of the declaration discloses an averment that the servants of defendant "wilfully, wantonly, recklessly, and maliciously ran said car with great violence into said coal wagon." This allegation was sufficient to charge the defendant with gross negligence. See Fike v. Railroad Co., 174 Mich. 167, 207 (140 N. W. 592); also Baldwin on Personal Injuries, § 138.

3. Exception was taken to the admission of the ordinance of the city of Detroit limiting the speed of the cars to 15 miles per hour. Subsequently some discussion took place between counsel, and it was excluded, but defendant claims that it left its harmful effect upon the jury. It has been several times held by this court that an ordinance, to be available in establishing the negligence of the defendant, must be pleaded. Richter v. Harper, 95 Mich. 221 (54 N. W. 768); Gardner v. Railway Co., 99 Mich. 182 (58 N. W. 49). The ordinance was not pleaded in the instant case, but was offered only for the purpose of affecting the question of plaintiff's negligence. For this purpose it was admissible. Putnam v. Railway, 164 Mich. 342 (129 N. W. 860).

4. As bearing upon the question of damages, the plaintiff was permitted to introduce testimony of his earning power as a railroad brakeman. This was assigned as error, for the reason that, when injured his occupation was that of a driver of a coal wagon, whose wages were very much less than those of a brakeman. The injured party's damages are measured by his inability to follow his usual employment or business, and are not confined to the temporary employment which he may be following at the time of the injury. 13 Cyc. p. 47; Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Perkerson, 112 Ga. 923 (38 S. E. 365, 53 L. R. A. 210); Peterson v. Traction Co., 23 Wash. 615 (63 Pac. 539, 65 Pac. 543, 53 L. R. A. 586); Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Clarke, 152 U. S. 230 (14 Sup. Ct. 579);

Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Long, 26 Tex. Civ. App. 601 (65 S. W. 882); McIntyre v. Railroad Co., 37 N. Y. 287. The proofs disclosed that plaintiff, who was 32 years of age when injured, had spent the greater part of his working years in the capacity of a railroad brakeman and switchman, and when injured he had an application filed with the Michigan Central Railroad to re-enter such employment. If he were actually qualified to discharge the duties of a brakeman, and had discharged them for nearly 15 years, to measure his loss by being deprived of his ability to drive the coal wagon would not be just compensation.

5. The assignments of error relating to the admission of the testimony of the plaintiff and of the witness Griffen with reference to the speed of the car are not well taken. The record shows that the plaintiff had been a brakeman on a steam railroad for nearly 15 years, and that he had ridden with the motormen on street cars, and observed the stopping of the cars. The witness Griffen had been driving a moving van in the city of Detroit for upwards of 20 years, had ridden upon the cars almost daily, and had observed the speed of the cars on Grand River avenue. The opinion of these witnesses might not have been entitled to great weight, but we think they qualified themselves to express an opinion thereon. Line v. Railway Co., 143 Mich. 163 (106 N. W. 719), and cases cited.

The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed. BROOKE, C. J., and MCALVAY, KUHN, STONE, OSTRANDER, MOORE, and STEERE, JJ., concurred.

LUND v. LOUGH.

1. NEGLIGENCE-CONVERSION-NAVIGATION-BOATS AND SHIPPING. Where the plaintiffs claimed and offered evidence tending to prove that the defendants, without permission, took a boat or lighter without their knowledge, loaded it with a boiler and some merchandise, and towed the lighter to a point about 20 miles away and refused to permit the master of the tug to bring the lighter back until it was loaded, that the master of the tug left a tow line and anchor with express directions how to use them to secure the boat, that defendant neglected these instructions and failed to exercise ordinary care in anchoring and protecting the lighter, which was lost in a storm, the testimony, being disputed, presented a proper issue for the jury as to defendants' negligence.

2. EVIDENCE-DAMAGES-NEGLIGENCE-NAVIGATION-BAILMENTS. Testimony that one of the defendants, in an action for loss of a lighter during a storm, stated or admitted immediately after the lighter broke up and sank that he guessed they would have a lighter to pay for, was admissible in evidence and furnished a proper basis of the inference that he understood he had neglected some duty.

Error to Cheboygan; Sharpe, J. Submitted June 22, 1914. (Docket No. 108.) Decided June 14, 1915.

Case by Robert Lund and another against Albert Lough and another for negligence in failing to properly secure and anchor a boat. Judgment for plaintiffs. Defendants bring error. Affirmed.

I. S. Canfield, for appellants.

C. S. Reilley, for appellees.

BIRD, J. Plaintiffs sued and recovered a judgment in tort for $650 against the defendants for their negligence in failing to care for and protect a certain

lighter, which was in their possession, but which was owned by the plaintiffs. Not being content with the result reached by the trial court, the defendants have brought the case to this court for review.

1. It is urged with much earnestness that the trial court was in error for refusing to direct a verdict in behalf of defendants, on the ground that the testimony failed to disclose any negligence on their part. It is not only the claim of plaintiffs, but the testimony tended to show that in November, 1913, the defendants took possession of the lighter, which was moored in Cheboygan river, without either the knowledge or consent of plaintiffs, loaded it with a boiler and smokestack and merchandise, and on November 18th had it towed to Grace Harbor, a point 20 miles south of Cheboygan, where they were carrying on lumbering operations; that they refused to permit the tug to convey the lighter back to Cheboygan until it was loaded with shingles; that in consequence of such refusal, the return of the lighter was delayed several days; that on the 21st day of November, while the lighter was still at Grace Harbor, a severe storm prevailed, and the lighter was wrecked. It was further shown that when the master of the tug learned that he was not to take the lighter back with him, he left a tow line and anchor and gave defendants instructions how to securely fasten and anchor the lighter, so that it would safely outride the storm; that defendants neglected to follow the instructions given by the master, and it is claimed that they failed to exercise ordinary care in securing and anchoring the lighter, and in consequence thereof the lighter was wrecked and became a total loss. These items of proof, or most of them, were disputed, but if plaintiffs' version were believed by the jury they were sufficient to establish the negligence of the defendants.

186 Mich.-41.

2. Complaint is made of the admission of certain statements in the nature of admissions claimed to have been made by defendant Lough. The following testimony will illustrate the nature of them. Cook, the master of the tug, was permitted to testify, over defendants' objection, that:

"Mr. Lough came aboard of the tug after the lighter had broken up, and I told him that I regretted very much that the thing had happened, and he says, 'Yes, sir; I guess we have a lighter to pay for all right enough.'

In view of the contention of the defendants on the trial that they were not responsible for taking possession of the lighter, and, further, that they were not responsible for the lighter not being returned by the tug, and denying all responsibility for its loss, we think the testimony was properly received. If Mr. Lough made the statement credited to him that “I guess we have a lighter to pay for all right enough," it furnished a basis for an inference that he himself understood that he had neglected some duty which he owed the plaintiffs to see that their property was properly protected.

Several assignments are based upon the charge of the court. We have examined them with reference to the criticisms made, but do not think they are well taken.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

BROOKE, C. J., and MCALVAY, KUHN, STONE, OSTRANDER, MOORE, and STEERE, JJ., concurred.