Review of the War in Europe. THE GENERAL SITUATION. ON July 28, 1914, Austria declared war upon Servia. This act proved to be the match which should ignite a general European conflagration, the sparks from which have reached the Orient. A conflict, encompassing the principal nations of Europe and surpassing in magnitude any war the world has hitherto seen, is being staged upon two great theatres of war-Europe and the Orient. In the European theatre, Russia, England, France, Belgium, Servia, and Montenegro, on the one hand, are arrayed against Germany and Austria-Hungary on the other. Italy has maintained her neutrality. In the Orient, Japan and England, her ally, are engaged in carrying the war into the Teutonic possessions. THE CAUSES OF THE WAR. General-Underlying the concrete acts which precipitate a war are certain basic potential influences often subtle and indeterminate. The fundamental influences underlying the present great struggle, aside from any attempt to place responsibility, are to be sought in the long continued, ever increasing and divergent Slavic and Teutopic interests and aspirations-racial and political. Racial Russia, as a Slay nation and a great power, had long exercised a predominant influence in the Balkans. Acting under this influence, Servia secretly fostered aspirations in the direction of a Pan-Slavic propaganda with the apparent object of not only lessening Austrian influence in the Balkans but of breaking up, through internal defections, the Austrian Empire; from the accomplishment of this Servia hoped to profit. The Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary contains a mixed population, chiefly Teuton where it is not Slav. The Teutons, by racial ties and sympathetic interests, are closely allied with Germany. The Slavs, by the same token, are closely allied with Russia. The spread of Pan-Slavism, with its persistent, intangible and secret agitation, constituted a menace to the very existence of the Dual Monarchy. The growth of German and Russian aspirations directed at expansion through the Balkan States had, therefore, a direct connection with the racial element of which Pan-Slavism was but one manifestation. As an evidence of the spread of the doctrine of "Pan-Slavic Unity" and of the bitterness of the racial antipathy which it engendered, the Austrian Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, were assassinated on June 28, 1914, at Sarajevo, the capital of the Austrian province of Bosnia. Political-Europe had viewed with anxiety the progress of the Balkan wars, fraught with danger to the peace of Europe, lest they precipitate the general conflict which for years had been the dread of Europe and of the civilized world. The geographical readjustments following upon the close of the Balkan wars led to the growth of new and conflicting interests that imposed restraints under which the powers of Europe chafed. A latent feeling of unrest, laden with potential danger, grew until all Europe was as a mass of tinder ready for the lighting. The focus of these basic potential influences centred in the Austro-Servian situation. Relations between these two states, never cordial, were strained to the elastic limit by the assassination of June 28 at Sarajevo. The Austrian Government charged that if not the Servian Government, men in close connection with it procured this crime. In this Austria was supported by Germany. As a result diplomatic exchanges ensued which culminated in an ultimatum, or demarche as Austria chose to designate it, presented on July 23 by Austria to Servia. A resumé of the terms of this demand, together with Servia's action thereon, is given below. Summary of Austria's demands upon Servia and of the Servian reply thereto: (1) That the Servian Government give a formal assurance that it condemns Serb propaganda That the Servian Government promises to proceed with the utmost rigor against all who may be guilty of such machinations. ACCEPTED. (5) That this declaration be simultaneously communicated by the King of Servia to his army as an order of the day and be published in the official bulletin of the army. ACCEPTED. (6) That all Servian publications which incite to hatred and contempt of Austria-Hungary be suppressed. ACCEPTED. That the society styled the Narodna Obrana (National Union) be dissolved and its means (7) of propaganda confiscated. ACCEPTED. (8) That teachers and methods of education in Servia which tend to foment feeling against Austria-Hungary be eliminated. ACCEPTED. (9) That all officers and officials guilty of propaganda against Austria-Hungary be dismissed from the service, the Austro-Hungarian Government reserving to itself the right to communicate to Servia the names and doings of such officers and officials. ACCEPTED.* (10) That representatives of Austria-Hungary shall assist Servia in suppressing in Servia the movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Dual Monarchy and take part in the judicial proceedings on Servian territory against persons accessory to the Sarajevo crime. REJECTED CONDITIONALLY. (11) That Servia furnish the Austro-Hungarian Government with explanations in regard to the utterances of high Servian officials in Servia and abroad who ventured to speak ill of the AustroHungarian Government after the Sarajevo crime. ACCEPTED CONDITIONALLY. † *Subject to proof. † If reply be deemed unsatisfactory, arbitration or mediation is proposed. By the presentation of this ultimatum the Austro-Servian dispute assumed a serious aspect and the great powers of Europe immediately entered into diplomatic exchanges in the interest of peace. The potential possibilities of the question were of vital interest to Germany and to Russia, between whom lay the main issue. The other powers of Europe were interested not only as the allies of either one or the other of those countries, but it may be said that Europe at the end of July, 1914, was in a state of unstable equilibrium formed of two groups of forces, the powers composing each of which had plans and desires which conflicted more with the hopes and aspirations of those of the other group than they did with those of their allies. The Russian attitude indirectly affected the Interests of England and France, who had with Russia formed a coalition known as the Triple Entente. The German attitude similarly affected the interests of Austria-Hungary and of Italy, who had with Germany formed a coalition known as the Triple Alliance. In the course of the diplomatic exchanges, preceding and following Austria's declaration of war upon Servia, Russia made known that she considered her own interests as inseparably bound up in those of the smaller Slavic state and that she could not allow Austría unopposed to crush Servia and become the predominant power in the Balkans. That an attack by Austría upon Servia would not be viewed with indifference by Russia, whose troops would mobilize the day Austria crossed the Servian frontier. (Brit'sh "White Papers," No. 17, July 25, 1914, and No. 72, July 29, 1914.) Germany announced her attitude as in favor of localizing the dispute; that she approved of the no! stand taken by Austria, whose value as an ally was in danger of being undermined. To the powers Germany issued a general warning that she could not tolerate interference with Austria in her purpose of chastising Servia. Of Russia she demanded that an alleged mobilization of Russian troops should forthwith cease. Of France she demanded to be at once informed of that country's attitude in the event of a Russo-German war. The replies to these demands were not reassuring, and were followed on August 1, 1914, by a declaration of war by Germany upon Russia. act Germany extended the area of disturbance to include, on the one hand, her own allies of the Triple Alliance, and, on the other hand, the allies of Russia in the Triple Entente. By this Subsequent events followed rapidly upon Germany's declaration of war against Russia. Italy proclaimed her neutrality and informed Germany that she construed the declaration of war by the latter as an act of aggression which released Italy from her obligation under the terms of the Triple Alliance. Circumstances soon involved first France and then England, as the allies of Russia, in war against Germany and brought from Germany's ally, Austria, a declaration of war against Russia. Austria's declaration against Russia was followed by declarations of war by France and England, in the order named, against Austria-Hungary. Japan, as England's ally, assumed her treaty obligations in the Far East and declared war against Germany, which act brought from AustriaHungary a declaration of war against Japan. In each case the motive actuating the several allies was to be found in treaty obligations, with, in the case of England, the double obligation of the guaranteed neutrality of Belgium, as other guarantors were already in a state of war. The war thus assumes the aspect of a Russo-German war in which the allies of each are active partisans. Chronology of events leading up to military operations and during the first and second phases of the campaign: June 28-Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heirapparent to the throne of Austria-Hungary, assassinated at Sarajevo, capital of Bosnia. July 23-Austria presents to Servia a demarche with a time limit of forty-eight hours. July 25-Servia replies to the Austrian de marche. July 26-Germany warns other powers not to interfere with Austria in her purpose of chastising Servia. Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Secretary, suggests to the powers that representatives of each meet in London to discuss means to avert complications. July 28-Germany and Austria refuse the proposition of Sir Edward Grey. Austria declares war upon Servia. Russia July 29-Austria bombards Belgrade. begins a partial mobilization. Germany prepares for mobilization without public order. July 30-Germany demands that mobilization cease. Russian July 31-Imperial decree declaring state of war throughout German Empire. Holland and Belgium mobilize to defend their neutrality. August 1-Germany declares war upon Russia. France orders mobilization. Italy notifies Germany that she will remain neutral. August 2-German troops enter the Duchy of Luxemburg. French frontier violated by German troops without declaration of war. German troops appear before Liège, Belgium. Germany demands safe passage through Belgium, which is refused. August 6-Austria-Hungary declares war upon Russia. British cruiser Amphion sunk by a mine; 131 men lost. Parliament votes an additional $500,000,000. August 7-German troops enter the city of Liège; the forts of Liège still hold out. August 8-British troops land in Belgium. Portugal announces herself an ally of Great Britain. French troops enter Alsace-Lorraine. French and German troops clash in the Vosges. August 9-German submarine U-15 sunk. August 10-France declares war on AustriaHungary. French and German covering troops clash around Longwy, Spincourt, and other points in that vicinity. August 12-Great Britain declares war upon Austria-Hungary. Germans temporarily repulsed by the Belgians at Haelen. French War Offee announces that troops are in contact from Holland to Switzerland, about 240 miles. August 13-Japan sends an ultimatum to Germany. August 16-German cavalry appears before Brussels. August 18-Belgian Government moved from August 19-Saarburg evacuated to the French. August 25-Five Namur forts fall. tain of the south Vosges. German August 3-German Ambassador to Paris de-line extends from Maubeuge to Donon, a mounmands his passports; French Ambassador to Berlin recalled. War declared between France and Germany. Germany invades Belgium. Belgium appeals to Great Britain for aid as one of the guarantors of Belgia neutrality. August 4-Great Britain declares war upon Germany. House of Commons votes war credit of $525,000,000. Reichstag votes $1,252,000,000. Germany notifies Belgium of a state of war. United States proclaims neutrality. August 5-Germans attack Liège. Lord Kitchener becomes Secretary of State for War in the British cabinet. August 27-Longwy and Namur taken. August 29-German army corps sent from western to eastern theatre of operations. prepares for siege. Paris August 30-Allies retire, but garrison of Maubeuge remains. September 3-French Government moved from Paris to Bordeaux. September 6-High tide of German invasio.. September 11-Germans make stand on the THE STRATEGIC SITUATION. Geographically the Teutonic states are contiguous and lie at the centre of the European theatre of war, an advantage in the movement of troops and supplies, a disadvantage when interior resources are exhausted and outside supply is estopped. In the neutral states contiguous to its borders the Teutonic coalition possesses avenues of ingress for supplies from the neutral states of the outside world. Irregularly disposed about the perimeter of the Teutonic area are the hostile states of the Russian coalition, a geographical dispersion that hinders mutual co-operation, and exterior lines of communication that render difficult the maintenance of armies directed upon an invasion of the Teutonic area. On the other hand, with control of the sea, the exterior position renders easy the replenishment of exhausted resources, and the allies are in a better position to continue a long and exhausting war than are the Teutonic states. The Teutonic coalition is homogeneous. Unity of action is therefore easier than is the case with the Russian coalition of different races, speaking different tongues. Russian Poland is a salient, a sort of promontory projecting from Russian territory into the hostile Teutonic area. Strategically it exposes Russian forces operating therein to attack upon their flank and rear-a danger of being thus cut off. The Belgian-French frontier offers no natural barrier, and none is found short of the interior. The French-German frontier presents the barrier of the Vosges Mountains. Topographically the Teutonic frontiers are naturally strong. On the east, the rivers, lakes, swamps, forests, and sandy wastes of East Prussia and, in a lesser degree, of Posen and Silesia, with the Carpathian Mountains of Galicia, offer formidable barriers to invasion. On the west the Vosges Mountains and the River Rhine similarly obstruct invasion. The seacoast of the north posseSSES few good harbors, but many inlets. Modern seacoast defences render invasion from the sea a hazardous undertaking. The southern frontier is bordered by no hostile state of sumclent strength to constitute a serious menace. In the Teutonic coalition, especially in Germany, national defence has been the determinant factor in the interior economy of railways and manufacturing plants which supply munitions of war. The states of the Russian coalition, while less advantageously equipped in this particular, are still sufciently well equipped for all practical purposes. Interior defences, seacoast defences, armament, and equipment of all belligerents are the results of evolution under the best military direction the country afforded. The results of the war alone can determine their relative eficiency. The Kiel Canal greatly strengthens the potentiality of the German naval forces. POTENTIAL ARMED STRENGTH. The Armies are composed of a convenient number of integral units, each complete in itself. basic integral unit is the division; the next is the army corps, composed of from two to four divisions. Several army corps, acting as a single command, constitute an army. The companies, battalions and regiments, with which we in the United States are most familiar, may for convenience be designated as fractional units of army organization. The standing army of Germany, at the beginning of mobilization, was distributed among twenty-five army corps. The normal army corps had a strength of about 30,000 men of all branches. The standing army of France was distributed among twenty army corps of approximately the same size as those of Germany. Great Britain's small standing army was of barely suficient strength to make up, when joined with the French forces, for the German advantage in numbers. The standing army of Russia, at the beginning of mobilization, was distributed as follows: 850,000 quartered in Europe, 250,000 in East Asia, 70,000 in the Caucasus, and 30,000 in Turkestan. About 60,000 Cossacks variously located. Excluding the frontier guards and certain independent brigades of foot and horse, this force is distributed among thirty-seven army corps and twenty-four cavalry divisions. The normal army corps, excluding reserve divisions, numbers thirty-two battalions, six squadrons, fourteen batteries; total war strength 44,000 men, 12,000 horses; combatant strength 30,000 rifles, sixty-four machine guns, 108 field pieces, and 1,000 sabres. The normal cavalry division has two cavalry brigades, each of two regiments of six squadrons, eight machine guns, two batteries of horse artillery, in all 4,500 men and 4,800 horses, with a combatant strength of 3,500 sabres, twelve field guns, and eight machine guns. In addition to the twenty-four cavalry divisions of the standing army, provision existed for placing ten Cossack divisions in the field. The Cossacks alone are capable of placing 1,000 squadrons in the field. A Russian army is composed of four or five army corps. Military districts become in war, army commands; for example, Warsaw, Vilna, Moscow, Kiel, Odessa. MOBILIZATION. Gathering and preparing for the field the forces available for military service affects not only the final fitting out of the standing army, but more particularly of re-enlisting, equipping, and organizing of men who have ceased to form a part of the standing army. The plans for carrying out such operations are carefully prepared in time of peace. In countries like Germany, France, and Russia, where military service is compulsory, the standing army constitutes a training school for the male population; its graduates upon passing into civil life constitute a great reserve force which is divided, generally speaking, into three classes-the first, second, and third-which in Germany are designated respectively (1) the reserve, (2) the landwehr, (3) the landsturm. To the third class belongs also that portion of the male population of which, for one reason or another, no military service has been required. The reserve is composed of those men most recently graduated from the standing army, and who after a fixed period of assignment to this class pass Into the landwehr. Allowing for national difference in nomenclature, the German system is exemplary of the system in operation in all European countries where military service is compulsory. In Great Britain, where a voluntary system like our own is in operation, the method is necessarily somewhat different and more dificult of operation. In Russia a system of expansion of the natural resources in men to a war footing was reorganized as late as 1908. It was estimated in Russia that a period of about eight years would see the new system in full operation. It is significant that only six years have elapsed. The Russian system of expansion, while more complex than the German, still adheres to the three general classes of reserve forces. France pursued practically the same system as the Germans. CONCENTRATION. The operation of uniting the mobilized units into armies and placing them in their zone of operations is the next step in the operations of war, and the time required depends in general upon the objective in view and the means of transportation available. MILITARY OPERATIONS. Plans-Offensive operations began on August 2, 1914, in the western theatre of operations with an invasion of Luxemburg by Germany. Germany was one of the guarantors of the neutrality of Luxemburg. Relying upon her guaranteed neutrality, Luxemburg possessed no troops and offered no resistance beyond remonstrance. The Luxemburg invasion was made by troops despatched from Treves without being completely mobilized. The same day German covering troops of the seventh army corps from Aix-laChapelle appeared on the German frontier opposite Liège, Belgium, and in the name of the German Government demanded the unobstructed passage of German troops through Belgian territory. Belgium met this demand with refusal, appealed for ald to Great Britain-the one guarantor of Belgian neutrality not yet at war-blew up the bridges across the Meuse, and prepared to resist attack. On August 5 the Germans attacked Liège by an assault. which marked the beginning of the bloody and almost continuous series of conflicts which have since occurred. Succeeding operations have clearly marked out the strategic plans underlying the war plans of the several belligerents. Strategic war plans have as an object the achievement of the greatest possible potential fighting power. An outline of such plans, prior to tracing the course of operations, will materially elucidate the latter. With the Germans committed to the offensive the French plan naturally first presents itself for examination. The northern frontier of France, generally speaking, is naturally weak and but lightly fortified. Behind this frontier the lines of the River Alsne, the River Marne, and the River Seine are encountered in order. Of these the River Aisne presents the disadvantage of lying obliquely to the line of retirement toward the interior; it is also short. The Marne and the Seine are much stronger. The eastern or German frontier presents the Vosges Mountains, their spurs, and the Moselle River. Naturally strong, this line has been further strengthened by the fortified Verdun-Toul, Epinal-Belfort lines, an unfortified gap having been left between Toul and Epinal. From Belfort to Verdun is practically a right line. The unfortified condition of the Belgian frontier has commonly but erroneously been attributed to French reliance upon the neutrality of Belgium. It is impossible to at once fortify and attempt to hold an entire frontier; to do so is to tie up, within fortifications, a disproportionately large number of the forces available; to commit such forces to a policy of inert defence which may check, but cannot destroy, the invader, Frederick the Great has laid it down as a principle that "By attempting to cover everything we end by covering nothing." Napoleon has corroborated this. The problem therefore was to determine which section of frontier, if any, should be fortified. By fortifying a strong frontier-making a strong line stronger-the French possessed from Verdun to Belfort a containing line as strong as it was humanly possible to make it. The strongest fortifications known to military science would have been unequal to the task of making the northern frontier the equal in strength of the fortified Verdun-Belfort line. The selected point of concentration for the national forces of France was at Neufchateau, directly opposite the Toul-Epinal gap in the Verdun-Belfort line. By this arrangement the French accomplished two important objects: First, in the event of invasion by the Germar frontier, potentiality for resistance was at its maximum-France could do no more; second, in the event of what actually has occurred, France was in a position to hold, with a minimum of men, the Verdun-Belfort line and, pivoting about Verdun, to either advance or retire as circumstances should require. Both points are in perfect accord with sound strategy. The French plan involved falling back from the north before an invading army of greater or equal numbers than her own until the line of the Marne or the Seine should be reached, and from that point launching a counter-offensive move. As invasion from the north involved a violation of Belgium's neutrality which England was under treaty obligations to resist. The British plans had been prepared in conjunction with the French General Staff and co-ordinated with the French plans in the Belgian situation. England's expeditionary force was barely sumcient to practically offset German superiority in number. The German plan in the event of war with both France and Russia was based upon the assumption that German mobilization and concentration could be effected somewhat more rapidly than the French and much more so than the Russian. Their plans contemplated, therefore, holding Russia on the eastern frontier with a force of from three to five of their total of twenty-five army corps, rapidly massing the remaining corps on their western frontier in three great armies-the army of the Meuse on the Belgian frontier, the army of the Moselle in Luxemburg, and the army of the Rhine from Metz to Strassburg. With the Metz-Strassburg line as a containing line similar to the French Verdun-Belfort line, the two northern armies pivoting about Metz were to be rushed through Belgium and Luxemburg and so crush the French in detail before the latter could complete their concentration. With the French army crippled or destroyed, the bulk of the western forces would be available for use against Russia and in conjunction with the Austrian forces on the eastern frontier. Time was thus a vital element in the success of the German plan. Returning to the situation at Liège before considering the Russian plan, the resistance offered by the forts surrounding the town was of a most determined character. Liège was protected by a group of twelve concrete, steelturreted forts. These turrets were operated from underground concrete structures and. themselves lying low to the surface of the ground, offered small and inconspicuous targets impervious to the light field pieces which were all the Germans had in the beginning. While waiting for the heavy siege howitzers which were destined to reduce these forts, the Germans continued to deliver sanguinary though unsuccessful assaults upon them. It was not until August 19 that the Germans had sumciently reduced some of the forts of Liège to permit of investing the remainder and proceeding with the masses of their troops toward Brussels. Three things connected with the siege of Liège stand out as having an important bearing upon subsequent events. First and foremost, for seventeen days the Germans were held in check and so were nearly three weeks behind a schedule in which time was an important element. Second, the arrival of their siege howitzers first exposed what was later emphatically demonstrated, that the guns of the strongest forts had no chance when pitted against that type of mobile siege gun. Thirdly, that the reduction of a fortified place was not essential to the safety of the rear of such enormous armies as the Germans possessed, for the reason that the investment of a fortified place effectually prevented its use as a base for offensive action and the force necessary to invest it required but a small percentage of the huge force available. On August 20 the Germans entered Brussels, levying a war indemnity of $40,000,000 upon that city and one of $10,000,000 upon Liège. German cavalry in great force had appeared before Brussels as early as August 16, having cut loose from their communications and crossed the Meuse at the town of Vise. On August 20 they had entered Brussels unopposed. Vise lay just beyond the range of the guns of Liège, about four miles from the Dutch-Belgian frontier, and at this point the Germans held the bridge over the Meuse. While the attack upon Liège was progressing the French executed two moves, the results of which were so important as to have a marked effect upon the early campaign. On August 8 a small French raiding force entered Alsace by the south of Belfort and, overcoming German resistance, entered first Altkirch and later Mülhausen. The latter point several times changed hands. Two days later a second and larger French expedition, turning the Vosges Mountains by the north, entered Lorraine, penetrating as far as Saarburg on the main line of railways connecting Metz and Strassburg. On August 11 and 12 this move was met by German counter moves directed against the flank and rear of the French raiding force and causing its withdrawal. This French invasion has been variously attributed to both political and sentimental reasons. that as it may, the results were those of reconnaissance in force. The first raid found the country south of Metz-Strassburg but weakly held: the second disclosed the absence of German masses behind Metz-Strassburg. The two raids together indicated that the attack through Belgium was real. Leaving the Germans at Brussels for the moment, the Russian General Staff annoured mobilization completed on August 18 and her troops in motion. The Russian plans had to consider the dimcult topographical features of East Prussia, the danger of the Polish sallent, the fortified frontier of Posen, and the Carpathian Mountains. Her plans contemplated expeditions in the nature of raids against both the first two sufficiently strong to prevent German forces of any size being sent to the assistance of Austria while Russia herself should mass enormous armies behind both the River Niemen and the city of Warsaw. While this was proceeding a third enormous force was to be directed into Galicia to seize the passes of the Carpathians, reduce Przemysl and, turning the Austrian fortress of Cracow, make a wide turning movement about the German right and rear. Such a plan is of bold conception, but if successful it will prove decisive. In this theatre lies the greatest field for strategic employment of the enormous forces which must be there gathered. August 20 the first Russian raid into East Prussia occurred. Be Returning to the situation in the western theatre, the occupation of Brussels firmly established German troops on Belgian soil, and the German plan of campaign was fairly launched. It is necessary to view broadly the campaign which followed in order to avoid confusion by the maze of detail which recency thrusts in the foreground. The salient features, which at intervals stand out prominently, mark phases of the campaign. Hostilities began with the German attack on Liège August 5, 1914. The first phase terminated with the battle on the Marne September 6, 1914. The second terminated with the German stand on the River Aisne September 11. The third terminated with the fall of Antwerp on October 8, 1914. At date of writing no event has occurred to mark the termination of the fourth phase. The fall of Namur in the first phase, of Maubeuge in the second, and of Antwerp in the third emphasized the potency of German heavy siege artillery and methods of attack on fortified places Having reached Brussels, the German forces of the Meuse proceeded to move their columns southward toward the French-Belgian frontier, forming a line parallel to it. While this force was engaged in the taking of Namur, the force of the Moselle, with Luxemburg as a base, took the French fortified town of Longwy and, reaching out to the west, effected a junction with the forces of the Meuse. The combined forces were composed of five armies: First, the army of General von Kluck; second, the army of General von Buelow; third, the Saxon army; fourth, the army of the Bavarian Crown Prince; fifth, the army of the German Crown Prince. In pursuance of their plan, the French forces steadily retired before the German advance, giving battle on August 23 on a line extending from Mons to Luxemburg. The first expeditionary force from Great Britain occupied, in this battle, the left of the French line, and in the ensuing retirement from Mons were hard pressed by greatly superior numbers. Their retreat was conducted with great skill, however, and though their losses were severe they were extricated from danger without being disorganized. The steady German advance and allied retirement continued until September 6, by which date the allies rested on the line of the Marne, with Paris on the French left and on the British right. The Germans were almost within range of the guns of Paris, which city had been hurriedly prepared for defence, garrisoned by a newly organized army of defence and the seat of Government moved to Bordeaux. At this juncture General von Kluck, commanding the German right, was confronted by the necessity of choosing one of three alternatives Pressing to the west of Paris, laying siege to the city, or passing to the east of it. The first alternative would separate him from the centre; the second was a long and costly operation without commensurate recompense. The third subjected his right flank and rear to attack by the combined British and Paris defence armies. He chose to attempt a passage to the east of Paris, with the result that his right flank was attacked and forced to retire. The flood tide of German invasion had been reached and the ebb had set in Three things acted to bring about the German retirement: Long and difficult lines of communication, an enveloped flank, and a superior allied position. The second phase of the campaign was a reversal of the first. When the necessity for a retirement became evident the Germans had prepared an Intrenched line of resistance along the River Aisne. This position was reached on September 11. So strongly were the Germans Intrenched and so skilfully had their retreat been conducted that the allied pursuit was checked and operations assumed the aspect of a siege in which the allies were the besiegers of the German position. Meanwhile the allies began a turning movement which resulted in a slow but steady bending back of the German line until its right wing ran northward toward Antwerp. Continuous but indecisive fighting marked this phase of the campaign until, on October 8, Antwerp fell after ten days of siege by the Germans. Chronology of events of third phase of campaign: September 12-German retreat from the Marne continues. September 13-Belgian sortie from Antwerp against German communications. September 14-Allies cross the Alsne near Soissons September 15-Russian southern force threatens Przemysl German cruiser Hela sunk by British submarine September 16-Russian northern army forced behind the River Niemen. September 17-Several divisions of British East Indian army en route to theatre of war. September 20-German cruiser Königsberg disables British gunboat Pegasus. September 21-Western theatre: tire to Noyon. Germans re September 22-British cruisers Aboukir. September 29-Germans invest Antwerp. rison of Antwerp escapes. October 8-Germans enter Antwerp. The garSmall part of British contingent crosses Dutch frontier and is interned. THE CAMPAIGN IN THE EASTERN THEATRE. On August 20, while the German triumphal entry into Brussels was being staged in the western theatre, the curtain had already risen upon the events of the eastern theatre. On August 18, more than two weeks before the calculated time, Russia announced her mobilization complete and a forward movement begun. By August 20, even while the German occupation of Brussels was taking place, strong Russian forces were crossing the German frontier into East Prussia on the north and were approaching the Austrian frontier of Galicia on the south. Russia's first move was thus to place a strong force both to the north and to the south of her Polish sallent. Manifestly her object was flank protection for a prospective central force in Russian Poland. Events following have been somewhat obscured by contradictory reports from Russian, German, and Austrian sources and in consequence can be reviewed but broadly at best. Certain salient features, however, have been clearly revealed. The early mobilization of Russian troops and the invasion which promptly followed acted to relieve the pressure of German superiority of numbers upon the allies in the western theatre of operations. Germany's dream of a rapid conquest of France was troubled by the spectre of an invasion of German soil by the Russian hordes. General von Hindenburg and two German army corps were detached from the west and hurried by rail to Danzig. Two Austrian corps, loaned to the western German operations, were hurriedly returned to Austria. Five additional German army corps were later added to the forces on the eastern frontier. It must be remembered that in accord with the Russian plan the mission of the northern army was to hold as large a German force as possible in East Prussia, the while protecting the flank of the central Russian force. The mission of the southern force was one of aggressive invasion. By September 1 the southern Russian force had taken and occupied the Galician town of Lemberg. On the same date the northern force, which had penetrated to the vicinity of Königsberg, met defeat near Allenstein at the hands of the Germans, losing two of its corps cut off amongst the lakes and swamps of that region. Following this reversal the northern Russian force retired into Russian territory behind the River Niemen, terminating the first phase of the northern campaign. The mere presence, however, of a large Russian force in that vicinity was a sufficient menace to the flank and rear of any German force attempting flank operations against the right of a Russian army of the centre. While these events were taking place in the north, the Russian advance in the south continued to progress. Overcoming Austrian opposition, the Russians penetrated as far as Tarnow, which they invested, having turned the fortified place of Przemysl by the north and effectually covered it. Meanwhile strong cavalry forces sought out and seized the principal passes of the Carpathians. In the western theatre the tide of German invasion was beginning to recede the detachment of |