mestic branches of industry is so completely incidental to that power, that it is difficult to suppose the existence of the one without the other. The States have delegated their whole authority over imports to the General Government, without limitation or restriction, saving the very inconsiderable reservation relating to the inspection laws. This authority having thus entirely passed from the States, the right to exercise it for the purpose of protection does not exist in them; and, consequently, if it be not possessed pro by the General Government, it must be extinct.

"Our political system would thus present the anomaly of a people stripped of the right to foster their own industry, and to counteract the most selfish and destructive policy which might be adopted by foreign nations. This surely cannot be the case: this indispensable power, thus surrendered by the States, must be within the scope of the authority on the subject expressly delegated."

To apply the above where the object of any internal improvement embraces two or more States, the committee will observe, that, antecedent to the Union, the States, as separate sovereignties, could have entered into negotiations and treaties to execute any extended line of road or canal; but, after its adoption, they were excluded from forming any compact with each other without the assent of Congress. The States, then, have wholly surrendered the power under which alone they could have effected great leading and permanent roads or canals, for their mutual accommodation, and cannot regain it by the mere exercise of their own wills. If the power be not extinct, it is wholly within the control of the United States, and must fall within the scope of the authority over the subject expressly delegated to Congress, and be directly incidental to them.

Again: the power to regulate commerce among the States is granted in the same words with that to regulate commerce with foreign nations. In the one case, it is agreed that imports can be cheapened by public works; the same reason will apply the power to cheapen the transportation of inland trade, that being of importance equal to foreign commerce; and the power must be as necessarily incidental to the express power.

This directly incidental power carries with it the full means of execution and protection, and does not rest on the undefined tenor of continued and uninterrupted usage, which is said to have been employed "at the expense of harmony."

The committee will pursue this subject no farther than to say that, in their opinion, the same constitution which legalises the removal of brambles for the free passage of the surveyor's chain, gives equal right to construct the contemplated work. That there is no partition of power. If Congress can act at all, it can act with effect; if it can make a road or a canal, it can employ the accustomed means of the country to keep the work in repair.

In relation to the subject of internal improvements, that there is a line between national and merely State objects, of a sound and practical meaning, is generally admitted; and where this line is, the wisdom of Congress must decide in each case as it arises.

With no pretension of describing the precise line, the committee will suggest that an object of national improvement may be entirely within a State, as a road to a fortification, such as that from New Orleans to fort St. Philip, in Louisiana; or perhaps a better illustration is supplied by the Delaware and Raritan canal, lying wholly in the State of New Jersey. The object may embrace

parts of two States, as abridge over a river dividing the States; in this instance, Congress could erect the bridge, if necessary for any national purpose. In every case where the improvement is to take a wide range through many States; in instances within a State where an object is considered as a link of an extended line; and in all cases where its end is to connect, by artificial means, the grand geographical divisions of the country; to draw the line, it must be expected, will sometimes give rise to debate, but not more frequently, nor of a more perplexing nature, than will occur in attempting to draw the line of correct legislation on various other subjects.

The tariff to protect American industry is declared by the President constitutional, but does he prescribe the exact limit required for this object? Congress can impose direct taxes, yet, in the exercise of this power, excesses would be real grievances.

But a road or canal, even of a doubtful character as to its nationality, would benefit the country; so it would seem that no federal power can be exercised with less cause of alarm.

In adverting to the message, the committee will not examine it by paragraphs, for fear of committing any error. A particular part of it can be better interpreted in connexion with the whole; they will only make allusion o some of the ideas conveyed by it, concerning which there can be no mistake; leaving the application of their general observations, where they come in collision with any part of it, to the judgment of the House, to be considered as an answer.

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The President, after carefully revolving in his mind the whole subject, has formed these opinions-that it is improper and inexpedient to subscribe for stock in private associations; that, unless an entire stop be put to the practice, certain bad consequences will follow; and that the course heretofore pursued to advance the internal improvements of the country, is the worst, perhaps, that could exist,

Among the reasons for these opinions, it is asserted, that, when an improvement is effected by the funds of the Union, the citizens ought to enjoy it without being compelled to pay tolls; that money so raised ought to be subject to the rule of revenue; that discredit might result from the Government's embarking with its constituents in joint stock associations; and that, in certain instances, the control of a portion of the public funds would be delegated to an authority unknown to the constitution.

To these objections and reasonings the committee reply, in the first place, that, if it is constitutional to subscribe for the stock of private companies, which does not appear to be controverted, none of the agencies thereunto appertaining can be alien to the constitution.

In regard to the idea that the citizens, respecting public improvements, ought to be exempt from tolls or any imposition of that character, this doctrine would apply to the States with the same force as it would to the Federal Union. In the States, however, it is the universal practice to receive tolls from those who use the roads of incorporated companies, in which a sovereign State is interested. The traveller gains an equivalent, and is not heard to complain. To say nothing of the consequent ruin of State enterprises, if the citizens should be treated better by any mode of internal improvement, under the auspices of the General Government, than by the laws and institutions of their respective States, their affections might be unwarily

weaned from the one and bestowed upon the other. As yet, such favor has not been extended, even to American genius. The inventor of the most valuable discovery has to pay for his patent.

With reference to the rule of revenue, it is provided by the constitution that all duties, imposts, and excises, shall be uniform throughout the United State; but the paying of tolls is clearly a tax of no description. A valuable consideration being received, it is no collection of revenue. It is only a profit on the revenue on hand. It is as much a contract as the purchase of public land, in which case the buyer is to pay for the value he receives; and in like manner the scientific inventor has to purchase his patent. Respecting the impropriety of subscribing for stock in private companies, this committee, and former committees, and both Houses of Congress, have deemed that the most eligible and least objectionable mode of effecting many of the improvements of the country. The opinion has been as generally entertained that the direct agency of the Government should be resorted to only in cases where States or private companies had not sufficient interest or means to induce them to embark in their execution.

The committee cannot discover how any deception could be practised in this mode of expenditure, more than in the direct application of the public money. No circumstance respecting the former can be better concealed. The United States' engineers can give as accurate information in the one case as in the other. In each, the same inducements will exist for additional appropriations, when the first have proved inadequate. Besides, when subscriptions are made, Congress will have the opinion of State Legislatures, and the guarantee of private subscriptions of stock, as to the importance of the undertaking, before they are begun; and in conducting them afterwards, the advantage of the vigilance and zeal of interested and enterprising individuals. In what manner disguise could be practised, the committee are at a loss to conjecture. It must be admitted that unforeseen obstacles will occasionally obstruct the progress of such improvements, and call for additional aid, in defiance of the skill, foresight, and honesty of man. The Chesapeake and Delaware canal, and the Louisville and Portland canal, afford instances of uncommon occurrence. In the first, the embankment for a considerable distance sunk about one hundred feet; and the latter had to be excavated through a solid rock of unusual and unexpected hardness.

In ordinary cases, the construction of roads and canals is reduced to strict rules, and contracts can be formed with reasonable certainty. Throughout the Union, such works are now executed by such contracts; which incorporated companies are as capable of making as the Government, and much more likely to execute with vigor.

The Committee on Roads and Canals, in 1825, after describing what they considered improvements of the first class, proceeded as follows: "The committee, however, are of opinion that there is a secondary class of cases, in which the General Government and States can act conjointly, by the subscription of stock on the part of the United States in companies incorporated in the respective States for internal improvements.'

"The plan proposed, after much reflection, has been deemed the most judicious of any that can be devised. It is a plan of encouragement, and in its operation will not interfere with objects of the first class. It will ex

cite the States to incorporate companies for such objects as will be sufficiently national to induce Congress to countenance them. It leaves Congress to decide in each case, when presented, upon its own circumstances and merits.

The committee cannot conceive how the General Government can aid in the internal improvements of the country, in most cases, with greater propriety than by subscriptions in companies incorporated by the respective States. Congress will have the opinion of the United States' engineers, who will make the necessary surveys, plans, and estimates; and it will have the opinion of the State in each case, and intelligent stockholders, as to the importance and probable profit of each work and, finally, Congress will exercise its own judgment on the utility and national character of the work. The prosecution of the works, besides, will be conducted by interested individuals, with less expense and delay than perhaps it could be done by the public." The plan of subscribing for stock in companies has, also, the advantage of augmenting the expenditures on public works far beyond the sum invested by the General Government. Congress may adopt the principle, that no subscription shall be made to any incorporated company until a certain proportion, say two-thirds, of the estimated expense, be subscribed by a State or by individuals. By this plan, ten millions belonging to the United States would cause the expenditure of thirty millions on public undertakings; and, in time, Congress might dispose of their stock, and use the same fund to aid in other works.

The practice of subscribing for stock in private companies by State sovereignties has long and extensively prevailed; they have joined their constituents in creating banks, and in promoting improvements. Without any disparagement to the General Government, State sovereignties, in this respect, stand on the same footing, and would be equally subject to inconveniences, if such really existed. The States of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Delaware subscribed for stock in the Chesapeake and Delaware canal; Virginia and Maryland subscribed to the stock of the Chesapeake and Ohio canal; and the practice has been approved by four or five distinct Congresses. To impair a principle so long acted upon, it would seem to the committee to require a train of abuses and inconveniences plainly to be laid before the people. How can any discredit result from the Government's embarking with its constituents in the great work of national improvements? •

If cannot be expected that the General Government would ever associate itself with companies merely with a view of pecuniary speculation; and by the report of the Committee on Roads and Canals in 1825, and the bill accompanying it, a provision was introduced, allowing the State or States creating the companies to purchase, at pleasure, the stock of the United States in such companies.

Congress, it is believed, will never be disposed to act without the cooperation of the States, except in a national work, in which the States or individuals, for want of interest or adequate resources, are unwilling to embark, or, if commenced, are unable to continue and complete. Such cases, in the opinion of the committee, may be considered as of the first national class, and cannot be included under any specific system.

The action of the Government in the first class will require either direct appropriations, to be expended under the agency of the United States, or subscriptions for stock in private companies. In this class, also, it is obvious, and by none denied, that no rule of equal distribution can be adopted. The localities of the country will require that much larger sums should be expended in some parts of the country than in others. As an illustration of this, the Chesapeake and Delaware canal would absorb the equal dis

tribution to which the State of Delaware would be entitled for perhaps a half a century, while this State is far less benefitted by the construction of the canal than many other sections of the Union.

Fair and important considerations may, likewise, induce more than a proportional expenditure of money in certain divisions of the country. For instance: while the erection of public works on the seaboard cheapens importation, and diffuses a general benefit among consumers, whether in the exterior or interior of the country, it must be acknowledged that the expenditures on light-houses, beacons, fortifications, &c. afford an additional advantage to those sections of the nation wherein they are erected, by the circulation of large sums, amounting, in fact, to many millions, among the people of those districts.

The new States do not enjoy corresponding advantages; and any degree of equal benefit, in this respect, cannot be effected, unless more than the representative proportion of the funds of the Union be expended among them. As internal improvements are the only objects of magnitude alike advantageous to the new States and to the Union, it is by acting on these alone that Congress can equalise the public benefits of the country. The new States have no unsettled land to constitute a fund for this purpose, and the nett proceeds of the sale of public lands will avail very little towards the execution of their leading roads. The rise and condition of the western States have, in an eminent degree, augmented the power and consequence of the Union. The citizens of these extensive regions have purchased our wild lands, and converted them into useful farms. The intercourse between them and the Atlantic States is daily increasing. For the mutual enjoyment of the internal commerce thence arising, good roads and canals are indispensable. It is true, the old States, with few exceptions, have prosecuted their own improvements to a great extent without federal aid; but many of these States possessed funds derived from the sales of public lands, and other sources not attainable in the west. It will be no more than an act of generous and good feeling in the Atlantic States to aid their younger sisters. A passage from the late message of the Governor of Pennsylvania we admire for its public spirit and truly American patriotism. It is as follows:

"Although extensively engaged in the construction of works of internal improvement within her own limits, and at her own individual expense, Pennsylvania has uniformly, with a magnanimity and a spirit of patriotism which does her honor, advocated and maintained the constitutional right of the General Government to aid in the construction of works of internal improvements of a national character, tending to bind, and to connect more closely together, the remote parts of our widely extended territory; to multiply the facilities of communication between the different parts of the Union; to diminish time and distance in the intercourse of its citizens with each other; to beget, by means of such intercourse, feelings of amity, kindness, and friendship, instead of those sectional jealousies, local prejudices, and unkind and uncharitable prepossessions, which a want of free and friendly intercommunication is always seen to produce; and generally to increase the comforts and promote the prosperity and happiness of the people of the United States."

If we descend from this elevation, and confine ourselves to the narrow, parsimonious pursuits of gain, no policy more substantial could be devised.