ported. The exigencies of the nation may require the general government the power contained in the that the treasure raised in the north should be trans- constitution, and on the states the whole residuum ported to the south, that raised in the east conveyed of power, would it have been asserted that the to the west, or that this or er should be reversed. government of the union was not sovereign with Is that construction of the constitution to be prefer- respect to those objects which were entrusted to it, red which would render these operations difficult, in relation to which its laws were declared to be hazardous, and expensive? Can we adopt that con- supreme? If this could not have been asserted, we struction, unless the words imperiously require it, cannot well comprehend the process of reasoning which would impute to the framers of that instru- which maintains, that a power appertaining to sovement, when granting these powers for the public reignty cannot be connected with that vast portion good, the intention of impeding their exercise by of it which is granted to the general government, so withholding a choice of means? If, indeed, such be far as it is calculated to subserve the legitimate obthe mandate of the constitution, we have only to jects of that government. The power of creating a obey; but that instrument does not profess to enu- corporation, though appertaining to sovereignty, is merate the means by which the powers it confers not, like the power of making war, or levying taxes, may be executed, nor does it prohibit the creation of or of regulating commerce, a great substantive and a corporation, if the existence of such a being be independent power, which cannot be implied as essential to the beneficial exercise of those powers. incidental to other powers, or used as a means of It is, then, the subject of fair enquiry, how far such executing them. It is never the end for which other means may be employed? powers are exercised, but a means by which other objects are accomplished. No contributions are made to charity for the sake of an incorporation, but a corporation is created to administer the charity; no seminary of learning is instituted in order to be incorporated, but the corporate character is conferred to subserve the purpose of education. No city was ever built with the sole object of being incorporated, but is incorporated as affording the best means of being well governed. The power of creating a corporation is never used for its own sake, but for the purpose of effecting something else.No sufficient reason is, therefore, perceived why it may not pass as incidental to those powers which are expressly given, if it be a direct mode of executing them.

It is not denied, that the powers given to the government imply the ordinary means of execution. That, for example, of raising revenue and applying it to national purposes, is admitted to imply the power of conveying money from place to place, as the exigencies of the notion may require, and of employing the usual means of conveyance. But it is denied that the government has its choice of means; or that it may employ the most convenient means, if, to employ them, it be necessary to erect a corporation.

On what foundation does this, argument rest? On this alone: The power of creating a corporation is one appertaining to sovereignty, and is not expressly conferred on congress. This is true. But all legislative powers appertain to sovereignty. The original powers of giving the law on any subject whatever, is a sovereign power; and if the government of the union is restrained from creating a corporation as a means for performing its functions, on the single reason, that the creation of a corporation is an act of sovereignty; if the sufficiency of this reason be acknowledged, there would be some dif ficulty in sustaining the authority of congress to pass other laws for the accomplishment of the same objects.

The government which has a right to do an act, and has imposed on it the duty of performing that act, must, according to the dictates of reason, be allowed to select the means; and those who contend that it may not select any appropriate means, that one particular mode of effecting the object is excepted, have taken upon themselves the burden of establishing that exception.

The creation of a corporation, it is said, appertains to sovereignty. This is admitted. But to what portion of sovereignt; does it appertain? Does it belong to one more than to another? In America, the powers of sovereignty are divided between the government of the union and those of the states. They are each sovereign, with respect to the objects committed to it, and neither sovereign with respect to the objects committed to the other. We cannot comprehend that train of reasoning which would maintain that the extent of power granted by the people is to be ascertained, not by the nature and terms of the grant, but by its date. Some state constitutions were formed before, some since that of the United States. We cannot believe that their relation to each other is in any degree dependent upon this circumstance. Their respective powers must, we think, be precisely the same as if they had been formed at the same time. Had they been formed at the same time, and had the people conferred on

But the constitution of the United States has not left the right of congress to employ the necessary means for the execution of the powers conferred on the government, to general reasoning, To its enumeration of powers is added that of making “all laws which shall be necessasy and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution, in the government of the U. States, or in any department thereof."

The counsel of the state of Maryland have urged various arguments, to prove that this clause, though in terms a grant of power, is not so in effect; but is, really, restrictive of the general right, which might otherwise be implied, of selecting means for executing the enumerated powers.

They have found it necessary to contend that this clause was inserted for the purpose of confering on congress the power of making laws. That, without it, doubts might be entertained, whether congress could exercise its powers in the form of le gislation.

But could this be the object for which it was inserted? A government is created by the people, having legislative, executive, and judicial powers. Its legislative powers are vested in a congress, which is to consist of a senate and house of representatives. Each house may determine the rules of its proceedings; and it is declared that every bill which shall have passed both houses, shall before it become a law, be presented to the president of the U. States. The 7th section describes the course of proceedings, by which a bit shall become a law; and, then, the 8th section enumerates the powers of congress. Could it be necessary to say, that a legislature should exercise legislative powers, in the shape of legislation? After allowing each house to prescribe its own course of proceeding, after describing the manner in which a bill should become a law, would it

have entered into the mind of a single member of the convention, that an express power to make laws was necessary, to enable the legislature to make them? That a legislature, endowed with legislative powers, can legislate, is a proposition too self-evident to have been questioned.

such narrow limits as not to leave it in the power of congress to adopt any which might be appropriate, and which were conducive to the end. This provision is made in a constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs. To have pre

But the argument on which most reliance is pla-scribed the means by which government should, in ced, is drawn from the peculiar language of this all future time, execute its powers, would have been clause. Congress is not empowered by it to make to change, entirely, the character of the instrument, all laws which may have relation to the powers con- and give it the properties of a legal code. It would ferred on the government, but such only as may be have been an unwise attempt to provide, by immu"necessary and proper" for carrying them into exe-table rules, for exigencies when, if foreseen at all, cution. The word "necessary" is considered as con- must have been seen dimly, and which can be best trolling the whole sentence, and as limiting the right provided for as they occur. To have declared that to pass laws for the execution of the granted pow- the best means shall not be used, but those alone ers, to such as are indispensable, and without which without which the power given would be nugatory, the power would be nugatory. That it excludes would have been to deprive the legislature of the the choice of means, and leaves to congress, in capacity to avail itself of experience, to exercise its each case, that only which is most direct and simple. reason, and to accommodate its legislation to cirIs it true, that this is the sense in which the word cumstances. If we apply this principle of construc"necessary" is always used? Does it always import tion to any of the powers of the government, we an absolute physical necessity, so strong, that one shall find it so pernicious in its operation, that we thing, to which another may be termed necessary, shall be compelled to discard it. The powers vestcannot exist without that other? We think it does ed in congress may certainly be carried into execu not. If reference be had to its use, in the common tion, without prescribing an oath of office. The affairs of the world, or in approved authors, we find power to exact this security for the faithful performthat it frequently imports no more than that one ance of duty, is not given, nor is it indispensably thing is convenient, or useful, or essential to another. necessary. The different departments may be esTo employ the means necessary to an end, is gene-tablished, taxes may be imposed and collected, arrally understood as employing any means calculated mies and navies may be raised and maintained, and to produce the end, and not as being confined to money may be borrowed, without requiring an oath those single means, without which the end would of office. It might be argued, with as much plausi. be entirely unattainable. Such is the character of bility as other incidental powers have been assailed, human language, that no word conveys to the mind, that the convention was not unmindful of this subin all situations, one single definite idea; and nothing ject. The oath which might be exacted-that of is more common than to use words in a figurative fidelity to the constitution, is prescribed, and no sense. Almost all compositions contain words, which, other can be required. Yet, he would be charged taken in their rigorous sense, would convey a mean- with insanity who should contend, that the legisla ing different from that which is obviously intended. ture might not superadd, to the oath directed by the It is essential to a just construction, that many words constitution, such other oath of office as its wisdom which import something excessive, should be under- might suggest. stood in a more mitigated sense-in that sense So, with respect to the whole penal code of the U. which common usage justifies. The word "neces- States; whence arises the power to punish in cases sary" is of this description. It has not a fixed cha-not prescribed by the constitution? All admit that racter peculiar to itself. It admits of all degrees of comparison, and is often connected with other words which increase or diminish the impression the mind receives of the urgency it imports. A thing may be necessary, very necessary, absolutely or indispensably necessary. To no mind would the same idea be conveyed by these several phrases. This com- Congress is empowered "to provide for the pument on the word is well illustrated by the passage nishment of counterfeiting the securities and current cited at the bar, from the 10th sec. of the 1st art. of coin of the United States," and "to define and punish the constitution. It is, we think, impossible to com- piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, pare the sentence, which prohibits a state from lay-and offences against the laws of nations." The seve ing "imposts, or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws," with that which authorizes congress to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution" the powers of the general government, without feeling a conviction that the convention understood itself to change materially the meaning of the word "necessary" by prefixing the word "absolutely." This word, then, like others, is used in various senses, and, in its construction, the subject, the context, the intention of the person using them, are all to be taken into view. Let this be done in the case under consideration. The subject is the execution of those great powers, on which the welfare of a nation essentially depends. It must have been the intention of those who gave these powers, to ensure, as far as human prudence could ensure, their beneficial execution. This could not be done by confiding the choice of means to

the government may, legitimately, punish ány violation of its laws; and yet, this is not among the enumerated powers of congress. The right to enforce the observance of law, by punishing its infraction, might be denied with the more plausibility, because it is expressly given in some cases.

ral powers of congress may exist, in a very imperfect state to be sure, but they may exist, and be carried into execution, although no punishment should be inflicted in cases where the right to punish is not expressly given.

Take, for example, the power "to establish post offices and post roads." This power is executed by the single act of making the establishment. But, from this has been inferred the power and duty of carrying the mail, along the post road, from one post office to another. And, from this implied power, has again been inferred, the right to punish those who steal letters from the post office, or rob the mail. It may be said, with some plausibility, that the right to carry the mail, and to punish those who rob it, is not indispensably necessary to the establishment of a post office and post road. This right is indeed essential to the beneficial exercise of the power, but not indispensably necessary to its

existence. So, to the punishment of the crimes of stealing or falsyfying a record or process of a court of the United States, or of perjury in such court. To punish these offences is certainly conducive to the due administration of justice. But courts may exist, and may decide the causes brought before them, though such crimes escape punishment.

2. its terms purport to enlarge, not to diminish powers vested in the government. It purports to be an additional power, not a restriction on those already granted. No reason has been or can be assigned for thus concealing an intention to narrow the discretion of the national legislature under words which purport to enlarge it. The framers of The baneful infuence of this narrow construction the constitution wished its adoption, and well knew on all the operations of the government, and the that it would be endangered by its strength, not by absolute impracticability of maintaining it, without its weakness. Had they been capable of using larrendering the government incompetent to its great guage which would convey to the eye one idea, and, objects, might be illustrated by numerous examples after deep reflection, impress on the mind ancdrawn from the constitution and from our laws.ther, they would rather have disguised the grant of The good sense of the public has pronounced, with-power, than its limitation. If then their intention out hesitation, that the power of punishment apper- nad been, by this clause, to restrain the free use of tains to sovereignty, and may be exercised when- means which might otherwise have been implied, ever the sovereign has a right to act, as incidental that intention would have been expressed in terms to his constitutional powers. It is a means for carry-resembling these. "In carrying into execution the ing into execution all sovereign powers, and may foregoing powers and all others," &c. "no laws shall be used, although not indispensably necessary. It be passed but such as are necessary and proper." is a right incidental to the powers, and conducive to Had the intention been to make tins clause restricits beneficial exercise. tive, it would unquestionably have been so in form

If this limited construction of the word "neces-as well as in effect. sary" must be abandoned in order to punish, whence The result of the most careful and attentive consiis derived the rule which would reinstate it, when deration bestowed upon this clause is that, if it does the government would carry its powers into execu- not enlarge, it cannot be construed to restrain the tion by means not vindictive in their nature? If the powers of congress, or to impair the right of the leword "necessary" means "needful," "requisite," gislature to exercise its best judgment in the selec"essential," "conducive to," in order to let in the tion of measures to carry into execution the constipower of punishment for the infraction of law, why tutional powers of the government. If no other is it not equally comprehensive when required to motive for its insertion can be suggested, a sufficient authorize the use of means which facilitate the exe- one is found in the desire to remove all doubts recution of the powers of government without the inspecting the right to legislate on that vast mass of fliction of punishment? incidental power which must be involved in the In ascertaining the sense in which the word "ne-constitution, if that instrument be not a splendid cessary" is used in this clause of the constitution, we bauble.

may derive some aid from that with which it is asso- We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of ciated. Congress shall have power "to make all the government are limited, and that its limits are laws which shall be necessary and proper to carry not to be transcended. But we think the sound coninto execution" the powers of the government. If struction of the constitution must allow to the nati the word "necessary" was used in that strict and ri- onal legislature that discretion, with respect to the gorous sense for which the counsel for the state of means by which the powers it confers are to be carMaryland contend, it would be an extraordinary de-ried into execution, which will enable that body to parture from the usual course of the human mind, as perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manexhibited in composition, to add a word, the only possible effect of which is to qualify that strict and rigorous meaning; to present to the mind the idea of some choice of means of legislation not straightened and compressed within the narrow limits for which gentlemen contend.

ner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.

But the argument which most conclusively de- That a corporation must be considered as a means monstrates the error of the construction contended not less usual, not of higher dignity, not more refor by the counsel of Maryland, is founded on the quiring a particular specification than other means, intention of the convention, as manifested in the has been sufficiently proved. If we look to the oriwhole clause. To waste time and argument in prov-gin of corporations, to the manner in which they ing that, without it, congress might carry its powers have been framed in that government from which into execution, would be not much less idle than to we have derived most of our legal principles and hold a lighted taper to the sun, As little can it be ideas, or to the uses to which they have been applirequired to prove that, in the absence of this clause, ed, we find no reason to suppose that a constitution, congress would have some choice of means. That omitting, and wisely omiting, to enumerate all the it might employ those which,in its judgment, would means for carrying into execution the great pow most advantageously effect the object to be accom-ers vested in government, ought to have specified plished. That any means adapted to the end, any this. Had it been intended to grant this power as means which tended directly to the execution of the one which should be distinct and independent, to constitutional powers of the government, were in be exercised in any case whatever, it would have themselves constitutional. This clause, as construed found a place among the enumerated powers of the by the state of Maryland, would abridge and almost government. But being considered merely as a annihilate this useful and necessary right of the le-means, to be employed only for the purpose of carislature to select its means. That this could not rying into execution the given powers, there could be intended, is, we should think, had it not been al-be no motive for particularly mentioning it. ready controverted, too apparent for controversy. We think so for the following reasons.

1. The clause is placed among the powers of congress, not among the limitations in those powers.

The propriety of this remark would seem to be generally acknowledged by the universal acquiescence in the construction which has been uniformly put on the 3rd sec. of the 4th article of the consti

The branches proceeding from the same stock, and being conducive to the complete accomplish ment of the object, are equally constitutional. It would have been unwise to locate them in the char

tution. The power to "make all needful rules and unanimous and decided opinion of this court that regulations respecting the territory or other proper- the act to incorporate the bank of the United States, ty belonging to the United States" is not more com- is a law made in pursuance of the constitution, and prehensive, than the power "to make all laws which is a part of the supreme law of the land. shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution", the powers of the government. Yet all admit the constitutionality of a territorial government, which is a corporate body. Ifa corporation may be employed indiscriminate-ter, and it would be unnecessarily inconvenient to ly with other means to carry into execution the employ the legislative power in making those subpowers of the government, no particular reason can ordinate arrangements. The great duties of the be assigned for excluding the use of a bank if re-bank are prescribed; those duties require branches; quired for its fiscal operations. To use one, must and the bank itself may, we think, be safely trusted be within the discretion of congress, if it be an ap-with the selection of places where those branches propriate mode of executing the powers of govern-shall be fixed; reserving always to the government ment. That it is a convenient, a useful, and essen- the right to require that a branch shall be located tial instrument in the prosecution of its fiscal opera-where it may be deemed necessary. It being the tions, is not now a suject of controversy. All those opinion of the court that the act of incorporating who have been concerned in the administration of the bank is constitutional; and that the power of esour finances, have concurred in representing its im-tablishing a branch in the state of Maryland might portance and necessity; and so strongly have they ba properly exercised by the bank itself, we probeen felt, that statesmen of the first class, whose ceed to enquireprevious opinions against it had been confirmed by every circumstance which can fix the human judgment, have yielded those opinions to the exigencies That the power of taxation is one of vital import of the nation. Under the confederation, congress, justifying the measure by its necessity, transcended ance; that it is retained by the states; that it is not perhaps its powers to obtain the advantage of a abridged by the grant of a similar power to the gobank; and our own legislation attests the universal vernment of the union; that it is to be concurrently The time exercised by the two governments; are truths which conviction of the utility of this measure. has passed away when it can be necessary to enter have never been denied. But, such is the parainto any discussion in order to prove the importance mount character of the constitution, that its capaciof this instrument as a means to effect the legiti-ty to withdraw any subject from the action of even mate objects of the government.

2. Whether the state of Maryland may, without violating the constitution, tax that branch?

this power, is admitted. The states are expressly But were its necessity less apparent, none can forbidden to lay any duties on imports or exports, deny its being an appropriate measure; and if it is, except what may be absolutely necessary for executhe degree of its necessity, as has been very justly ting their inspection laws. If the obligation of this observed, is to be discussed in another place. Should prohibition must be conceded-if it may restrain a congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt mea-state from the exercise of its taxing power on im sures which are prohibited by the constitution; or ports and exports, the same paramount character should congress under the pretext of executing its would seem to restrain, as it certainly may restrain, powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects a state from such other exercise of this power as is not entrusted to the government; it would become in its nature incompatible with, and repugnant to the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case re-the constitutional laws of the union. A law absoquiring such a decision come before it, to say such lutely repugnant to another as entirely repeals that an act was not the law of the land. But where the other, as if express terms of repeal were used: Jaw is not prohibited, and is really calculated to ef- On this ground the counsel for the bank place its fect any of the objects entrusted to the government, claim to be exempted from the power of a state to to undertake here to enquire into the degree of its tax its operations. There is no express provision necessity, would be to pass the line which circum- for the case, but the claim has been sustained on a scribes the judicial department, and to tread on le-principle which so entirely pervades the constitugislative ground. This court disclaims all pretensions to such a power.

tion, is so intermixed with the materials which compose it, so interwoven with its web, so blended with its texture, as to be incapable of being separated from it, without rending it into shreds.

After this declaration it can scarcely be necessary to say that the existence of state banks can have no possible influence on the question. No trace is This great principle is, that the constitution and to be found in the constitution of an intention to the laws made in pursuance thereof, are supreme; create a dependence of the government of the uni- that they control the constitution and laws of the reon on those of the states, for the execution of the spective states, and cannot be controlled by them. great powers assigned to it. Its means are adequate From this, which may be almost termed an axiom, to its ends; and on those means alone was it expect- other propositions are deduced as corrollaries, on ed to rely for the accomplishment of its ends. To the truth or error of which, and on their application impose on it the necessity of resorting to means to this case, the cause has been supposed to depend. which it cannot controul, which another govern- These are-1st. that a power to create implies a ment may furnish or withhold, would render its power to preserve. 2nd. that a power to destroy, course precarious, the result of its measures uncer-if wielded by a different hand, is hostile to, and intain, and create a dependence on other govern-compatible with these powers to create and to prements which might disappoint its most important serve. 3d. that where the repugnancy exists, that designs, and is incompatible with the language of authority which is supreme must control, not yield that constitution, But were it otherwise, the choice that over which it's supreme. of means implies a right to choose a national bank in preference to state banks, and congress alone can make the election.

After the most deliberate consideration it is the

These propositions, as abstract truths, would, perhaps, never be controverted. Their application to this case, however, has been denied; and, both in maintaining the affirmative and the negative

splendor of eloquence, and strength of argument, seldom, if ever, surpassed, have been displayed.

This is true. But to what source do we trace this right? It is obvious that it is an incident of soveThe power of congress to create, and of course reignty, and is co-extensive with that to which it to continue, the bank, was the subject of the pre-is an incident. All subjects over which the soveceding part of this opinion, and is no longer to be considered as questionable.

reign power of a state extends are objects of taxation; but those over which it does not extend, are, That the power of taxing it by the states may be upon the soundest principles, exempt from taxaexercised so as to destroy it, is too obvious to be tion. This proposition may almost be pronounced denied. But taxation is said to be an absolute pow-self-evident. er, which acknowledges no other 1 mits than those The sovereignty of a state extends to every thing expressly prescribed in the constitution, and like which exists by its own authority, or is introduced Sovereign power of every other description, is trust-by its permission, but does not extend to those ed to the discretion of those who use it. But the means which are employed by congress to carry invery terms of this argument admit that the sove-to execution powers conferred on that body by the reignty of the state, in the article of taxation itself, people of the United States? We think it demonis subordinate to, and may be controlled by, the con- strable that it does not. These powers are not givstitution of the United States. How far it has been en by the people of a single state. They are given controlled by that instrument must be a question of by the people of the United States, to a government construction. In making this construction, no prin- whose laws made in pursuance of the constitution, ciple not declared, can be admissable, which would are declared to be supreme-consequently, the defeat the legitimate operations of a supreme go- people of a single state cannot confer a sovereignty vernment. It is of the very essence of supremacy which will extend over them. to remove all obstacles to its action within its own If we measure the power of taxation residing in sphere, and to modify every power vested in subor- a state, by the extent of sovereignty which the peodinate governments, as to exempt its own opera-ple of a single state possess, and can confer on its tions from their own influence. This effect need government, we have an intelligible standard apnot be stated in terms. It is so involved in the de- plicable to every case to which the power may be claration of supremacy, so necessarily implied in it, applied. We have a principle which leaves the that the expression of it could not make it more cer-power of taxing the people and property of a state tain. We must, therefore, keep it in view while con-unimpaired: which leaves to a state the command struing the constitution. of all its resources; and which places beyond its The argument on the part of the state of Mary-reach, all those powers which are conferred by the land is not that the states may directly resist a law of congress, but that they may exercise their acknowledged powers upon it, and that the constitution leaves them this right in the confidence that they will not abuse it.

people of the United States on the government of the Union, and all those means which are given for the purpose of carrying those powers into execution. We have a principle which is safe for the states, and safe for the Union. We are relieved, as we ought Before we proceed to examine this argument to be, from clashing sovereignty, from interfering and to subject it to the test of the constitution, we powers: from a repugnancy between a right in one must be permitted to bestow a few considerations on government to pull down, what there is an acknowthe nature and extent of this original right of taxa-ledged right in another to build up; from the incomtion, which is acknowledged to remain with the patibility of a right in one government to destroy states. It is admitted that the power of taxing the what there is a right in another to preserve. We people and their property is essential to the very are not driven to the perplexing enquiry, so unfit existence of government, and may be legitimately for the judicial department, what degree of taxation exercised on the objects to which it is applicable, is the legitimate use, and what degree may amount to the utmost extent to which the government may to the abuse, of the power, The attempt to use it chuse to carry it. The only security against the on the means employed by the governments of the abuse of this power, is found in the structure of the union, in pursuance of the constitution, is itself an government itself. In imposing a tax the legisla-abuse, because it is the usurpation of a power which ture acts upon itself and upon its constituents. This the people of a single state cannot give. is in general a sufficient security against erroneous We find then, on just theory, a total failure of this and oppressive taxation. original right to tax the means employed by the goThe people of a state, therefore, give to their government of the Union for the execution of its powvernment a right of taxing themselves and their ers. The right never existed, and the question whether it has been surrendered, cannot arise, property, and as the exigencies of government cannot be limited, they prescribe no limits to the exerBut, waving this theory for the present, let us recise of this right, resting confidently on the interest sume the enquiry whether this power can be exerof the legislator, and on the influence of the consti-cised by the respective states, consistently with a tuents over their representative, to guard them fair construction of the constitution? against its abuse. But the means employed by the That the power to tax involves the power to degovernment of the union have no such security, nor stroy; that the power to destroy may defeat and renis the right of a state to tax them sustained by the der useless the power to create; that there is a plain same theory. Those means are not given by the repugnance in conferring on one government a powpeople of a particular state, not given by the con-er to controul the constitutional measures of anostituents of the legislature which claim the right to tax them, but by the people of all the states. They are given by all, for the benefit of all-and upon theory, should be subjected to that government only which belongs to all.

It may be objected to this definition that the power of taxation is not confined to the people and property of a state. It may be exercised upon every object brought within its jurisdiction.

ther, which other, with respect to those very measures, is declared to be supreme over that which exerts the controul, are propositions not to be denied. But all inconsistencies are to be reconciled by the magic word confidence. Taxation, it is said, does not necessarily and unavoidably destroy. To carry it to the excess of destruction, would be an abuse, to presume which would banish that confidenee which is essential to all governments. But is