Decentralizing the State: Elections, Parties, and Local Power in the Andes
Cambridge University Press, 2005年6月6日
This book, first published in 2005, explores the location and dynamics of power within the state, focusing on a recent wave of decentralizing reforms that have swept across both developed and developing countries in recent years. Variation in the timing of reform across countries only vaguely relates to the genesis of an international consensus pushed by big lenders and development banks or the reemergence of democracy in decentralizing countries. The book develops a theory linking decentralization's adoption to the electoral concerns of political parties: decentralization represents a desirable strategy for parties whose support at subnational levels appears more secure than their prospects in national elections. It examines this argument against experiences in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela and speculates on how recent political changes may affect decentralization's shape and extent in coming years.
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administration Alan García Alberto Fujimori Alvaro Gómez Hurtado analysis APRA Bolivia Cambio 90 candidates Carlos Andrés Pérez central government chapter Chávez Colombia Concertación CONDEPA Conservatives Constitutional Assembly contests COPEI debt decen decentraliza decentralization occurred decentralization's decentralized power decentralized system decentralizing reforms democratic economic Ecuador elec electoral support executive federalism fiscal decentralization fiscal resources fiscal transfers FREDEMO Fujimori funds governors Hugo Chávez increase indigenous legislative legislature levels of government López majority municipal elections national elections National Front national level national support national-level support Nationalist Democratic Action party support party system party's percent period Peronists Peru political and fiscal political decentralization political parties popular election predict president's party presidential elections provincial regional governments stable statistical strength strong support subnational elections subnational governments subnational levels subnational support Table term tion traditional parties tralization Venezuela victory vote change weak won the presidency
第 7 頁 - I interpreted federalism as a bargain between prospective national leaders and officials of constituent governments for the purpose of aggregating territory, the better to lay taxes and raise armies.
第 43 頁 - If party leaders are organized at the subnational level and occupy positions in subnational governments, then national legislators often act as "delegates" representing subnational interests. Alternatively, if party leaders preside within a national party organization or occupy executive and legislative posts at the national level, then legislative interests over decentralization will coincide more with executive or "national interests.
第 151 頁 - The exclusionary, managed, top-down process of [decentralization] can be attributed to the fact that there was no coherent political movement for the radical transformation of state-society relations from below, apart from the weak indigenous organizations and the writings of politically impotent intellectuals.
第 232 頁 - Both were removed from office for reasons that were clearly political and that had nothing to do with administrative matters. Ornelas was removed because he had "allowed" too many PAN victories in his state; Velasco Ibarra was removed because he supported the wrong candidate to succeed him as governor and openly opposed the party.
第 230 頁 - These economic reforms, carried out during the presidencies of Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988), Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994), and Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000...
第 242 頁 - abstention reached about 16 percent in the 1978 Constituent Assembly elections, and 19 percent in the 1980 presidential race, but it rose to 30 percent in the local elections of the same year. Throughout the decade of the 1980s abstention in presidential races generally ran between 10 and 20 percent, but it averaged well over 20 percent on the municipal level
第 5 頁 - This is most likely when the party in power believes it cannot hold on to power that is centralized in the national government but believes it has a good chance of winning a substantial portion of decentralized power through subnational elections. Decentralization distributes power at one moment in time to the venues where a party's political allies are most likely to win it in future contests.
第 92 頁 - Constitution increased federalism: [M]any of the leading Conservatives had now come to the support of federalism as a form of political organization - whether moved by theoretical arguments, by the successful example of federalism in the United States, or by the tactical consideration that under a federal system they could always expect to enjoy a solid control of at least those regions where they were strongest.
第 102 頁 - Boyaca Caldas Caqueta Cauca Cesar Cordoba Cundinamarca Choco Huila La Guajira Magdalena Meta Narino Norte de Santander Quindio Risaralda Santander Sucre Tolima Valle...