form of trial guaranteed in the treaty of 1795 and the protocol of 1877. In many instances, on the merits. of the case any penalty to the accused would not have been too severe. They were American subjects only in name and for convenience. Their return to Cuba should have automatically worked the lapse of their American citizenship and revived that of their native land. The case of the crew of the Competitor, an American schooner taken in the act of landing arms for the insurgents in April, 1896, furnished one of the most important illustrations of this limited right of the United States to protect its citizens in trouble for filibustering. The accused were ultimately accorded a trial, in form at least, as required by the agreement of 1877. Inflammatory reports of Spanish procedure in such cases kept popular feeling among sympathetic neutrals at high tension throughout the early part of the insurrection. By November 28, 1897, no American citizen remained imprisoned in Cuba.65 The testimony of American official sources exonerates Spain from injustice, and proves her most liberal and conciliatory in the treatment of Americans involved. Filibustering profoundly influenced public opinion in Spain. It was a ready expedient for administrative authorities responsible for the failure of the military operations in Cuba to foist the responsibility upon the so-called non-neutral conduct of the United States. The Spanish public came to believe unquestioningly in the partisan non-friendly attitude of this country. On the American side the prolongation of the war tried the patience of a naturally long-suffering public.

65 Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 644.

CHAPTER III

ABANDONMENT OF NON-INTERVENTION POLICY, OCTOBER, 1897, TO MARCH, 1898

The change of administration in the United States in 1897 had at first no perceptible effect on American neutrality. President McKinley adhered closely to the time-honored pacific policy, traditional in American diplomacy, and the choice of Senator John Sherman as Secretary of State was indirectly a confirmation of such a policy. A financial secretary was chosen at a time when the monetary question, not an aggressive foreign policy, was held to be paramount.1

On June 16, 1897, General Woodford was appointed Minister to Spain, another appointment interpreted as a confirmation of pacific intentions.2 However, General Woodford's instructions made it manifest that strained diplomatic relations might at any time be broken. His instructions were to press upon the Spanish Government the American view of the seriousness of the conditions, the limits of the moral obligation of a border neutral to maintain self-restraint and remain a passive spectator-limits the essence of which is the "reasonableness" of the delay in ending the struggle and the impossibility of continuing the policy of inaction much longer. The adjournment of Congress made the diplomatic situation somewhat

1

2

1 Viallate, Revue historique, Vol. 82, p. 250.

Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence and Documents, p. 36; Revue historique, Vol. 82, p. 252.

easier to control by suppressing for a time the agitation for the recognition of Cuba. On the assassination of Mr. Cánovas del Castillo, August 8, 1897, General Azcanaga became President of the Spanish Council; he continued the policy of his predecessor, but within a little over a month he had fallen into the minority, and the liberal Mr. Sagasta had taken his place. General Weyler was thereupon recalled, and General Blanco was despatched to the post in Cuba with instructions to abandon the policy of concentration. A bando of November 13 partially revoked the military system of General Weyler. The Spanish concentration of non-combatants had called forth American sympathy and interest, especially by reason of the presence of from seven to eight hundred American citizens among those in the concentration camps.5 Repeated protests from the Government of the United States, and the activity of American consuls in Cuban cities in behalf of such Americans, had greatly strained diplomatic relations. The immediate result of the change of administration in Spain was to relieve the stress measurably. The aggressive attitude of the United States in the early summer, which seemed verging on intervention, yielded to one of expectancy in October and November."

6

On November 25, 1897, three Spanish decrees extended to Cuba the provisions of the Spanish constitution with the fundamental guarantees contained in

3

Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence and Documents, p. 36.

* Ibid., p. 37; Foreign Relations, 1898, pp. 600, 602.

"Foreign Relations, 1897, p. 507.

6

Ibid., pp. 507-14; 1898, pp. 597-98; Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence and Documents, pp. 24, 26.

7

Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence and Documents, p. 38.

8

it, applied the electoral laws of Spain providing universal manhood suffrage, and announced autonomy for the island. The new constitution for Cuba provided for an insular parliament of two coördinate chambers and for a Governor-General representing the home government. The upper house of administrative council was to consist of 35 members, 18 elective and 17 life appointments made by the Governor-General. Representatives of the other house were to be elected by universal suffrage, one for each 25,000 inhabitants, and for a term of five years. Annual sessions were made obligatory. The legislative power of the parliament was made residuary, and colonial legislation was extended to all subjects on insular concerns not specifically and determinately reserved to the home. government. Commerce was reserved for the Cortes at Madrid. The apportionment of the debt, including that for the existing war, was likewise reserved. The final authority was vested in the Governor-General, who could suspend the publication of new laws pending final decision at Madrid, and who had in his hands. the control of the military, the appointing power, the pardoning power, subject to instructions from the King, and finally the power to suspend the most vital guarantees of individual liberty whenever he might deem it necessary for the preservation of the peace. The judiciary was made entirely subject to the control

8

Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence and Documents, p. 40; Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 616; Mérignhac, Revue du droit public, Vol. IX, p. 235. A plan of reform was under consideration by the conservative ministry before its overthrow. See Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence and Documents, p. 19. 'Suffrage was given to males of twenty-five years, and to residents in a commune of two years. This had been one of the main demands of the Cuban liberal party.

of the home government. The same decrees established an autonomous municipal and provincial régime. Proportionate representation and the referendum on municipal debts and loans, when demanded by a third of the councillors, were included. Autonomy on the lines laid down in the decrees was predestined to failure. Cuban industries were in a state of ruin, and yet the imposition of a crushing burden of taxes would inevitably follow the conclusion of peace. If the plan had been accepted and put in force in the best good faith, discontent and future rebellion were certain. The plan merely postponed the final settlement. Autonomy as laid down in the Spanish decrees bore no resemblance to the Canadian constitution, for in Cuba the sovereignty of Spain remained an active and controlling force, and all the concessions had in no wise lessened or weakened it. Cuba possessed nothing like the responsible ministry known to the British colonies. However, justice to Spain requires the statement that the concessions were put forth as preliminary to a fuller liberty to follow the successful operation of these. Recent events in Cuba have tended to justify the view held in Spain that the Cubans were not at the time ready for a fuller degree of self-government.10 President McKinley recognized in his message, December 6, the efforts of Spain to inaugurate a new | military policy and system of government, and he expressed a disposition to give her a reasonable time to | develop the results of the new régime. A tendency to question the ability of Spain to carry autonomy into

10

'Mérignhac, L'Autonomie cubaine et le conflit hispanoaméricain, Revue du droit public, Vol. IX, pp. 235-36.