simply a vagary or blunder of the lapidary can have but an accidental interest to the philologist. A vase that helps us to interpret a myth, or throws light on some ceremony, or explains a custom, will be highly prized; but one that shows us only the quality of the clay used in its construction, or the style of pottery of a particular period, interesting though this may be for some to know, need not occupy our attention. If then the researches of the German student in the history of the ancient mode and meaning of osculating can be shown to have any bearing upon the interpretation of any literary or historical monument, they are perfectly legitimate as a philological study; otherwise, they shall be relegated to the historian, who is content with the fact for its own sake. The mere annalist is not affected by Seneca's depreciatory observations on a certain kind of learning which he called "that disease of the Greeks," which consisted in enquiring how many rowers Odysseus had, and whether the Iliad or the Odyssey was first written; but the philologist who is satisfied and stops with answering these questions must justify himself, if he can, to the old Roman. The mere linguist, who is content when he has gained the knowledge of certain facts of language for their own sake, indispensable as the service is that he renders, is not entitled to the name of philologist in its historic sense, nor must he wonder if sometimes his true worth is overlooked, and if to him the sneering epigram of Herodicus is applied: γωνιοβόμβυκες, μονοσύλλαβοι, οἶσι μέμηλεν

τὸ σφὶν καὶ τὸ σφῶν καὶ τὸ μὲν ἠδὲ τὸ νίν.*

To the philologist every fact, whether of language or of art, of custom or of belief, stands not simply and barely for itself, but is clothed, so to say, with the flesh and infused with the blood of that organic life of which it is at once an expression and a producing cause. A word of caution may possibly not be amiss against the present danger of over interpretation of statistics. Figures in philology, if they do not lie, are not always sure to yield valuable results, and need to be interpreted historically. For instance, the fact that Sophocles uses the final particle a only half as often, bulk for bulk, as Euripides,

*"Bumble-bees in a corner, monosyllables, whose sole care is for op and σφῶν, and for μίν and viv.”

and on more than twice as often, cannot prove anything unless we know first the history of oлws and va in other writers contemporary with and before and after these. But again, it is only when pursued in this historical spirit that the study of philology can hope to gain its true place in the interest of men of to-day. Here we recall the significant words of W. von Humboldt: "The study of the various languages of the world misses its aim, if it does not always keep in view the course of intellectual culture and find therein its true object."* I cannot undertake to say how far in other countries this aim of philological study may have been ignored; but in our own land it seems to me that a more just and broad view of philology needs to be cultivated, and the historical side of it needs to be made more prominent. I for one cannot doubt that the preponderance given among us to the formal and linguistic side of philology has led to its estrangement from the historical spirit of our age, and from the interest and sympathy of certain circles of intelligent men. No one can dispute that our American scholarship in philology has been one-sided. In looking over the Proceedings of this Association during all its history, one is struck with the slight consideration that has been given to archæological and historical study and criticism. The Revue Critique, in commenting on the Transactions of the American Philological Association for 1882, says: "It is noticeable how small a part relatively is devoted to the studies that are strictly philological, i. e. studies of criticism and interpretation. Grammar receives a little more attention, but that which prevails is linguistics." I am not aware that this volume is peculiar in these characteristics. Doubtless there has been reason for this predominance. We have no original documents in our libraries to collate and to edit; we have no monuments of art to interpret, no inscriptions to decipher, no ruins to explore (except such as belong to the semi-civilized antiquity of the prehistoric races of this continent); and so we have

* "Das Studium der verschiedenen Sprachen des Erdbodens verfehlt seiner Bestimmung, wenn es nicht immer den Gang der geistigen Bildung im Auge behält, und darin seinen eigentlichen Zweck sucht.” Ueber die Kawi-Sprache, Werke, vol. vi, p. 428.

had to be content with taking our knowledge at second hand from English, German, and French explorers and critics. But all this is changing. Thanks to the zeal of our American Archæological Institute and the promise of our American School of Classical Studies at Athens, we are coming into the possession of original material; and we may hope to have American scholarship honored in the same field in which Foucart, Newton, Köhler, Smith, and other archæologists of Europe have gained their laurels. It is a matter of congratulation that we are not compelled to accept the views of an honored member of this Association which were expressed at our last meeting, to the effect that American scholars need not expect to have opportunity for original work in diplomatic and higher criticism, but must relegate this department of philological work to their more fortunate compeers in Europe. The project of the London Society for the promotion of Hellenic learning to publish facsimiles of the chief Codices of the Greek classics promises better things for us.

But after all, it is not so much the increase of original material for study that is to reinstate and fortify the study of philology among us in an honored place; it is rather the recognition of the fact that in studying classical philology our young men are studying that period in the history of human culture that is most inspiring and creative for the culture of our own day; that in studying what the old Greek and Roman said and did, they are unconsciously learning much that is truest and noblest for the modern American and European to say and to do. Jean Paul says: "Life would sink into an abyss, were our youth not to pass through the silent temple of the great ones of ancient days to the mart of daily life."

"Das Alte stürzt, es ändert sich die Zeit,

Und neues Leben blüht aus den Ruinen,"

says Schiller. In so far as the science of philology undertakes to make new life bloom for the modern from the ruins of the ancient world, its pursuit must be infused with the historical spirit which makes the present the child of the past and the parent of the future.

ARTICLE VI.—TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES.

IV. THE FUTURE OF TAXATION.

THE exceptional influences which have determined the fiscal legislation of the United States for the last twenty years have ended in the perversion of its constitutional power to purposes not foreseen by the constitution inasmuch as they are purposes not defined by the law. The State has charged all its expenses, or nearly all, to certain classes of its subjects selected from the others for acts which it has nowhere declared to be reasons for imposing exceptional burdens, which on the contrary it authorizes in the very act of imposing the burdens. The consumers of certain articles of domestic and foreign production furnish far the larger part of the national revenue, yet so far are they from having been found guilty of the real punishment they suffer that the continuance of the acts which bring the punishment is looked for as the continuing source of State revenue. We may, I think, be sure that this passing equivoque will be cleared up in the natural evolution of the commonwealth, notwithstanding the powerful array of interests which have created and maintain it: that the political instincts and intelligence of the people, the resentment of the classes which suffer, with the moral sentiment of the classes which profit by their suffering, will recall the perverted power of the State to the necessary distinctions, will effectually separate between the sovereign right of raising revenue, and the sovereign function of suppressing wrong, for which the revenue is raised. When this inevitable evolution has accomplished its term we shall have a State which no longer seeks to effect its ends in the act of providing the necessary means for them, but gets the means first and the ends afterward; which calls upon all its subjects impartially for their rightful portions of tribute, and then expends the tribute openly, without equivocation, indirection or disguise, for purposes of public and common import plainly defined in the law. These two most distinct things, now confused in the action of the State, having been perfectly differentiated from one

another, will the sale and use of Swiss watches or alcoholic beverages, be regarded as a public wrong, calling for interven tion of the State? If yes, then they will be declared to be so by laws expressing the will of the people to that effect, laws which convert the articles in question from sources of revenue into occasions of expenditure, and transfer the seller or user of them from the class of subjects held for taxation to the class held for punishment. That this rectification will take place speedily in the matter of pernicious articles, like intoxicating spirits, is unlikely, for in the face of all the obstacles to effective prohibition the moral sense of the community will insist upon such restraints as are to be had by increasing the cost of the article to the consumer. It is undeniably the purpose of the people that if drunkenness and ministering to drunkenness cannot be defined and punished as a crime according to the law, it shall be checked by heavy taxation; if its suppression cannot be made an end of expenditure its continuance shall furnish a source of revenue. And we need not look for any clearing up of the confusion in the action of the State until we have got it first in the purpose of the people. But for the sale and use of commodities which have nothing against them but their foreign origin the case is different. The feeling which actually exists as to the disloyalty or lack of patriotism in using these articles, is too ill defined, and when defined too preposterous to admit of serious discussion. We may be sure therefore, that in time the good sense and real interest of the people will get the better of a prejudice unworthy of them, and of the selfish interest of the class which profits by it.

But although the issue is certain, it is not yet at all easy to predict by what circuits and gradations the aberrant power of the State will be recalled to the strict exercise of its specific functions. I write at the opening of the debate upon Mr. Morrison's new tariff, a most inconclusive measure, full of partisan precautions, whose significance is that it indicates with the sensitiveness of a barometer the complex and delicate equilib rium of political forces which always precedes a new departure in public policy. On the one hand there is concentrated upon the legislature the powerful pressure of the alarmed manufacturers, who have finally succeeded, it would seem, in