Decentralizing the State: Elections, Parties, and Local Power in the Andes
Cambridge University Press, 2005年6月6日
This book, first published in 2005, explores the location and dynamics of power within the state, focusing on a recent wave of decentralizing reforms that have swept across both developed and developing countries in recent years. Variation in the timing of reform across countries only vaguely relates to the genesis of an international consensus pushed by big lenders and development banks or the reemergence of democracy in decentralizing countries. The book develops a theory linking decentralization's adoption to the electoral concerns of political parties: decentralization represents a desirable strategy for parties whose support at subnational levels appears more secure than their prospects in national elections. It examines this argument against experiences in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela and speculates on how recent political changes may affect decentralization's shape and extent in coming years.
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addition administration adopted allowing analysis appears APRA assembly attempt Bolivia candidates central government chapter Colombia compared Conservatives constitution contests continued COPEI crisis debt decentralizing reforms decision democratic Despite discussion economic Ecuador effect elections electoral enjoyed evidence examined executive expect experience explain face fact federalism Finally fiscal forces funds future gained given governors greater hold important incentives increase issues L L L legislative less Liberals lists look majority mayors measure municipal national level national support Note occurred opposition particularly party party's percent percentage period Peru political popular positions predict presidency presidential pressure provides provincial regional relative remained represented responsibilities rule share significant stable statistical strength strong studies subnational subnational levels suggests Table term theory tion transfers Venezuela victory vote weak
第 7 頁 - I interpreted federalism as a bargain between prospective national leaders and officials of constituent governments for the purpose of aggregating territory, the better to lay taxes and raise armies.
第 5 頁 - This is most likely when the party in power believes it cannot hold on to power that is centralized in the national government but believes it has a good chance of winning a substantial portion of decentralized power through subnational elections. Decentralization distributes power at one moment in time to the venues where a party's political allies are most likely to win it in future contests.