Long v. School District of Cheltenham Township

It does not, however, either expressly or by necessary implication, enlarge the borrowing capacity of a school district.

Its own phraseology also supports this construction. It reads, in part, "Any of the said municipalities or counties may incur" &c. and to ascertain its particular meaning the first resort is to the natural signification of the words used, in the order and grammatical arrangement in which the framers have placed. them. In such a connection words are presumed to have been used with the greatest possible discrimination. We are not at liberty to presume that the people did not understand the force of language-12 Corpus Juris 703, section 47 and notes. "Said" is not only a word of reference, but the element of identification enters into its meaning, which is, generally, "aforesaid", or "before-mentioned". Had this sentence read "Any municipality or county may incur" &c. there might be little difficulty in giving to it the meaning for which the defendant contends, but expressed as it is and giving to the word "said" its natural, proper and true signification, the municipalities or counties referred to are those, and those only, which are the subject matter of the other two provisions of the section,-those incurring indebtedness to provide the public works mentioned therein. See Sampson vs. Com., 5 W. & S. 385.

Nor, as we understand it, is this conclusion at variance with the exception in section 8 of Article IX as it first appears in its last amendment of November, 1918, which, consistently therewith, declares as still the fundamental and organic law of the state that the debt of any school district shall never exceed seven (7) per centum upon the assessed value of the taxable property therein. Of little value though it may be, it would seem also to be supported by the enabling act of June 5, 1915, P. L. 846, which relates only to the indebtedness of "municipalities" and provides for carrying into operation section 15 of Article IX only so far as it relates to municipalities. School districts are not mentioned and its exclusion of the word counties would seem to indicate that the word municipality is used therein with its correct meaning as including only cities and boroughs. And if it is so used, then there has been no legislation adopted since section 15 became a part of the constitution, to enable even counties to take advantage of its provisions.

And, in conclusion, it is not apparent, if the intended effect.

Long v. School District of Cheltenham Township

of the last portion of section 15 is to enlarge the borrowing capacity of all cities, boroughs, counties, townships and school districts to ten per centum of the taxable property therein with the assent of three-fifths of the electors thereof, why section 8 should have retained, in its subsequent amendments of 1915 and 1918, substantially its original phraseology We, therefore, conclude that the last sentence of the amendment known as section 15 of Article IX of the constitution does not apply to school districts.

It necessarily follows that the maximum borrowing capacity of the defendant does not exceed seven per centum upon the assessed value of the taxable property therein, as the proposed increase of its indebtedness will, in the aggregate exceed that limit, it is invalid.

From the facts, as found, we, therefore, draw the following

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The amendment ratified by the people on November 4, 1913, and known as section 15 of Article IX of the Constitution of Pennsylvania is valid in that the time of its submission did not violate Article XVIII thereof.

2. The said amendment and the enabling Act of June 5, 1915, P. L. 847, do not, however, apply to a school district nor confer power upon it to incur indebtedness exceeding, in the aggregate, seven per centum upon the assessed value of the taxable property therein.

3. The proposed increase by $1,150,000 of the indebtedness of the defendant, mentioned in the bill, and the issuing of bonds to secure the same, are unauthorized by law and violative of section 8 of Article IX of the Constiution of the Commonwealth, last amended on November 5, 1918.

4. The defendant, the School District of Cheltenham Township, be, and it is hereby, restrained and enjoined from incurring said increase of $1,150,000 in its present indebtedness and from issuing and selling, or otherwise disposing of, bonds to secure the same.

5. The defendant shall pay the costs of this proceeding.

And now, 19 July, 1920, after final hearing and mature consideration it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the prothonotary be directed to mark these findings of fact and of law

Long v. School District of Cheltenham Township

filed, thereby to become a part of the record in the case, and to enter a decree nisi in accordance therewith.

The prothonotary is further directed to give notice thereof to counsel in the case, as required by the rules of equity practice, and that, unless exceptions thereto are filed within ten days of this date, a final decree will be entered by him in accordance with the foregoing conclusions.

Orphans' Court of Montgomery County

Estate of Henry Tetlow, Deceased.

Decedent died leaving a paper purporting to be his last Will and Testament, said paper was admitted to probate by the Register of Wills and subsequently a petition presented for a citation to be directed to the widow, who is the sole beneficiary, to show cause why the appeal should not be sustained and the admitting of the alleged will be set aside and an issue be awarded to determine, (a), whether decedent at the time of executing said Will was of sound disposing mind, memory and understanding, (b), whether the said Will was not procured by unlawful and undue influence by his widow, a citation was awarded to the widow who filed her answer to said petition, averring that decedent was of sound and disposing mind, memory and understanding, and that said Will was not procured by unlawful or undue influence on the part of herself.

Said Will was executed November 8, 1917, in the office of his counsel, and the same was drawn at the direction of decedent at least three days prior to the actual execution, the. wife was not present when Testator signed his said Will.

In order to set the Will aside on the ground of undue influence the Court has consistently held that undue influence means doing something wrong according to the standard of morals which the law enforces in relation to men, therefore something violating of a legal duty such influence would mean "There must be an imprisonment of the body or mind," which virtually means that he is no longer a free agent.

The testimony as produced at the hearing clearly shows that the widow who was decedent's second wife and who prior to their marriage had entered into an ante nuptial agreement, lived happily together and that she exercised no control over him in the making of his Will.

In support of the allegation that decedent lacked sufficient mental capacity to execute the paper, in question. Contestants claim that he was affected with Senile Dementia, numerous witnesses were called in support of this contention and various acts of decedent in his life time were brought forward to sustain the claim that he was incapable of making a Will. In answer to this allegation, a large number of witnesses were called among whom were a number of medical experts who stated that Testator prior to and subsequent to the execution of the said Will had a clear mind and knew what he was doing, and that in business he was very keen. It has been held that the draftsman of the Will especially if a lawyer or conveyancer is always the most important witness of the case as well as the attending physician both of whom in this case stated that Testator was thoroughly capable of making a Will, and in order to award an issue and to grant a jury trial the Court must feel that a decision in favor of contestants would be sustainable under the facts of the case, the facts established in this case clearly show that decedent was of disposing mind and clearly capable of making the necessary disposition of his property, therefore the appeal from the granting of the letters must be dismissed.

Appeal from granting of letters Testamentary.

No. 45, June Term 1919.

B. Gordon Bromley and Larzelere, Wright & Larzelere, Attorneys for Executrix.

G. P. Middleton and Evans, High, Dettra & Swartz, Attorneys for Appellant.

Opinion by Solly, P. J., August 2, 1920.

Estate of Henry Tetlow, Deceased.

Henry Tetlow, a resident of Jeffersonville, West Norriton Township, this county, died on the 6th day of January 1919, leaving surviving his wife Eliza Jarman Tetlow, and issue, two adult grandchildren, Grace Tetlow Sauveur, and Henry Tetlow, 2nd. These grandchildren are the children of Joseph Tetlow, the only child of the decedent.

On the 15th day of January 1919, the Register of Wills admitted to probate a paper writing purporting to be the last will and testament of the decedent, dated the 8th day of November 1917, and letters testamentary thereon were granted to the said Eliza Jarman Tetlow, who was appointed sole executrix. A caveat against the admission of any paper writing purporting to be the last will and testament of the decedent had previously been filed by Grace Tetlow Sauveur, but was subsequently withdrawn. In said paper writing the decedent, after directing the payment of his debts and funeral expenses, gave, devised, and bequeathed the rest, residue, and remainder of his estate, real. personal, and mixed, of whatsoever nature and kind the same might be, and wheresoever situate, to his wife, her heirs and assigns forever.

On the 24th day of June 1919, the grandchildren appealed from the decree admitting said paper writing to probate. On the same day they filed bond with security, which was approved and accepted by the Register of Wills.

On the 2nd day of September 1919, the appellants presented their petition to this court praying that a citation be awarded directed to Eliza Jarman Tetlow to show cause why the appeal should not be sustained, and the judicial act or decision of the. Register of Wills in admitting said alleged will of the decedent to probate set aside, and why an issue should not be awarded to try the following questions:

(a) Whether or not the said Henry Tetlow, at the time of the execution of the said alleged will was of sound disposing miud, memory and understanding.

(b) Whether or not the said alleged will was procured by unlawful or undue influence on the part of the said Eliza Jarman Tetlow.

(c) Whether or not the said writing is the last will and