particular, but in the subsequent diplomacy Spain was held at fault on the ground that the accident had happened within her jurisdiction. No demand was made for any specific pecuniary indemnity, but Spain was left to offer a suitable reparation. This meant concessions in Cuba. General Woodford, Minister at Madrid, expressed the American position in a note to the Spanish Government, March 28, 1898. "Upon the facts as thus disclosed a grave responsibility appears to rest upon the Spanish Government. The Maine, on a peace errand and with the knowledge and consent of that Government, entered the harbor of Havana, relying upon the security and protection of a friendly port. Confessedly she still remained, as to what took place on board, under the jurisdiction of her own Government. Yet the control of the harbor remained in the jurisdiction of the Spanish Government, which, as the sovereign of the place, was bound to render protection to persons and property there, and especially to the public ship and to the sailors of a friendly power."28 Granting the American contention of an external explosion, which is very difficult to prove with any degree of satisfaction in the light of our present knowledge of the effect of high explosives and which is rejected by the majority of European experts; granting that the Government of Spain had mined the harbor, which was emphatically denied by that power-then the Maine disaster presents the responsibility which attaches to mining harbors. The right of a state to place fixed mines (distinct from the floating torpedoes which ought never to be employed) in the national ports is one of its sovereign rights. 25 Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence and Documents, 18961900, p. 105.

Mining harbors is as legitimate a method of defence as placing cannon in fortresses, but owing to the important rights of access to ports acquired by friendly states under commercial treaties the placing of mines or submarine torpedoes carries grave responsibility. The sovereign state which opens its ports to neutrals owes in every case the greatest care in securing the safety of a visiting man-of-war. The necessities of international relations make perfectly normal the visits on occasion of the naval vessels of friendly powers both in defence of national interests and in the exchange of mutual courtesies and the peaceful conduct of naval affairs. It is recognized that the ports of civilized states are generally open to the warships of friendly powers, subject to the restrictions imposed by the sovereign authority of the port. It is perfectly within the right of the state to refuse entrance entirely, to make restrictions and to watch and control the actions of the visiting ship either from political, military or sanitary considerations. The admission of a visiting ship is at all times a concession made out of courtesy or friendship.20 But once having admitted public ships to the use of its ports the sovereign power assumes responsibilities. The visiting ship cannot know of the dangers lurking in such ports as it may be allowed to enter, nor is it compatible with the use of mines in harbors that another power should know of their location. If the local authorities choose to give a visiting ship a berth over a mine they guarantee its safety while there through such control of the mine

29 Rivier, Principes du droit des gens, Vol. I, p. 156; Rule adopted by L'Institut de droit international, 1898. Annuaire, Vol. XVII, p. 273. Revue de droit international public, Vol. V, p. 853.

as makes an accident absolutely impossible. They alone have the power to do this. It is not necessary in case of an accident to prove the complicity of the Government in order to attach a liability. But the essential questions involved in the Maine explosion had to do with the facts of an external or an internal explosion-whether the damage was caused by a mine —and second, if an external cause is found, the extent of damages. If the two questions cannot be settled by joint investigation and ordinary diplomatic procedure they are suitable subjects of arbitration. Today they would in all likelihood be referred to the Hague Tribunal. From the standpoint of international law it is greatly to be regretted that the Maine case was not settled apart from the Cuban question. In asking for a settlement by arbitration Spain had the better of the two positions.

Before the reports of the naval commissions engaged in the investigation of the Maine disaster were made the war party had gained considerable headway in spite of the pacific councils of President McKinley. Consul-General Fitzhugh Lee gave offence to Spain by his vigorous representations of the suffering of the rural population. It was represented that the distress. of the classes concentrated in camps was only partially relieved by the withdrawal of the more serious restrictions in the concentration system.30 Relying on his statements, the Government of the United States had decided early in March to increase the succour for Cubans and to employ two ships of war, the cruisers Montgomery and Nashville, in its transmission. Spain protested and the United States yielded, substi

30 Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 673; Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence and Documents, 1896–1900, p. 66.

tuting transports for the service.31

A few days later, however, the Montgomery was sent into Havana to take the place of the Maine. With the same purpose Xof preparing for any emergency President McKinley, after consultation with the Secretary of the Navy, the leader of the majority in the House, and the four chairmen of the House and Senate Committees on the Navy and Appropriations, decided to ask Congress for an appropriation of fifty million dollars for national defense. The money was immediately voted and placed at the disposal of the President without any restrictions and with a unanimity which astonished all Americans. The unmistakable indications of a full treasury and of national confidence in the Executive was no less a revelation to the Spanish court.32 Other events of the time indicated a conviction in American political circles that preparedness for war was the necessity of the hour.33 Ships were assembled at Key West. On March 14 two cruisers just built in England were purchased from Brazil, and auxiliary vessels were added as rapidly as possible. On March 21 Congress, still having an approaching war in view, exempted all war material from customs duties.34 Such events make it very evident that the war party in Congress had won the contest, and that President McKinley with his small circle of advisers of peace had begun a change in policy.

31

Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence and Documents, 18961900, p. 89; Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 677.

32

Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence and Documents, 18961900, p. 90; Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 684.

33

Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence and Documents, 18961900, p. 93.

34

See London Times, March 17, 1898; Message and Documents, 1898-1899, Abridgment, Vol. II, pp. 902-3.

{

CHAPTER IV

INTERVENTION

The American commission inquiring into the Maine disaster placed its report in the President's hands on March 25. Several days earlier, on March 22 and again on March 23, Spain had been notified that unless some satisfactory agreement securing immediate and honorable peace in Cuba could be reached within a few days the Maine report would immediately on its receipt be transmitted to Congress, where the decision would rest. The statement in the temper of the moment was almost tantamount to a threat of breaking off diplomatic relations.1 A few days later, on March 27, the demands of the United States were again transmitted to Spain in a more specific form. They included an armistice in Cuba until October 1, during which time negotiations looking toward a permanent peace should be undertaken; the immediate and total revocation of the order of concentration, and relief measures for those in the camps; and, as a secondary suggestion for the American Minister, an effort to gain Spanish consent to the appointment of the PresiIdent of the United States as final arbitrator in case the terms of peace were not settled by October 1.2 No mention was made of the Maine affair, but it was apparent all through that Spanish concessions alone.

1 Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence and Documents, 18961900, p. 95; Foreign Relations, 1898, pp. 696–713.

'Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 712.