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Treasury Circular.

(Dec. 19, 1836.


a contraction of the issues of the Bank of England; de larger and more magnificent scale, and with more destruction of country bank paper in 1814, 1815, 1816, structive consequences. Sauve qui peut! Save himself also in 1825 and 1826; measures proposed in 1826 for who can! was the universal cry. And the destruction improving the state of the currency; remarks on those of country paper was so sudden and excessive that in measures; proposals for taking security from country less than six weeks above 70 banking establishments banks; advantages that would result from carrying this were swept off” proposal into effect; objections to it examined and an. This (said Mr. B.) is Mr. McCulloch's account of the swered."

three per cent. system earthquakes which have taken Mr. B. then read some passages from the chapter itself, place since the time of Adam Smith, maugre all his fine regretting the necessity which limited him to few and phrases about specie-paying banks, and bank notes brief extracts:

equivalent to gold, and convertible into gold at the will 1. Panic of 1793.-—"The extended transactions of of the holder. Three times in twenty-five years has the the country required fresh facilities for carrying them whole blown up! to say nothing of the crisis of 1797, on; and, in consequence, a bank was erected in every and the numerous small panics and individual explosions market town, and in almost every village. To force which have filled up the intervals between the large their paper into circulation was the object of all. The The result is a conviction that banks of issue catastrophe which followed was such as might have been must be suppressed, directly or indirectly, all over Erg. foreseen. The currency having become redundant, ibe land. The mode proposed, is to require security from exchanges took an unfavorable turn in the early part of them in addition to their individual liability, and that not 1792; and the Bank of England baving been, in conse the personal security of men, but the real security of quence, obliged to narrow her issues, a most violent re lands mortgaged or Government stock pledged. Here vulsion took place in the end of that year and beginning is an extract from McCulloch on this point: of 1793. The failure of one or two great houses ex. “Whatever bank notes may be in law, they are prac. cited a panic, which proved fatal to myriads more. tically, and in fact, a legal tender. The great mass of When this revulsion began, there were, it is supposed, the people are totally without the power to refuse them, about 350 country banks in England and Wales; of The currency of many extensive districts consists almost which about 100 were compelled to stop payment, and entirely of country notes; and such small farmers, trades. upwards of 50 more were totally destroyed, producing men, or laborers, as should refuse to take them, would be by their fall an extent of misery and bankruptcy that obliged to migrate elsewhere. There cannot, therefore, har been, until then, unknown in England.”

as it appears to me, be the shadow of a doubt that this is 2. Panic of 1813.-"Up to 1813 there were banks in a case in which Government is imperiously called upon to almost all parts of England, forcing their paper into cir- interfere. We have sustained incomparably more misculation at an enormous expense to themselves. The chief from the issue of spurious paper than from that of price of corn had risen to an extraordinary height in base coin; and in order io obviale such mischief in fu1813, and fell in the beginning of 1814. This fall pro. ture, and to give that security to the public which is so duced a want of confidence, and an alarm among the essential, we have, as was observed before, no alternacountry bankers and their customers; and such a delive, but either to suppress country notes altogether, or struction of country paper took place as las not been to require security from the issuers.” ** *°"In the paralleled, except only by the revulsion in 1825. By case of Bank of England notes, a guarantee is taken by 1816, no fewer than 340 country banks had stopped pay. the Government for the notes which the bank issues; ments, and 92 commissions of bankruptcy were issued and the whole capital of the bank musi be lost before by these establishments. The failures that then occur the holders of the notes can be sufferers. Why is not red were the more distressing as they chiefly affected the same principle followed with respect to country the industrious and poorer classes, and frequently swal. banks? What objection can there be against requiring of lowed up, in an instant, the fruits of a long life of la. those who take upon themselves the office of furnishing borious exertion. Thousands upon thousands, who had the country with a circulating medium, to deposite with considered themselves affluent, found they were desti-Government an adequate security for the performance tute of all real property, and sunk, as if by enchantment, of their engagements? In the use of money every one and without any fault of their own, into the abyss of is a trader; those whose habits and pursuits are little poveriy. The universality of the wretchedness and mis- suited to explore the mechanism of trade, are obliged to ery had never been equalled, perhaps, except by the make use of money, and are no way qualified to ascer. breaking up of the Mississippi scheme in France." tain the solidity of the different banks whose paper is in

3. Panic of 1825.-"Nations are slow and reluctant circulation; accordingly, we find that men living on limit. learners; and it seems as if additional experience had ed incomes, women, laborers, and mechanics of all de. been necessary to convince the Parliament and people scriptions, are often severe sufferers by the failure of the of England that there was any thing defective in a sys-country banks, which have lately become frequent betem which had, in two previous instances, deluged ihe yond example. Against this mischief the public should country with bankruptcy; and which enables every in. be protected by requiring of every country bank (that dividual, however poor and unprincipled, who chooses is to say, exery bank except the Bank of England, for to open a money shop, to issue notes to serve as curren. which the Government is security to the whole amount of cy in the ordinary transactions of society! A rise of its capital) to deposite with Government, or with comprices and a rage for speculation took place in 1824–’25. missioners appointed for that purpose, funded property, Many of the country bankers seemed to have no other or other Government security, in some proportion to the object than to get themselves indebted to the public; and amount of their issues. No establishment for the issue such was the vigor and success of their efforts to get of notes could then exist, unless it had been set on foot their paper into circulation, that the amount of it afloat by individuals possessed of adequate capital. And advenin 1825 was estimated to be near fifty per cent. greater turers, speculating on the funds of others, and sharpers, than the amount afloat in 1823. The consequence of anxious to get themselves indebted to the public, would this extravagant and unprincipled conduct is well known. find that banking was no longer a field on wbich they The currency became redundant, exchange began to de- could advantageously enter." cline, and a heavy drain for bullion compelled the Bank Mr. B. would economize time and words, and pro. of England to lessen ber issues. This was the signal for ceed to the practical application of these extracts from the repetition of tbe tragedy of 1793, but on a much I the present head of the paper system school in England.

Dec. 19, 1836.]

Treasury Circular.


It is a surrender and proposed suppression of all banks 1. The destruction of the standard or measure of value. of issue except the Bank of England, for which the Paper money neither is, ever was, or ever can be, a British Government is the security and the responsible standard of value. Its quantity varies at the will of man, backer. This is what the original of our paper system, or rather at the will of each of the thousand Neptunes and a far safer system than ours, has come to in England! | who preside over the ocean of paper; and not only at Given up and proscribed by the school that founded it, their will, but without their will, in the mere impruand that school more seriously engaged now in putting dence or folly of those who direct paper issues, and the down their system than they were fifty years ago in thousand causes which operate upon the expansion and founding it. And what is the state of things with us? contraction of banks. The standard, or measure of Not only an appalling extension of the paper system value, is at this moment materially altered in the United through the annual bank incorporations of nearly thirty States. This is seen in the increased price of every Legislatures, State and Territorial, but this atlempt now article which depends for its price upon the domestic made in the Senate of the United States to compel the market; and it is proved by the stationary or reduced adoption of all the State and Territorial paper systems, price of every article which depended for its price on existing or to exis', by the Federal Government, and foreign markets. Cotton and tobacco were in this latter thus to make out of this multifarious mass a national pa- class, and had not risen, but rather fallen; all articles of per currency. This is the effect; and, without disturbing home use and consumption were in the former, and all the States in the use of this paper themselves, Mr. B. con had risen, some one half, some double. The precious fined himself to the question before the Senate, namely, metals, from their uniformity of production, difficulty of the adoption of the whole of it for the currency of the suddenly and violently changing the quantity and intrinsic Federal Government. To this he had insuperable and in- ' value all over the world, can alone make a standard or exorable objections, founded, first, upon the constitution measure of value. Our constitution has guarantiel that of the United States, and, next, upon the unspeakable standard to us; and it is our sacred duty to preserve it. mischiefs of the scheme. On the constitutional point he Mr. B. finished his remarks on this point with a quotawould be brief, limiting himself to the words of the in. tion from Mr. McCulloch, preferring bis authority to strument, and to Mr. Madison's commentary.

others, because he was of the paper system school, The constitution says: Congress shall bave power though now limiting his system to the Bank of England

“ To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of only! foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and meas. "No doubt has ever been insinuated with respect to ures.”

the expediency of the regulations by which all weights “ To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the and measures of the same denomination are rendered securities and current coin of the United States."

equal. But money is not a commodity merely; it is also No Stale shall coin money; emit bills of credit; make the standard or measure, adopted by society, by which any thing but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of to estimate and compare the value of every thing debis.”

else that is bought and sold; and if it be, as it most unMr. Madison, in No. 44 of !he Federalist, says: doubtedly is, the duty of Government to adopt every

“ The loss which America has sustained since the practicable means for rendering all foot-rules of the peace, from the pestilent effects of paper money on the same length, and all bushels of the same capacity, it necessary confidence between man and man; on the ne. must be still more incumbent upon it to omit nothing to cessary confidence in the public councils; on the indus-render money, or the measure of value, a measure which try and morals of the people, anil on the character of re. is, beyond all question, the most important of any used publican government, constitutes an enormous debt in society, uniform or steady in its value." against the States, chargeable with this unadvised meas. 2. Usury. This, he said, was a direct effect of paper ure, which must long remain unsatisfied; or, rather, an money. The more banks of issue, the higher the rate accumulation of guilt, which can be expiated no other of interest, Common bank interest in the United States wise than by a voluntary sacrifice on the altar of justice is seven per cent. or more, which is double the rate of of the power which has been the instrument of it. In interest in Holland, where there is no paper. But comaddition to these persuasive considerations, it may be ob. mon interest is nothing compared to the usury which enserved that the same reasons which show the necessity sues great banking, and which becomes enormous when of denying to the States the power of regulating coin, banks, from necessity or mischief,- stop discounts, and prove, with equal force, that they ought not to be at lib. Ihrow borrowers upon money dealers. Three per cent. erty to substitute a paper medium in the place of coin. discount per month is then the order of things; and this

* The power to make any thing but gold and sil. may now be seen in Philadelphia, where the United ver a tender in payment of debts is withdrawn from the States Bank, with its thirty-five millions capital, on be. States, on the same principle with that of issuing a paper coming a State institution, was to fill the state with currency."

money, and reduce interest to five per cent. But that Resting the constitutional objection to this adoption of bank does lend to some borrowers at five per cent. or the State paper currencies for the currency of the Feder. less. The correspondence of the commissioners emal Government where the constitution and Mr. Madison ployed in examining the state of the bank, preparatory had put it, and merely referring to the great revenue to the settlement of the value of the United States stock, acts of 1789 and 1800, for the correct exposition of the shows a mass of loans, to the amount of twenty-three constitution, in limiting the receipts for the customs and millions of dollars, on extended or indefinite time, and the lands to "gold and silver coin only,” and “lo specie *t rates from 41, 5, 53, to 6 per cent. per annum. NO) or evidences of the public debt,” Mr. B. would stale the doubt many of the three per cent. per month borrowers heads, and the heads only, of the objections to the ex get their supplies from a part of these loans. pediency of the measure. Premising that what the 3. Panics, convulsions, and stoppages.-- These (said Government received, as cash, would have to be paid Mr. B.) are inherent in the paper system. They take out as cash, and that, if local paper was received at all, place in England in defiance of all power in the Governit would soon be received totally, and to the exclusion of ment and the banks themselves to keep thein down. specie, and that local paper would thus become the There, no panics are perpetrated to scourge the counactual currency of the Government and the country, iry or to overset the Government, save and except the until relieved from it by a general explosion, Mr. B. two political ones lately seen-- Mr. O'Connoi's, and the went on to enumerate the practical evils of such an un. one during the interregnum of Lord Grey's administraconstitutional currency.


Treasury Circular.

(Dec. 19, 1836.

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tion. But here, panics are the regular work of banks may succeed, but he (Mr. B.) would not despair. The and politicians, and are now looked for whenever an darkest hour of night is just before the break of day; important election is depending, or Congress is to be ex and, through the gloom allead, he saw the bright vision cited.

of the constitutional currency erect, radiant, and victori. 4. The expense of the paper system.-- This was proba. Through regulation or explosion success must bly greater at present than the expenses of the Federal eventually come. if reform measures go on, gold and Government, and the whole a tax upon the productive silver will be gradually and temperately restored; if re. classes. The number of banks was about one thousand; form measures are stopped, then the paper system runs each bank had its officers, and they their salaries; each riot, and explodes from its own expansion. Then the had its stockholders, and they their profits. Then came Bank of the United States will exult in the catastrophe, Josses for broken banks, counterseits, and depreciated and claim its own re-establishment, as the only adequate paper, and changes in the value of property from ex. regulator of the local banks. Then it will be said the pansions and contractions of the currency. These ex specie experiment has failed! But no; the contrary wil penses and losses were the price paid by ihe people for be known, that the specie experiment has not failed, but a paper currency, when they can get constitutional cuir: it was put down by the voice and power of the interested rency from the mints, without paying salaries, furnishing classes, and must be put up again by the voice and pow. profits, or sustaining losses, if paper was checked and er of the disinterested community. confined to large notes. 5. Stock gambling, forgeries

, banishment of all gold Appendix 10 Mr. Benton's speech on the rescinding resoand silver, were all great evils inherent in the paper Íuiion, containing proofs of several things stated in the system, and too obvious to need, or even endure, com speech. mentary. Mr. B., therefore, barely named them, and left every one's knowledge and memory to do the rest.

1. That the banks themselves, by contractions and Mr. B. approached the conclusion of his remarks on

expansions of the currency, lead to fluctuations which this great subject. It was, indeed, a great subject, in.

affect the prices of produce and properly, and beget volving that momentous question, the national currency.

panics. The Treasury order was a measure of regulation upon

1. Extract from the testimony of Joseph C. Dyer, the State banks, intended to save the finances and the Esq., director of the Bank of Manchester, taken before currency, as well as the public lands. The bank of the

Lord Althorpe's committee:
United States regulated the State banks by the simple panics.”_" The bank has been the cause of the panics.

The Bank of England, the cause of fluctuations and
process of exclu ting their paper from the Federal re.
ceipts and expenditures; and this was effected by the

"Their manner of issuing and withirawing the Bank of 24th and 25th articles of the by-laws of the corporation England paper produces those continued' Auctuations, a'ready read. She excluded them to make room for her

at short periods, which affect the prices in the market, own notes; and this was the extent of her skill and of

and inereby affect trade. Those issues, sometimes in a her merit in all this boas!ed regulation of local curren

single week, vary three or four millions. The bank cies of which we hear so much. The Federal Govern

may be necessitated to do so, but such a necessity is that ment has only to do the same, and the State bank issues

of ic. Aiciing a great evil on the country. The returns of are repelled upon their sources, and become compara

the weekly issues from the 28th of December, 1819, to tively harmless. It is receivability for federal cues; it

the 4th of February, 1826, prove witness's statement. is receivability at the land offices, custom-houses, and

“The reason why it is necessary to make an alterapost offices, which gives them wings to fly over the con

tion in the banking system of Lancashire, is that tlie tinent, and enables them pass, without regard to the

circulation by the Bank of England subjects the trade credit or solvency of the bank from which they come.

to fluctuations, and exercises a pernicious influence over

the destinies of commerce. It is the Federal Government endorsement which does

This expansion and con. the mischief; and this endorsement, for all the purposes

traction of the circulation induce similar effects to a ruof false credit and want of responsibility, is given to the

inous extent. All the periods of panic may be attributed whole issue of every bank whose paper is made receive

to that power exercised in secret, and of which the pub. able for public dues. The experiment has been tried,

lic can have no knowledge, until it has accomplished its and local paper has failed as a national currency, and

results. It stimulates over-issues in the country, raises out of that failure arose the second United States Bank.

and lowers the value of money capriciously, and erects It will fail again, and again, and forever! There is no

its own security on the insecurity of country bankers. safely for the feilerul revenues but in the total exclusion

Such a company, possessing such infinence so cxercised, of local paper, and that from every branch of the reve.

is a dangerous company; and plans can be devised to nue--customs, linds, and post office. There is no safe. procure a better circulation than the present, in which ty for the national finances but in the constitutional me.

There is neither stability nor sleadiness." dium of gold and silver. After forty years of wandering 2. Extract from the preface to the digest of evidence in the wilderness of paper money, we have approached tåken before Lord Althorpe's committee in 1832: tie confines of the constilutional medium. Seventy-five " The records of past history bave invariably desig. millions of specie in the country, with the prospect of nated a time of peace as one of prosperity and happi. annual increase of ten or twelve millions for the next

But, ever since the last war, the different great four years, three branch mints to commence next spririg, interests of this country have been in a continued state and the complete restoration of the gold currency, ale of fluctuation between the extremes of prosperity and nounce the success of President Jackson's great meas. adversity; though the latter bas unfortunately predom. ures for the rt form of the currency, and vindicate ilic inated.

In the beginning of that constitution from the libel of having prescribed an im. year, (1825,) every class of the community was doing practicable currency. The success is complete; and well, if not in a stale of great prosperily. But a change there is no way to thwait it, but to put down the Treas took place the currency, by the Bank of E gland ury order, and to reopen the public lands to the inunda-contracting their issues. The general prosperity, with. tion of paper money. Of this, it is not to be dissem out any other visible cause, immediately received a bled, there is great danger. Pour deeply interested chick; and as the bank continued to contract their classes are at work to do it-speculators, loc:l banks, issus, malters became worse, until they ended in the United States Bunk, and politicians out of power. They I panic. By this a lolal dirangement of Ilie monetary



Dec. 19, 1836.]

Treasury Circular.


system was occasioned, and every class of the communi. been expected; but this seems to bave arisen chiefly ty was thrown into a state of embarrassment, the inju. from their having been but very imperfectly aware of rious and depressing effects of which continued for some the vast magnitude of the transactions settled by their years, and this without any other apparent cause than intervention, and of the extent to which they are em. the monetary derangement which haci occurred." ployed. In the great manufacturing county of Lan.

“An undue issue of four or five millions by cashire, and in part of Yorkshire, a bill on London at the Bank (of England) would eventually make an three months is reckoned a money payment; and by far extraordinary derangement in the value of all the prop. the largest proportion of the currency consists either of erty in the kingdom, and be productive of infinite mis the bills of bankers drawn on their correspondents, or chief in a variety of ways."

of those of the merchants and dealers scatiered up and 3. Further extract from the testimony of J. C. Dyer, down the country. The following extracts from the Esg.

evidence given before the committee of the flouse of "I think the banks, so far from having saved the Lords on Scotch and Irish currency, in the session of country from the effects of those panics, have been the 1826, show the great extent to which internal bills are cause of those panics; and that they have been the cause now employed. Mr. Gladstone, an eminent merchant of a constant succession of little panics, continually an. of Liverpool, informed the committee that we sell our noying the commerce of the country, by monthly and goods, not for payments in cash, such as are usual in weekly fluctuations."

other places, but generally at credits from ten days to 4. Extract from the testimany of Benjamin J. Smith,

three months' dale; these bills we pay to our bankers, Esq., a director of the Bank of Manchester, before

and receive from them bills or cash. We have a conLord Althorpe's committee:

siderable portion of large Bank of England notes in • The supply of the circulation by the Bank of Eng duties, and also for the purpose of remittance; but the

circulation; these are generally used for the payment of land subjects our trade to great and injurious Auclua. tions, owing to what is called a scarcity of money, ari.

great mass of our circulation is in bills of exchange. sing from causes of which the public, who are deeply Sovereigns and smaller bank notes are only required for interested in that question, can have no knowledge. The

such objects as charges of merchandise, with duties, objections to the existing system are, that the Bank of freights, and other items.' Lewis Lloyd, Esq. The England has a secret and despotic influence and control

wages of workmen are paid in gold or Bank of England oser the de: tinies of our commerce, which we feel to be

notes; the manufacturer is chiefly paid in bills of ex. a most pernicious one."

change. When a bill is drawn in favor of a manufacII. No local banks of issue in the great county of

lurer, he endorses it to the person to whom be pays it, Lancashire, including Liverpool and Manchester. Hiland

and the person to whom he pays it pays it again to anbills of exchange used in large dealings; gold in the

other; and it goes on often till it is covered with endorse. common transactions.

ments. Mr. Henry Burgess, a manufacturer at Leeds. 1. Extract from the evilence of J. C. Dyer, Esq., a

The great mass of the circulating medium of Lanca. director of the Bank of Manchester, before Lord Al

shire, as in all the manufacturing districts in the North, is thorpe's committee:

bills of exchange: a part of the circulation is in gold and "The bankers in Manchester who can, do not, issue

silver and Bank of England notes.'" notes, in consequence of the strong feeling that prevails III. Suppres-ion of all banks of issue in England, es. in Lancashire againt local paper. There were two oc cept the Bank of England, directly by law, or indirectly, casions when that feeling was publicly expressed; first, by compelling them to give security for their issues. in 1834, and next when the Bank of Manchester was 1. Extract from Mr. McCulloch's notes on Adam formed. Bankers who intended to issue notes abandoned Sinith: their intention, from a conviction that they could not, under any such circumstances, derive any profit froin the

“ It seems, therefore, to be indispensable, either that

the country banks should be compelled, as has been pre. issue."

viously proposed, to give full security for their issies, 2. Extract from Mr. McCulloch's notes on Adam

or that their paper should be suppressed altogether, Smith's work:

and the paper of the Bank of England substituted in iis “ The principal distinction between notes and bills of place.

Now, it is obvious, and is indeed una exchange is, that every individual passing a bill of ex versally admitted, that the only measure that can be change has to endorse it, and by so doing makes himself adopted for guarding completely against the misconduct responsible for its conten!s. Nothing can be more in as well as the bad faith of the country bankers is to accurate iban to represent bank nutes and bills of ex. compel thein to give full security for the payment of change under the same point of view. The note is pay their notes. This, and this alone, can afford a sufficient able on the instant, without deduction--the bill not until guarantee to the public that the country paper in circu. sume future period. The note may be passed to another, lation will be returned when presented for payment, without incurring any risk or responsibility, wliile every and that it is really equivalent to gold. endorser of the bill makes himself liable for the value of “Every country banker, on applying for slamps, il. Bank notes form the currency of all classes; of those should be required and obliged, previously to obtaining who are not engaged in business, of women, children, them, to lodge in the hands of Government securities, in laborers, &c., wbo are all, as we have seen, without the stocks or landed estates, fully equivalent to the amount power to refuse them, and without the means of forming of the stamps issued to him." any correct conclusion as to the sclvency of the issuers. 2. Extract from the testimony of Henry Burgess, Esq., Bills of exchange, on the other hand, pass only, with secretary of the committee of country banks, representvery few exceptions, between persons engaged in busi ing seven eighths of the bankers in England, who have ness, and who are fully aware of the risk they run in resolved to relinquish their circulation rather than give taking them.”

security for it: 3. Further extract from McCulloch's nolcs:

“ The only strong opinion to which the committee have " The effects produced by the employment of internal come is, that if securities for their issues were demandbills of exchange, have not certainly excited that atten. ed, they would relinquish their issues altogether. That tion, on the part of most of those who have speculated resolution was imbodied in a petition to Parliament. on the subject of currency, that might reasonably have

The chief reason why country bankers VUL. XIII.-5


Deposite Banks.

[l'ec. 20, 1836.




6 do.


4 do.

G. H. 1.

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would cease to issue notes, if called upon for securities, 3. Further extract from Mr. Clayton's report of 1832, is, that it would be giving a preference to one class of to illustrate the conduct of the Bank of the United States creditors over another; besides, giving securities would in loaning much to the few, and little to the many, and be locking up their money in the funds, which money explanatory of the present condition of the money marwould be thus unavailable, and be also placed at risk. kei in Philadelphia, where small borrowers for short

So they would prefer to give up their cir terms pay three per cent. per month discount for money, culation."

which may have come from the Bank of the United States IV. Extract from the report of the commissioners ap- to a large borrower on a term of years, or indefinitely, pointed on the part of the United States to examine into or on immateriality of time: the debts and affairs of the Bank of the United States, April, 1832, loan to 72 persons, $2,404,278 to ascertain the value of the stock, showing above twen.

19 do 1,274,882 ty millions of loans at low interest for long terms, or in.

do 3 do 341,729 definite terms, and explaining the reason why borrow.

do 4 do 995,455 ers in Philadelphia are thrown upon brokers at two and

do 1 person,

417,766 three per cent. discount per month. 1. Statement of the debts of the Bank of the United

Totals, 99 persons, $5,434,111
States, &c. on the 3d March, 1836:

Whole amount of loans discounted at
Notes discounted.
the same time,

$5,964,085 A. On bank stock

at 6 per cent. $1,291,913 72
of which to 99 persons

5,434,111 B. On various stocks and other securi.

4,061,553 71
To all other persons

$529,974 Loans drawing interest.

@ These are the loans of the National Bank at Pbila. C. On bank stock

at 5 per cent. 1,294,890 00 D. On

delphia, April, 1832.

466,300 00 E. On various stocks and other securi.


44 do.
632,818 63


4.551.865 65 do.

1,321,100 00


1,000,000.00 Mr. WEBSTER offered the following resolutions, and K. do.

355,500 00 L.

53 do.

471,600 00

asked the unanimous consent of the Senate to their imdo.

1,296,678 00 mediate consideration:

6 do
3,317,605 09

Resolved, That the Secretary of the Treasury commu.
Total as above

20,237,136 80

nicate to the Senate the latest slatement made at or for

the Treasury of the condition of the deposite banks; ex. The length of time for which some of these loans are hibiting, among other particulars, the names and places made is thus stated in the report:

of all deposite banks appointed since the 238 Junc last; 5 per cent. C, due 21th August, 1837.

their capitals, and the amounts of public moneys actually 6 per cent. D," when due iinmaterial."* per cent. E, due 21st November 1810.

transferred, or ordered to be transferred, to those banks, 44 per cent. F, due 1st April, 1838.

respectively. 5 per cent. G, due 15th March, 1838.

Resolved, that the Secretary of the Treasury commu5 per cent. H, due 8th October, 1838. 5 per cent. I, due Ist December, 1835.

nicate to the Senate a detailed statement of all transfers per cent. K,"time of payment indefinite."

of public moneys ordered since the 230 June last, for 54 per cent. L, dur 12th January, 1838. per cent. M," when due in material."'*

the purpose of executing the act of that date for regulaper cent. N," when due immaterial."*

ting the deposites of the public money; showing the 2. Statement of loans from the Bank of the United

dates and amounts of such transfers; from what place to States to Thomas Biddle & Co., in the years 1830, '31, allowed for such transfers, other than such as were made

what place; from wbat bank to what bank, and ibe time and '32, taken from the report of Mr. Clayton's commit. in execution of the aforesaid act, tee of 1832, and now to be referred, as illustrative of some of the above loans on stocks or personal securily:

Mr. WEBSTER said that the honorable member from Missouri (Mr. Benton] had, in his speech yester

day, read statements wbich had been obtained at the Year, Month. Paper. Discounter. Rate. Treasury, for the purpose of showing that sundry banks

had enlarged their issues since the publication of the 1830. Sept. 17

Treasury order of the 11th of July. This information $144,950 $220,000 5 per cent. (said Mr. WEBSTER) is neither new nor surprising, Oct. 15 1,131,672 1,123,100 5 do.

That fact has been well undestood. But what banks Nov. 16 737,112 730,000 5 do.

are ihese which have thus increased their loans? Are Dec. 14 737,012 730,000 5 do.

they the banks of the country generally, or the banks 1831. Jan. 14 722,300 720,000 | 5 do.

in the principal commercial cities, or a majority of them? Feb. 15 540,400 540,400 5 do.

No, sir. The gentleman's statement was confined to March 15 400,000 400,000 5 do.

the deposite banks, or some of them. All those deApril 15 480,000 480,000 | 5 do,

posite banks were seventy or eighty perhaps in number, May 17 443,098 443,138 41 and 5 while it has been staled that the whole number of banks June 14 571,178 557,968 do.

in the country is near a thousand. Now, as I underJuly 15 501,162 504,912 5 do.

stand the subject, one of the strongest grounds of com. Aug. 16 573,912 579,912 5 do

plaint against the order of the 11th of July, and against Sept. 16 573,912 683,995) 5 and 6

ihe marner of executing the deposite law, is, that by Oct. 14 580,000 698,727 do.

those measures many of these deposite banks, in places Nov. 15 580,000 752,647 do.

where the wants of business did not call for more money, Dec. 16 580,000 689,125 do. have had large and entirely unnecessary sums of money 1832. Jan. 17 589,000 652,388 do. nevertheless ihrown into them, drawn from places in Feb. 17 467,766 488,328 5 do,

which it was wanted, to the great prejudice of other

banks, and of the commercial community generally: 1 *These are the words of the bank statement.

understand this to be one of the prominent objections



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