with. He notes also, as two other important problems brought out by le Bon's descriptive account of crowds, the contagion of emotions and the prestige of leaders.

Freud (unlike le Bon, Sighele, Schallmeyer, Trotter, Martin, and most of the other writers who have dwelt upon the defects and ferocities of the crowd) is not blind to the fundamental paradox of group psychology, the paradox on which I have insisted in my Group Mind, namely, that, while immersion in the crowd commonly degrades the individual below his normal level, yet it is only by participation in group life that any man achieves his humanity and rises above the level of animal life: for, passing on to give in Chapter III an excellent, though incomplete and brief, résumé of my views, he recognises this paradox as another fundamental problem. In my Group Mind I maintained that the solution of this problem is to be found in the organisation of the group, that in proportion as a group becomes organised it gets rid of the peculiar defects and weaknesses of the crowd and becomes capable of higher modes of functioning and, under the better forms of organisation, capable of raising its members rather than degrading them. But Freud seems to reject my explanation by organisation, for he writes:

It seems to us that the condition which McDougall designates as the 'organisation' of a group can with more justification be described in another way. The problem consists in how to procure for the group precisely those features which were characteristic of the individual and which are extinguished in him by the formation of the group. For the individual, outside the primitive group, possessed his own continuity, his self-consciousness, his traditions and customs, his own particular functions and position, and kept apart from his rivals. Owing to his entry into an 'unorganised' group, he had lost this distinctiveness for a time.

But this is merely a restatement of the problem; it suggests no alternative solution of it. Curiously enough, Freud, having recognised this problem and having implied that he has some alternative solution for it, passes on and does not, in the course of this book, return to it. He closes his reference to it with the following cryptic comment:

If we thus recognise that the aim of the group is to equip the group with the attributes of the individual, we shall be reminded of a valuable remark of Trotter to the effect that the tendency towards the formation of groups is biologically a continuation of the multicellular character of all the higher organisations.

In this chapter Freud mentions also the principle I have invoked for the explanation of the intensified emotional reactions of crowds. He writes:

The manner in which individuals are thus carried away by a common impulse is explained by McDougall by means of what he calls the "principle of direct induction of emotion by way of the primitive sympathetic response," that is, by means of the emotional contagion with which we are already familiar.

Now, le Bon, fully recognising the fact and importance of emotional contagion in crowds, had treated it as one manifestation of suggestion. I, on the other hand, had treated it as a fundamental phenomenon, distinct from all the phenomena of suggestion and requiring a different explanation or theory. That explanation I had supplied in the theory of primitive passive sympathy or direct induction of emotion. In this I had been anticipated in some measure by Malebranche, as Dr Drever has pointed out, but by no other writer. The theory is bound up with my view of the relation of the primary emotions to the instincts, and stands or falls with that view. The theory is based on a large array of facts of behaviour of the gregarious animals; namely, that among such animals the display of any instinctive reaction by one member of the species is apt to provoke similar instinctive emotional reactions in all other members of the species that perceive these reactions; as when the behaviour of fear in one member of a flock provokes fear behaviour in other members. For the explanation of these facts, my theory assumes that each of the major instincts is so organised on its perceptual side that the expressions of the same instinct in other individuals of the species are effective provocatives of the instinct. And it postulates a similar special perceptual organisation of the major instincts of the species Homo sapiens. Freud, in saying of my theory, "that is, by means of the emotional contagion with which we are already familiar," reduces my explanation to a mere restatement of the facts in generalised form. It is true that we are all familiar with the facts of emotional contagion. The question is-have we any theory adequate to the explanation of them? The fact or phenomenon is one of the most fundamental with which a theoretical Group Psychology has to grapple. I have endeavoured to progress from the purely descriptive stage, represented by le Bon, to a theoretical explanation of the fact. Freud entirely overlooks my theory in saying that I explain the fact "by means of the emotional contagion with which we are already familiar." I protest that I do not suffer from any such delusion as is here attributed to me by Professor Freud; the delusion, namely, that, in describing a large array of phenomena in general terms, I in any sense explain them. My theory of primitive passive sympathy is a perfectly definite and plausible theory for the explanation of the facts of emotional contagion; it is not a mere restatement of the facts in general terms. Let me illustrate the point by reference to laughter. Laughter is notoriously contagious. But why and how? We do not explain the fact by saying that it is a case of the emotional contagion with which we are already familiar. In saying that, we merely Med. Psych, v

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classify it with a wider group of similar phenomena. My theory is that the laughter instinct1 (like most of the major instincts of man) is so innately organised on its receptive or perceptual side that the auditory and the visual perception of laughter excite the laughter instinct. If we seek any deeper or further explanation, we may plausibly suppose that these special perceptual adaptations of the instincts of the gregarious species have been produced in the course of evolution, because they secure, among the members of any group, that emotional and impulsive congruity which is a principal foundation stone of all group-life, animal and human. There is no rival theory in the field, so far as I know. Freud does not further deal with the problem beyond implying that he agrees with le Bon in regarding emotional contagion as one of the manifestations "so often covered by the enigmatic word 'suggestion."" And he proceeds in the following chapter to deal with the enigma of suggestion. In fact the rest of the book is devoted to the elaboration of a theory of suggestion. He begins by insisting again on

the fundamental fact of Group Psychology—the two theses as to the intensification of the emotions and the inhibition of the intellect in primitive groups. Our interest is now directed to discovering the psychological explanation of this mental change which is experienced by the individual in a group.

Freud continues:

It is clear that rational factors...do not cover the observable phenomena. Beyond this, what we are offered as an explanation by authorities upon Sociology and Group Psychology is always the same, even though it is given various names, and that is the magic word 'suggestion.' Tarde calls it 'imitation'; but we cannot help agreeing with a writer who protests that imitation comes under the concept of suggestion, and is in fact.one of its results. Le Bon traces back all the puzzling features of social phenomena to two factors: the mutual suggestion of individuals and the prestige of leaders. But prestige, again, is only recognisable by its capacity for evoking suggestion. McDougall for a moment gives us an impression that his principle of 'primitive induction of emotion' might enable us to do without the assumption of suggestion. But on further consideration we are forced to perceive that this principle says no more than the familiar assertions about 'imitation' or 'contagion,' except for a decided stress upon the emotional factor.

Now, if Professor Freud had done me the honour to read my Introduction to Social Psychology (a thing which, so far as I can judge, neither he nor any one of his many disciples has ever done), instead of reading only my Group Mind (which is explicitly founded upon the other book and is essentially an attempt to apply to the problems of group psychology the principles arrived at in the earlier work), he would have seen that I distinguish clearly between suggestion and emotional contagion, and, further, that I have there propounded, not only a theory of emotional contagion, but also a distinct theory of suggestion. He would then not

1 Cf. my theory of laughter in Outline of Psychology, p. 165.

have committed the error of saying that there has been, during thirty years, no change in the situation as regards suggestion and that

there has been no explanation of the nature of suggestion, that is, of the conditions under which influence without adequate logical foundation takes place.

Since Freud has thus entirely overlooked my theory of suggestion I beg leave to restate it here, in order that the reader may compare it . with the very complicated theory which is the main substance of Freud's book. My theory sets out from the fact of observation that among animals of gregarious species we commonly find relations of dominance and submission; we see some members of a herd or flock submitting tamely and quietly to the dominance, the leadership, the self-assertion of other members. This submission does not always or commonly seem to imply fear. Yet it is unquestionably instinctive. I have argued, therefore, that such behaviour is the expression of a distinct and specific instinct of submission: an instinct which is apt to be evoked by the aggressive or self-assertive behaviour of other, especially larger and older, members of the group, and whose goal or function it is to secure harmony within the group by prompting the junior and weaker members of it to submit to the leadership of others, to follow them, to "knuckle under to them" without protest, to accept their lightest word as law, to feel humble or lowly in their presence and to adopt lowly or 'crestfallen' attitudes before them. My theory maintains that the human species also is endowed with this instinct of submission; and that, with the development of language and intellect, verbal indications of the attitudes of the strong become very important means of evoking and directing this submissive impulse; that the impulse, the emotional conative tendency of this instinct, is the main conative factor at work in all instances of true suggestion, whether waking or hypnotic. Further, that, in human societies, reputation for power of any sort becomes a very important factor in evoking this impulse, supplementing and, in fact, largely supplanting the bodily evidences of superior powers which, on the animal plane, are the principal excitants of this impulse; such reputation constituting the essence of all that we call prestige, the power of using suggestion, of compelling bodily and mental obedience or docility, without evoking fear. The theory maintains that, if the human species were not gregarious, and if its native constitution did not comprise also this special submissive instinct, human beings would not be suggestible; and, therefore, the social life of man would be profoundly other than it is1.

1 I say that this instinct of submission is evidenced by the animals of many gregarious species. But I maintain that it is distinct from the gregarious instinct itself; that there

Freud and his disciples make frequent references to ego-instincts; but they have never, so far as I know, attempted to define these postulated ego-instincts. I imagine that, if they would undertake to attempt to define them, it would appear that these ego-instincts are identical with what I have attempted to distinguish and define as two distinct instincts, the instincts of self-assertion and of submission. But Freud does not seek in the ego-instincts the explanation of suggestion. Rather his theory of suggestion is very much more complex. I will try to sketch it briefly and fairly.

Freud's theory of suggestion derives all the phenomena of suggestion from his libido. "Libido' is an expression taken from the theory of the emotions. We call by that name the energy (regarded as a quantitative magnitude, though not at present actually measurable) of those instincts which have to do with all that may be comprised under the word 'love."

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After a passage, in which he seeks to justify once more his acceptance of the popular usage of the word 'love' as evidence of the essential unity of all manifestations to which the word 'love' can with any propriety be applied, including, besides sexual attraction or lust, "on the one hand, self-love, and on the other love for parents and children, friendship and love for humanity in general, and also devotion to concrete objects and to abstract ideas," Freud goes on to say: "We will try our fortune, then, with the supposition that love relationships (or, to use a more neutral expression, emotional ties) also constitute the essence of the group mind." He adds: "Let us remember that the authorities made no mention of any such relations. What would correspond to them is evidently concealed behind the shelter, the screen, of suggestion." Freud then proceeds to the study of highly-organised groups, and especially churches and armies; for, as he says, "the most interesting examples of such structures are churches-communities of believers-and armies." He finds common to them one essential feature, namely, "the same illusion holds good of there being a head-in the Catholic Church, Christ; in any army its Commander-in-Chief who loves all the individuals in the group with are species of animals which have the gregarious instinct, but lack the submissive instinct; just as there are men who are strongly gregarious, but in whom the submissive instinct operates very little, if at all; that is to say, I maintain that the gregarious and the submissive tendencies are independent variables and, therefore, cannot be properly ascribed to the same instinct. In this I dissent strongly from the teaching of Mr Wilfred Trotter, who, throughout his famous little book on Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War, assumes without question that all the phenomena commonly classed under the head of suggestion are sufficiently explained by invoking the 'herd instinct.'