Decentralizing the State: Elections, Parties, and Local Power in the Andes
Cambridge University Press, 2005年6月6日
This book, first published in 2005, explores the location and dynamics of power within the state, focusing on a recent wave of decentralizing reforms that have swept across both developed and developing countries in recent years. Variation in the timing of reform across countries only vaguely relates to the genesis of an international consensus pushed by big lenders and development banks or the reemergence of democracy in decentralizing countries. The book develops a theory linking decentralization's adoption to the electoral concerns of political parties: decentralization represents a desirable strategy for parties whose support at subnational levels appears more secure than their prospects in national elections. It examines this argument against experiences in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela and speculates on how recent political changes may affect decentralization's shape and extent in coming years.
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administration Alan García Alberto Fujimori Alvaro Gómez Hurtado analysis APRA Bolivia Cambio 90 candidates Carlos Andrés Pérez central government chapter Chávez Colombia Concertación CONDEPA Conservatives Constitutional Assembly contests COPEI debt decen decentraliza decentralization occurred decentralization's decentralized power decentralized system decentralizing reforms democratic economic Ecuador elec electoral support executive federalism fiscal decentralization fiscal resources fiscal transfers FREDEMO Fujimori funds governors Hugo Chávez increase indigenous legislative legislature levels of government López majority municipal elections national elections National Front national level national support national-level support Nationalist Democratic Action party support party system party's percent period Peronists Peru political and fiscal political decentralization political parties popular election predict president's party presidential elections provincial regional governments stable statistical strength strong support subnational elections subnational governments subnational levels subnational support Table term tion traditional parties tralization Venezuela victory vote change weak won the presidency
第 7 頁 - I interpreted federalism as a bargain between prospective national leaders and officials of constituent governments for the purpose of aggregating territory, the better to lay taxes and raise armies.
第 5 頁 - This is most likely when the party in power believes it cannot hold on to power that is centralized in the national government but believes it has a good chance of winning a substantial portion of decentralized power through subnational elections. Decentralization distributes power at one moment in time to the venues where a party's political allies are most likely to win it in future contests.