and unavoidably convicted by a fentence which fhall never be confirmed. 4. ANOTHER, DRAWN FROM MAN'S BEING BY NATURE AN AC COUNTABLE CREATURE. Laftly, another argument, which may be drawn from right reafon in proof of a future ftate, is this, that man is plainly in his nature an accountable creature, and capable of being judged. Thofe creatures, indeed, whofe actions are all determined by fomething without themfelves, or by what we call mere inftinct; as they are not capable of having a rule given them, fo it is evident that neither can they be accountable for their actions. But man, who has entirely within himfelf a free principle or power of determining his own actions upon moral motives, and has a rule given him to act by, which is right reason, can be, nay, cannot but be, accountable for all his actions, how far they have been agreeable or difagreeable to that rule. Every man, becaufe of the natural liberty of his will, can and ought to govern all his actions by fome certain rule, and give a reafon for every thing he does. Every moral action he performs, being free and without any compulfion or natural neceflity, proceeds either from fome good motive or fome evil one; is either conformable to right reafon, or contrary to it; is worthy either of praife or difpraife, and capable either of excufe or aggravation. Confequently it is highly reafonable to be fuppofed, that fince N 4 there |