In civil actions, the plaintiff might then bring his action in a federal or State court, as he pleased, and as he thought he should be most likely to succeed; whilst the defendant would have no option, but must abide the consequences, without the power of removing the cause from a State into a federal court, except in the single case of his being sued out of the district in which he resides; and this, although he might have a conclusive defence under the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Another reason for preserving this section is, that, without it, there would be no uniformity in the construction and administration of the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States. If the courts of twenty-four distinct, sovereign States each possess the power, in the last resort, of deciding upon the Constitution and laws of the United States, their construction may be different in every State of the Union. That act of Congress which conforms to the Constitution of the United States, and is valid, in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Georgia, may be a direct violation of the provisions of that instrument, and be void, in the judgment of the Supreme Court of South Carolina. A State law in Virginia might in this manner be declared constitutional, whilst the same law, if passed by the Legislature of Pennsylvania, would be void. Nay, what would be still more absurd, a law or treaty of the United States with a foreign nation, admitted to be constitutionally made, might secure rights to the citizens of one State, which would be denied to those of another. Although the same Constitution and laws govern the Union, yet the rights acquired under them would vary with every degree of latitude. Surely the framers of the Constitution would have left their work incomplete, had they established no common tribunal to decide its own construction, and that of the laws and treaties made under its authority. They are not liable to this charge, because they have given express power to the judiciary of the Union over "all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority."

The first Congress of the United States have, to a considerable extent, carried this power into execution by the passage of the judicial act; and it contains no provision more important than the 25th section.

This section ought not to be repealed, because, in the opinion of the minority of the Committee on the Judiciary, its repeal would seriously endanger the existence of this Union. The chief evil which existed under the old confederation, and which gave birth to the present Constitution, was, that the General Government could not act directly upon the people, but only by requisition upon sovereign States. The consequence was, that the States either obeyed or disobeyed these requisitions, as they thought proper. The present Constitution was intended to enable the Government of the United States to act immediately upon the people of the States, and to carry its own laws into full execution, by virtue of its own authority. If this section were repealed, the General Government would be deprived of the power, by means of its own judiciary, to give effect either to the Constitution which called it into existence, or to the laws and treaties made under its authority. It would be compelled to submit, in many important cases, to the decisions of State courts, and thus the very evil which the present Constitution was intended to prevent would be entailed upon the people. The judiciary of the States might refuse to carry into effect the laws of the United States; and without that appeal to the Supreme Court which the 25th section authorizes, these laws would thus be entirely annulled, and could not be executed without a resort to force.

This position may be illustrated by a few striking examples. Supposthe legislature of one of the States, believing the tariff laws to be constitutional, should determine that they ought not to be executed within its limits. They accordingly pass a law, imposing the severest penalties upon the collector and other custom house officers of the United States within their territory, if they should collect the duties on the importation of foreign merchandise. The collector proceeds to discharge the duties of his office under the laws of the United States, and he is condemned and punished before a State court, for violating this State law. Repeal this section, and the decision of the State court would be final and conclusive; and any State could thus nullify any act of Congress which she deemed to be unconstitutional.

The Executive of one of the States, in a message to the legislature, has declared it to be his opinion, that the land belonging to the United States within her territory is now the property of the State, by virtue of her sovereign authority. Should the legislature be of the same opinion, and pass a law for the punishment of the land officers of the United States who should sell any of the public lands within her limits, this transfer of property might be virtually accomplished by the repeal of the 25th section of the judicial act. Our land officers might then be severely punished, and thus prohibited by the courts of that State from performing their duty under the laws of the Union, without the possibility of redress in any constitutional or legal form. In this manner, the title of the United States to a vast domain, which has cost the nation many millions, and which justly belongs to the people of the several States, would be defeated or greatly impaired.

Another illustration might be introduced. Suppose the Legislature of Pennsylvania, being of opinion that the charter of the Bank of the United States is unconstitutional, were to declare it to be a nuisance, and inflict penalties upon all its officers for making discounts or receiving deposites. Should the courts of that State carry such a law into effect, without the 25th section, there would be no appeal from their decision; and the legislature and courts of a single State might thus prostrate an institution established under the Constitution and laws of the United States.

In all such cases, redress can now be peaceably obtained in the ordinary administration of justice. A writ of error issues from the Supreme Court, which finally decides the question whether the act of Congress was constitutional or not; and if they determine in the affirmative, the judgment of the State court is reversed. The laws are thus substituted instead of arms, and the States kept within their proper orbits by the judicial authority. But if no such appeal existed, then, upon the occurrence of cases of this character, the General Government would be compelled to determine whether the Union should be dissolved, or whether there should be a recurrence to force-an awful alternative, which we trust may never be presented. We will not attempt further to portray the evils which might result from the abandonment of the present judicial system. They will strike every reflecting mind.

It has of late years been contended that this section of the judicial act was unconstitutional, and that Congress do not possess the power of investing the Supreme Court with appellate jurisdiction in any case which has been finally decided in the courts of the States. It has also been contended, that, even if they do possess this power, it does not extend to cases in which a State is a party. On this branch of the question we would refer the House

to the very able and conclusive argument of the Supreme Court of the United States in the cases of Martin vs. Hunter's lessee, (1st Wheaton, 304,) and Cohens vs. the State of Virginia, (6 Wheaton, 264,) by which the affirmative of these propositions is clearly established. It may be proper, however, that we should make a few observations upon this part of the question. Those who have argued in favor of these positions assert that the general words of the Constitution, extending the judicial power of the Union "to all cases, in law and equity," arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, ought, by construction, to be restricted to such cases, in law and equity, as may originate in the courts of the Union. They would thus establish a limitation at war with the letter, and, in our opinion, equally at war with the spirit of the instrument. Had such been the intention of the framers of the Constitution, they well knew in what language to express that intention. Had it been their purpose to restrict the meaning of the general language which they had used in the first clause of the section, they could have done so with much propriety in the second. This clause, after providing "that, in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction," proceeds to declare "that, in all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations, as the Congress shall make." On the supposition contended. for, it is wholly unaccountable that the framers of the Constitution did not limit the natural effect of the words used in the first clause, by making the second to read that, in all the other cases before mentioned," arising in the inferior courts of the United States, "the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction." But no such restriction exists; and from the fair import of the words used in both clauses, the Supreme Court possess the power of finally deciding "all cases, in law and equity," arising under the Constitution, the laws, and the treaties of the United States, no matter whether they may have originated in a federal or in a State court, and no matter whether States or individuals be the parties.

But it is not our intention to enter into a protracted constitutional argument upon the present occasion, because this question has long since been put at rest, if any constitutional question can ever be considered as settled in this country. The Federalist, which is now considered a text book in regard to the construction of the Constitution, and deservedly so, as well from the great merit of the work as the high character of its authors, is clear and explicit on this subject. After reasoning upon it at some length, the author of the 83d number of that production arrives at the following conclusion: "To confine, therefore, the general expressions which gave appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court to appeals from the subordinate federal courts, instead of allowing their extension to the State courts, would be to abridge the latitude of the terms, in subversion of the intent, contrary to every sound rule of interpretation."

The Federalist, it will be recollected, was written between the formation of the Constitution and its adoption by the States. Immediately after its adoption, Congress, by passing the 25th section of the judicial act, now sought to be repealed, fully confirmed this construction. This appellate jurisdiction has ever since been exercised by the Supreme Court in a great variety of cases; and we are not aware that the constitutionality of its exereise has ever been questioned by the decision of any State court, except in

a single instance, which did not occur until the year 1815; and even in that case, (Hunter vs. Fairfax,) the judgment of the Supreme Court was carried into effect according to the existing law, without endangering the peace of the country.

The last topic to which we would advert, is the claim which bas been set up to exempt the judgments obtained by the States of this Union, before their own courts, in civil and criminal suits, prosecuted in their name, from being reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States upon a writ of error. Much stress has been laid by those who sustain this claim, upon the general proposition, that a sovereign, independent State cannot be sued, except by its own consent. But does this proposition apply, in its extent, to the States of this Union? That is the question for discussion.

We have in this country an authority much higher than that of sovereign States. It is the authority of the sovereign people of each State. In their State conventions, they ratified the Constitution of the United States; and so far as that Constitution has deprived the States of any of the attributes of sovereignty, they are bound by it, because such was the will of the people. The Constitution, thus called into existence by the will of the people of the several States, has declared itself, and the laws and treaties which should emanate from its authority, to be "the supreme law of the land;" and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.

Why, then, should a State, who has obtained a judgment in her own courts against an individual, in violation of this "supreme law of the land,” be protected from having her judgment reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States? Is there any reason, either in the Constitution, or in natural justice, why judgments obtained by a State in her own courts should be held sacred, notwithstanding they violated the Constitution and laws of the Union, which would not apply, at least with equal force, in favor of individual plaintiffs? The Constitution subjects to the review of the Supreme Court all cases, in law or equity, arising under itself or the laws of the Union. It excepts no case bearing this character. Whether the party be a State or an individual, all must alike bow to the sovereign will of the people, expressed in the Constitution of the United States.

In suits brought by a State against an individual in her own courts, there is much greater danger of oppression, considering the relative power and influence of the parties, than there would be in controversies between individuals. And are these to be the only cases selected, in which the citizen shall not be permitted to protect himself by the Constitution and laws of the Union before the Supreme Court of the United States? Is it not sufficient that, under the Constitution, the States cannot be sued as defendants, without adding to this, by a strained and unnatural construction, the additional privilege, that the judgments which they may obtain as plaintiffs or prosecutors before their own courts, whether right or wrong, shall in all cases be irreversible?

We will not repeat the considerations which have been already urged to prove that, unless this provision of the Constitution applies to the States, the rights of individuals will be sacrificed, all uniformity of decision abandoned, and each one of the States will have it in her power to set the Constitution and laws of the United States at defiance.

The eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States interferes in no respect with the principles for which we have contended. It is

in these words: "The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit, in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign State."

Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the court in the case of Cohens vs. Virginia, has given so clear, and, in our opinion, so correct an exposition of the true construction of the amendment, that we shall, in conclusion, present to the House a few extracts from that opinion, instead of any argument of our own. He says that the first impression made on the mind by this amendment is, that it was intended for those cases, and for those only, in which some demand against a State is made by an individual in the courts of the Union. If we consider the causes to which it is to be traced, we are conducted to the same conclusion. A general interest might well be felt in leaving to a State the full power of consulting its convenience in the adjustment of its debts, or of other claims upon it; but no interest could be felt in so changing the relation between the whole and its parts as to strip the Government of the means of protecting, by the instrumentality of its courts, the Constitution and laws from active violation. The words of the amendment appear to the court to justify and require this construction."

"To commence a suit is to demand something by the institution of process in a court of justice; and to prosecute the suit is, according to the common acceptation of language, to continue that demand. By a suit commenced by an individual against a State, we should understand process sued out by that individual against the State, for the purpose of establishing some claim against it by the judgment of a court; and the prosecution of that suit is its continuance. Whatever may be the stages of its progress, the actor is still the same. Suits had been commenced in the Supreme Court against some of the States before the amendment was introduced into Congress, and others might be commenced before it should be adopted by the State legislatures, and might be depending at the time of its adoption. The object of the amendment was not only to prevent the commencement of future suits, but to arrest the prosecution of those which might be commenced when this article should form a part of the Constitution. It, therefore, embraces both objects; and its meaning is, that the judicial power shall not be construed to extend to any suit which may be commenced, or which, if already commenced, may be prosecuted, against a State, by the citizens of another State. If a suit, brought in one court, and carried by legal process to a supervising court, be a continuation of the same suit, then this suit is not commenced nor prosecuted against a State. It is clearly, in its commencement, the suit of a State against an individual, which suit is transferred to this court, not for the purpose of asserting any claim against the State, but for the purpose of asserting a constitutional defence against a claim made by a State."

"Under the judiciary act, the effect of a writ of error is simply to bring the record into court, and submit the judgment of the inferior tribunal to reexamination. It does not in any manner act upon the parties; it acts only on the record. It removes the record into the supervising tribunal. Where, then, a State obtains a judgment against an individual, and the court rendering such judgment overrules a defence set up under the Constitution or laws of the United States, the transfer of this record into the Supreme Court, for the sole purpose of inquiring whether the judgment violates the Constitution or laws of the United States, can, with no propriety, we think, be denominat